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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
ESSAYS ON INTERGENERATIONAL DEPENDENCY
AND WELFARE REFORM
This dissertation consists of three essays related to the effects of welfare reform on
the intergenerational transmission of welfare participation as well as effects on labor sup-
ply and childcare arrangements. States implemented welfare reform at different times
from 1992 to 1996, and these policies notably introduced work requirements and other
restrictions intended to limit dependency of needy families. One mechanism reforms were
intended to address was childhood exposure to a “culture” of ongoing welfare receipt. In
Essay 1, I estimate the effect of reform on the transmission of welfare participation for
2961 mother-daughter pairs in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) over the
period 1968-2013. I find that a mother’s welfare participation increased her daughter’s
odds of participation as an adult by roughly 30 percentage points, but that welfare re-
form attenuated this transmission by at least 50 percent, or at least 30 percent over the
baseline odds of participation. While I find comparable-sized transmission patterns in
daughters’ adult use of the broader safety net and other outcomes such as educational
attainment and income, there is no diminution of transmission after welfare reform. In
Essay 2, I estimate behavioral labor supply responses to reforms using experimental data
from Connecticut’s Jobs First welfare waiver program in 1996. Recent studies have used
a distributional analysis of Jobs First suggesting evidence that some individuals reduce
hours in order to opt into welfare, an example of behavioral-induced participation. How-
ever, estimates obtained by a semi-parametric panel quantile estimator allowing women
to vary arbitrarily in preferences and welfare participation costs indicate no evidence of
behavioral-induced participation. These findings show that a welfare program imposes
an estimated cost up to 10 percent of quarterly earnings, and these costs can be hetero-
geneous throughout the conditional earnings distribution. Lastly, in Essay 3, I return to
PSID data to examine the relationship between welfare spending on childcare assistance
and the care arrangements chosen by low-income families. Experimental evidence has
shown that formal child care can result in long-term socioeconomic gains for disadvan-
taged children, and work requirements after welfare reform have necessitated increased
demand for child care among single mothers. I find that an increase of a thousand dollars
in state-level childcare assistance per child in poverty increases the probability of for-
mal care among low-earnings single-mother families by about 27 to 30 percentage points.
When public assistance makes child care more affordable, families within the target popu-
lation reveal a higher preference for formal care relative to informal, which may be related
to perceived quality improvements for child enrichment and development.
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INTRODUCTION
A fundamental question for social welfare policy is whether assistance is helping or
hurting, and by how much? The classical conjecture is that cash assistance discourages
labor supply, which in turn makes it harder for low-income families to exit poverty and
dependence. In the case of able-bodied adults with dependents, welfare dependence
may be defined as an increasing propensity to participate in assistance programs given
prior participation. A compounding policy issue for welfare dependence, however, is the
second-generation effect for dependents who are exposed to poverty and welfare during
childhood. If a child grows up in a family that receives welfare, what effect does this have
on that child’s socioeconomic outcomes later in adulthood?
There are competing stories in public debates on the nature of welfare dependence.
Generally, the safety net is intended to support families who experience some negative in-
come shock, which may lead to either temporary or persistent states of need. Many spells
of welfare participation are relatively short, yet historically, periods of rising caseloads
have prompted reform policies concerned with childhood exposure to a “culture of wel-
fare” in the home. At issue is whether a typical welfare case is characterized as a kind
of short-run social insurance that helps families smooth consumption and make long-run
child-development investments, or whether welfare use creates a poverty and/or welfare
trap such that dependence increases for both generations.
The following essays are concerned with behavioral responses to welfare participation
and implications for the transmission of poverty and dependence in the welfare reform
era since the 1990s. For social assistance programs to be effectively designed to alleviate
1
poverty and promote sustainability, it is important to understand how policies change
family incentives for short-run labor supply decisions as well as long-run human capital
investment decisions as a two-generation problem. The theme for this dissertation relates
to the outcomes for low-income, single-mother families relative to policies for welfare and
work requirements. Evidence concerning welfare dependence is incomplete, partially due
to the difficulty of analyzing family choices when ability, preferences, and constraints are
not easily observed. However, the policy implications of properly identifying program
effects can be long lasting if our public response to poverty now is causally related to
levels of poverty and dependence in the future.
In Essay 1, I estimate the effect of welfare reform on the intergenerational transmission
of welfare participation among mothers and daughters. Essentially, this transmission is
defined by the effect that childhood exposure to a mother’s welfare participation has on
a daughter’s subsequent participation decision as an adult. One of the primary goals
of reform was to break the link of welfare dependence, yet there has been no study
of whether intergenerational dependence has changed after the reforms of the 1990s.
Restrictive reform measures such as work requirements, time limits, and sanctions have
greatly decreased welfare caseloads and thus reduced childhood exposure. Now, over 20
years after the major reform period, children during that period can be observed as adults
making their own welfare participation decisions.
Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) over the survey period 1968-2013,
I find that a mother’s welfare participation increases the odds that her daughter partici-
pates as an adult by about 30 percentage points. Across a range of models, welfare reform
reduces this transmission by at least 50 percent, or adjusting for lower participation after
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reform, by at least 30 percent over the baseline odds of participation. When considering
the daughter’s participation in the wider safety net, as opposed to cash assistance, welfare
reform has no effect in diminishing participation. Similarly, other economic outcomes for
the daughter—such as educational attainment or family income—are negatively related
with childhood welfare exposure but undiminished by reforms. These results address
potential threats to identification including nonrandom selection into welfare, misclassi-
fication error, life-cycle age effects, and cross-state mobility. While welfare reforms were
partially effective at reducing dependence on cash assistance, dependence on welfare more
broadly has been unchanged and daughters appear to be no better off as adults. Further,
some amount of learning or reduction of stigma may be beneficial given that the take-
up rate for welfare remains low among eligible mothers. More research is warranted on
optimal transfer program design given knowledge spillovers across generations.
In Essay 2, I examine the behavioral response to a work incentive introduced by welfare
reform, the earnings disregard, which may have the unintended consequence of causing
individuals to reduce their labor supply to be income-eligible. This short-run form of
dependence would be considered an example of behavioral-induced participation. Before
reform, additional earnings corresponded to equal reductions in cash assistance, while
after reform, some states chose to disregard up to 100 percent of earnings in determining
the benefit amount. In such cases, a rational individual may attempt to constrain total
earnings to some point just below the eligibility cutoff. If high earnings disregards induced
more welfare participation, the effects of reform may decrease labor supply for women
near the federal poverty line while increasing labor supply for individuals at lower levels
of earnings.
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Based on experimental data from Connecticut’s Jobs First welfare waiver program in
1996, I find no evidence of behavioral-induced participation. In a nonparametric com-
parison of the welfare recipients and applicants randomly assigned to treatment groups,
the reform led to −200 dollars of earnings per quarter for women at the 90th quantile of
earnings in the sample. However, women in the treatment group may face welfare partic-
ipation costs to labor supply compared to women in the control group who are no longer
income-eligible to participate and have no comparable transaction costs on their time.
Using a semiparametric panel quantile estimator that allows for women to vary arbitrarily
in preferences and costs of welfare participation, I find a positive treatment effect of 300
dollars at the upper distribution of earnings. This finding suggests that welfare partic-
ipation can cost up to 10 percent of quarterly earnings, which corresponds to estimates
in the literature. Further, subgroup analysis by participant type with respect to new
applicants versus continuing recipients reveals that the most relevant unobserved costs of
participation may be related to labor-force informational costs or persistent stigma for
longer-term welfare recipients.
Lastly, in Essay 3, I explore the effect of childcare assistance on formal care arrange-
ments among low-income single mothers in the period after welfare reform. Given the
work requirements on welfare participation after reform, mothers must choose between
informal child care such as a grandmother or neighbor, or more formal arrangements such
as center-based child care. Research has shown that disadvantaged children experience
better educational outcomes given formal child care, possibly owing to a comparatively
rich learning environment conditional on the family’s lower socioeconomic status. Child-
care assistance funding ramped up in the early 1990s, and by 1996, states were granted
4
a much larger degree of discretion in allocating federal block grant funds toward child
care. For instance, after reforms some states began to allocate more welfare funds toward
childcare assistance than toward cash assistance.
State-level childcare assistance expenditures after reform may be characterized by two
stylized facts: first, spending per child in poverty varies widely by state and over time
within states; and, second, childcare subsidy take up is very low on average, implying
many welfare-eligible families choose informal care. Using PSID data on family child-
care choices along with state expenditure and policy measures from various government
sources, I find that an additional thousand dollars of childcare assistance per child in
poverty raises the probability a family uses formal child care by around 27 to 30 per-
centage points. Since experimental evidence suggests positive effects of child care for
low-income children, I plan to use childcare assistance policy in future work as a first
stage predictor of care arrangement in order to test the effects of formal child care on
educational outcomes using observational data that is nationally-representative.
5
1 WELFARE REFORM AND THE INTERGENERATIONAL
TRANSMISSION OF DEPENDENCE
1.1 Introduction
A fundamental goal of the landmark 1996 welfare reform in the United States was to elim-
inate the dependence of needy families on government assistance. This was premised in
part on the belief that dependence is passed down from parent to child through knowledge
and values, creating a “culture of welfare” across generations (DeParle, 2004; Haskins,
2007; Murray, 1984). While this belief was bolstered by an empirical consensus docu-
menting a positive intergenerational correlation of welfare use, the literature is much less
settled on whether the relationship is causal (Borjas and Sueyoshi, 1997; Dahl, Kostøl,
and Mogstad, 2014; Duncan, Hill, and Hoffman, 1988; Gottschalk, 1990, 1992, 1996;
Levine and Zimmerman, 1996; McLanahan, 1988; Page, 2004; Pepper, 2000; Solon et al.,
1988). Instead, the parent-child link in welfare participation could simply be a spuri-
ous by-product of incomes that are correlated across generations. That is, low economic
mobility across generations means that children of parents with low incomes likely have
low incomes themselves in adulthood, and both generations participate in means-tested
programs solely because of their shared poverty status and not welfare exposure per se.
If true, then one should not expect generational welfare participation to fall after reform
unless poverty among the young declined. Scores of papers have been written evaluating
welfare reform (see surveys in Blank, 2002; Grogger and Karoly, 2005; Moffitt, 2003; Zil-
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iak, 2016), but to date there has not been research on whether it achieved a key aim of
ending generational welfare dependence.
In this essay, I estimate the effect of welfare reform on the intergenerational trans-
mission of welfare participation. In addition, because the goal of welfare reform was to
reduce dependency more broadly, I also estimate whether reform changed the relationship
between parental welfare use and other adult economic outcomes of the child including
human capital attainment, employment, and poverty status. The empirical framework
I use builds on a canonical Becker-Tomes (1979) transmission model with a difference-
in-difference-type specification whereby the economic outcome of the child during adult-
hood is regressed on the prior welfare participation of the parent, a variable reflecting
the implementation of welfare reform in the parent’s state, and the interaction of the
welfare-reform variable with parent’s participation. The identification strategy exploits
the quasi-experimental variation provided by the 1990s reforms to the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) program in the United States. AFDC was established
during the Great Depression and was the main cash transfer program for families with
dependent children. Conditional on low income and assets, along with the presence of
children under age 18, eligibility for assistance was an entitlement. Starting in 1992,
states began implementing substantive changes to their AFDC programs with waivers
from federal rules, and by 1996, 43 states had implemented some form of waiver affect-
ing program features such as new work requirements, time limits on length of receipt,
and caps on benefit generosity. These waivers culminated with passage of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, which replaced AFDC
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with the non-entitlement block grant program Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF).
Even though welfare reform provides exogenous variation in access to program benefits
across welfare eras, identifying whether there is a causal pathway from parent to child
in welfare use within periods is complicated by four—potentially reinforcing—forms of
bias. First, selection bias in welfare participation across generations can arise through
possible unobserved correlations in labor market productivity between the parent and
child, perhaps because of latent shared cognitive or noncognitive skills, or shared tastes
for welfare relative to work (Gottschalk, 1992, 1996; Pepper, 2000; Solon et al., 1988).
The second threat to identification comes from potential misclassification bias in survey
responses (Bollinger and David, 1997, 2001; Hausman, Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton, 1998;
Kreider et al., 2012; Meyer and Mittag, 2014). In transfer programs, this nonclassical
measurement error mostly comes in the form of “false negatives” when the respondent
states they did not participate in a program when in fact they did. Meyer, Mok, and
Sullivan (2015a,b) document a trend increase in misreporting across all major household
surveys in the U.S., including the PSID. Third, so-called life-cycle bias and the ‘window
problem’ may affect intergenerational estimates of economic status because researchers
generally only observe snapshots of a parent and child and not their full life cycles (Haider
and Solon, 2006; Nybom and Stuhler, 2016; Page, 2004; Wolfe et al., 1996). In the welfare
context, this form of bias may exacerbate or attenuate intergenerational transmission
estimates depending on whether the window of parent-child observations is dominated
by families in the midst of long-term welfare spells. Fourth, there could be bias in the
transmission estimates if the child moves across states as an endogenous response to the
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generosity of the state’s welfare system (Gelbach, 2004; Kennan and Walker, 2010; Levine
and Zimmerman, 1999; McKinnish, 2007).
To estimate the model, I assemble a long panel of mother-daughter pairs over the sur-
vey period 1968-2013 in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). I focus on mother-
daughter pairs because over 90 percent of AFDC cases were headed by a single mother,
and there has been a large secular increase since the 1960s in the fraction of first births to
unmarried women in the U.S. from fewer than 1 in 10 to over 4 in 10 such that more than
one third of U.S. children were exposed to welfare by age 10 (Cancian and Reed, 2009;
Levine and Zimmerman, 2005). I address potential endogenous selection into welfare by
instrumenting for mother’s welfare use. Because selection is likely to be time-varying, I
instrument mother’s welfare participation with the state maximum AFDC/TANF benefit
guarantee and the maximum federal and state Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) when
daughters are ages 12 to 18. These instruments are constructed during a daughter’s crit-
ical ages of exposure to her mother’s potential welfare, which is generally well before she
faces a participation decision as an adult. The mother’s welfare participation decision
is assumed to respond positively to greater state-level AFDC/TANF benefit standards,
whereas EITC benefits may offer a substitute for AFDC/TANF assistance. Fundamen-
tally, these aggregated measures of state-level policies identify the portion of a mother’s
participation decision that are related to her welfare status separately from conditions
related to her poverty status, and consequently, her daughter’s future poverty status.
Next, I address the implications of misclassified welfare participation, which may occur
in both the dependent variable for daughters as well as the independent variable for
mothers. Instruments for mother’s participation will partially address misclassification
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in the right-hand-side variable, and I use a relatively long time history to determine
whether the mother ever participated on welfare in the past, which also should attenuate
measurement error compared to a contemporaneous measure. I address misclassification
bias in the dependent variable by parametric methods using “extra-sample” information
based on PSID reporting rates estimated in Meyer et al. (2015b).
I attempt to mitigate the influence of the life-cycle window problem by using the
relatively long time series for each mother-daughter pair now available in the PSID. To
be included in the estimations sample, mother and daughter must live together at least
5 years during the critical exposure period of ages 12-18, and to observe the daughter for
at least five years after she forms her own family unit. On average, I observe mothers and
daughters co-residing for 14 years, and daughters for nearly 25 years as head of their own
family, and thus I observe the full welfare life cycle for many mother-daughter pairs. As
a sensitivity check, I also estimate a variant of the model with the Lee and Solon (2009)
age-adjustment in order to re-center the data at a common point in the mothers’ and
daughters’ life cycles. Lastly, for the issue of cross-state mobility, I examine the sensitivity
of estimates to possible endogenous migration by examining various subsamples of non-
movers.
The estimates show that there is strong evidence for a causal transmission of AFDC/
TANF participation from mother to daughter, and it is economically sizable, on the
order of 30 percentage points. However, welfare reform significantly attenuated the level
of transmission pathway by at least 50 percent, or at least 30 percent over the baseline
probability. Moreover, I find that childhood exposure to welfare substantively increases
the use of the wider safety net, the odds of nonemployment, and the odds of family
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earnings at poverty or near poverty levels. Yet in these cases, welfare reform did not
affect the transmission path, leaving daughters no better off in broader economic status.
Estimates of the reform effect are robust across a variety of specifications, including
the length of mother-daughter observation window, the age of welfare exposure by the
daughter when living at home, the length of time the daughter is exposed to welfare,
life-cycle age adjustments, and misclassification error.
1.2 Welfare Reform and Intergenerational Transmission
“Welfare” in the U.S. through the 1980s was largely defined by the AFDC program, which
was established as part of the Social Security Act of 1935 to assist low-income families
with children under age 18. Initially, assistance was restricted to the children of destitute
widows and widowers, and then later was expanded to cover the guardian of the child,
and eventually a second parent if present in the household. In well over 90 percent of the
cases, the family was headed by a single mother. Eligibility for assistance (conditional
on the presence of a dependent child under age 18) was determined by an income test,
a liquid asset test, and a vehicle asset test. The federal government set rules on what
counted as income or an asset, and also established limits on the dollar value of those
resources. States did have authority to set maximum benefit levels (which increase with
family size) and need standards used in assigning income eligibility. The program was an
entitlement funded by a federal-state matching grant based on state per-capita income,
with the federal government picking up over 60 percent of expenditure on average (Ziliak,
2016).
Beginning in the 1960s, states could apply for waivers from federal rules to experiment
with program features, but with few exceptions, they did not utilize this flexibility, and
11
when they did, it was typically for small pilot programs. This changed in the last half of
the President George H.W. Bush administration when several states filed waiver applica-
tions, and then accelerated under President Clinton, who had pledged to “end welfare as
we know it” as part of his 1992 campaign. By 1996, 43 states had waivers approved by
the Department of Health and Human Services (Grogger and Karoly, 2005). The waivers
were far reaching, and included both strengthening and expanding of pre-existing policies
(e.g. work requirements and sanctions on benefits for failing to work or participate in a
training program introduced as part of the Family Support Act of 1988), as well as new
policies aimed at family responsibility (e.g. caps on the generosity of benefits by family
size and time limits on benefit receipt). Some of the new policies actually expanded eli-
gibility, such as higher asset limits and earnings disregards for benefit determination, but
the majority were designed to restrict program access. Time-limit waivers in particular
were introduced to break long-term spells on AFDC, and in turn to reduce exposure of
children to parental use of welfare.
The state-level waivers were codified into federal law with passage of the Personal Re-
sponsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in August of 1996.
PRWORA replaced AFDC with a new program called Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF), which is not an entitlement. The new law established federal max-
imum guidelines regarding funding, work requirements, and time limits, but otherwise
devolved much more program design authority to the states. For example, the federal
lifetime time limit for benefits for an adult is five years, but nearly half the states opted
to impose shorter limits. Nineteen states now require some form of mandatory job search
at the point of benefit application, and in fourteen of those states the sanction for non-
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Figure 1.1. Trends in AFDC/TANF, Food Stamps/SNAP, and SSI Recipients
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Notes: Authors’ tabulations of data collected from the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and Social Security Administration. The major waiver
period of welfare reform is indicated by the shaded region. Abbreviations: Aid to Families with
Dependent Children/Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (AFDC/TANF), Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).
compliance is to deny the application. Seventeen states have opted to impose a family
cap on benefit generosity, and thirty-two states introduced “diversion payments” that
steer eligible applicants away from the official caseload and toward a lump-sum payment,
typically valued at three months of the maximum benefit for a given family size (Ziliak,
2016).
Figure 1.1 depicts trends in the number of persons on AFDC/TANF, spanning the
AFDC era (1960-1991), the major waiver period (1992-1996 shaded in gray), and the
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TANF era (from 1997 onward). Participation accelerated throughout the 1960s from
about 3 million persons in 1960 to 10 million a decade later. The level of recipients
remained fairly constant for nearly two decades, and then increased by approximately
30 percent from 1989 to 1994. By 2012, however, the number of recipients had plum-
meted 67 percent to levels roughly the same as five decades earlier. Numerous studies
demonstrated that while the economy accounted for more of the decline in welfare in the
mid 1990s, welfare waivers also reduced participation, especially in those states adopting
more stringent responsibility and time limit policies (Blank, 2001; Council of Economic
Advisers, 1997; Grogger, 2003; Ziliak et al., 2000). For those few studies that examined
caseload decline after passage of PRWORA, greater weight was given to policy reforms
in accounting for the decline in participation compared to the waiver era, though the
macroeconomy was still the driving force (Grogger and Karoly, 2005). The declining
participation stemmed more from reduced entry onto welfare than from increased exits
(Frogner, Moffitt, and Ribar, 2009; Grogger, Haider, and Klerman, 2003; Haider and
Klerman, 2005).
Families that received AFDC were categorically eligible for food assistance from the
Food Stamp Program, which started in 1964 but took nearly a decade to roll out nation-
wide (and was renamed Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) in 2008).
Receipt of AFDC was not necessary for eligibility for food stamps, but it was sufficient,
and typically about 80 to 90 percent of AFDC recipients took up both (Committee on
Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, 1994). This categorical eligibility re-
mained after the introduction of TANF. While any given individual on AFDC could not
simultaneously receive assistance from the disability program Supplemental Security In-
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come (SSI), which began in 1972, it was possible for families to combine benefits with
some on AFDC and some on SSI (and still also qualify for food stamps). These provisions
remain after welfare reform.
Figure 1.1 also presents trends in the number of recipients on food stamps and SSI.
There was a marked drop in food stamp participation in the immediate aftermath of
welfare reform, followed by a huge expansion in the subsequent decade. These swings
have been attributed to changes in the macroeconomy, welfare and food stamp policies,
and program take-up rates among those eligible (Ganong and Liebman, 2013; Ziliak,
2015). There has also been growth in SSI, especially after 1990 when the Supreme Court’s
Zebley Decision expanded eligibility for children (Kubik, 1999), and again after welfare
reform where there is some evidence that states systematically facilitated the applications
of former AFDC recipients for SSI program benefits (Schmidt and Sevak, 2004). The
implication is that even if welfare reform succeeded in breaking the generational cycle
on AFDC/TANF, it is not clear a priori that it reduced dependence more broadly when
additional safety net programs are considered.
As motivating evidence for the role of welfare reform on the intergenerational transmis-
sion of dependence, Figure 1.2 presents the correlation between mother’s and daughter’s
welfare participation for rolling cohorts of daughters over time based on the PSID. No
attempt is made here to separate out cause and effect, only correlations over time in
order to illustrate the trend and to anchor these estimates to those in the prior literature
as summarized in Page (2004).1 Figure 1.2 shows that the intergenerational correlation
1Specifically, across rolling cohorts of mother-daughter pairs in each year I estimate W dit = αt +
δtW
m
it + 
d
it where W
d
it and W
m
it are the daughter’s and mother’s welfare indicators, respectively, δt is
the year-specific intergenerational correlation in welfare use, and dit is the error term. In order to make
these estimates comparable to Page (2004), I use daughter’s PSID core longitudinal weights at age 25 in
estimation, and I temporarily define the sample and measures of welfare participation for the purposes
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Figure 1.2. Trends in the Intergenerational Correlation of
Welfare Participation
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Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether a daughter ever participated in
AFDC/TANF (or AFDC/TANF, SSI, or Food Stamps) in any year after forming her own
family through age 27. The independent variable is an indicator for whether the mother ever
participated in AFDC/TANF when the child is observed living at home. These trends reflect
rolling cohort groups of daughters aged 27-42 in each year. The major waiver period of welfare
reform is indicated by the shaded region. Abbreviations: Aid to Families with Dependent
Children/Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (AFDC/TANF), Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP), and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).
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in welfare increased throughout the two decades leading up to the passage of welfare
reform, and did not peak until 1998 when the correlation of 0.40 was more than double
that of the late 1970s. The correlation between mothers’ and daughters’ AFDC/TANF
use then fell precipitously afterwards to levels comparable to those in the early 1980s.
However, expanding the definition of daughter’s welfare to include food stamps or SSI
(mother’s welfare remains defined by AFDC/TANF use), then there is a very different
pattern. The intergenerational correlation is relatively constant after welfare reform. The
descriptive evidence thus points to the possibility that welfare reform succeeded in re-
ducing the transmission of AFDC/TANF use across generations, but dependence more
broadly defined has not changed.
To identify the intergenerational dependence parameter, one naturally has to sepa-
rate the poverty trap from the welfare trap. The correlations presented in Figure 1.2
can simply reflect persistence in poverty status, and thus, the evidence does not imply
that welfare generated dependence on government assistance transmitted from mother
to daughter. The literature, however, has elaborated on potential mechanisms beyond
the poverty mechanism (see, for example, Antel, 1992; Duncan et al., 1988; Durlauf
and Shaorshadze, 2014; Moffitt, 1983). First, a mother’s participation might lower her
daughter’s stigma associated with welfare as well as other costs of participation. A child
on welfare can observe and learn how the program ‘works’, while her mother does not
incorporate potential future costs on her daughter in her utility-maximizing behavior.
Secondly, contrasting the idea that welfare offers mothers additional resources in times of
of Figure 1.2. For each year t, the sample consists of daughters ages 27-42 years old who are the heads of
their family unit and the dependent variable is an indicator for any welfare use by the daughter between
ages 14 and 27. The independent variable is an indicator for mother’s welfare use prior to the daughter’s
matriculation to family headship.
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need, participation in government assistance affects job market opportunities for mothers,
and consequently, can increase dependence for daughters through several factors such as
labor force attachment and social capital, for example. Essentially, the reform targeted
these plausible intertemporal mechanisms. Therefore, a framework for identifying the
intergenerational transmission of dependence needs to move beyond the correlations pre-
sented in Figure 1.2 by considering that the reform could affect daughters’ participation
decisions, both directly on AFDC/TANF and more broadly on other programs and adult
economic outcomes. Further details on identification are discussed in the next section.
1.3 Estimating Intergenerational Transmission Pre- and Post-Reform
Contemporary empirical studies on intergenerational socioeconomic outcomes trace their
intellectual foundation to the work of Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986), who provide a
structural framework of dynastic family decision making. The corresponding canonical
statistical model involves regressing the outcome of interest of the child on the corre-
sponding outcome of the parent, whether it is earnings, education, health, income, wealth,
or in this case, welfare participation (see surveys in Black and Devereux, 2011; Solon,
1999). The prima facie evidence in Figure 1.2 suggests a structural break in (AFDC)
welfare participation starting during the reform era. Introducing welfare reform implies a
straightforward modification to the canonical model of the intergenerational transmission
of welfare before and after reform as
W dist = α + β
′xdist + δW
m
is,∀j<t + γR
m
st + θR
m
stW
m
is,∀j<t + µ
d
s + ρ
d
t + v
d
ist, (1.1)
where W dist is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the daughter (d) in family i
residing in state s at time period t participates in welfare and 0 otherwise; Wmis,∀j<t takes a
value of 1 if the mother (m) ever participates in welfare in any prior period j = 1, . . . , t−1
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and 0 otherwise; xdist is a vector of observed demographic characteristics of the daughter;
Rmst is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 when the state of residence of the mother
implements welfare reform and 0 otherwise; and, vdist is the unobserved error term.
2 The
state effect µds controls for permanent differences in states such as natural endowments
that affect economic opportunities, while the time effect ρdt controls for macroeconomic
and policy changes affecting all daughters the same in a given year.
In equation (1.1), once the mother participates, the Wmis,∀j<t variable remains “on”
for each subsequent observation. The use of ever on welfare for the mother instead
of contemporaneous participation serves two purposes: first, it implies that once the
mother participates in welfare it cannot be “unlearned” by the daughter; and second, the
ever-on measure captures a longer window and thus attenuates potential measurement
error. The baseline models define welfare of the daughter and mother as participation
in AFDC/TANF, but I also explore heterogeneity in the transmission mechanisms by
age of the daughter when exposed to the mother’s welfare use, the length of exposure to
the mother’s welfare use, by race of the family, and by stringency of the state’s welfare
reforms. In addition, to examine whether welfare reform altered the relationship between
mother’s welfare use and other adult economic outcomes of the daughter, I also estimate
models where the dependent variable is replaced with an indicator for broader safety net
participation on AFDC/TANF, food stamps/SNAP, or SSI, as well as indicators for low
educational attainment, nonemployment, and poverty and near poverty status.3
2While the notation implies that the daughter and mother share the same state s, this constraint is
non-binding in practice where welfare reform implementation and state-level instruments correspond to
the mother’s state of residence. I test the robustness of the estimates to possible cross-state mobility
below.
3The prior literature generally only provided estimates of AFDC with General Assistance (for example,
Gottschalk, 1996), or of combined AFDC/GA/Food Stamps/SSI in main results with some discussion
of estimates restricted to AFDC/GA (for example, Page, 2004; Solon et al., 1988).
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In equation (1.1), δ is the intergenerational correlation of welfare participation, and
δ + θ is the correlation after welfare reform. This specification is akin to a difference-in-
difference model whereby I exploit the quasi-experimental variation induced by the fact
that different states adopted welfare reform at different times starting in the early 1990s.4
That is, the indicator Rmst “turns on” when the state s implements a waiver and remains
on thereafter. By adopting this functional form, I implicitly assume that the TANF
program implemented after PRWORA is a continuation of the reforms begun during
the waiver period for those states that were early adopters of reform. This has been a
standard assumption in the welfare reform literature, though in some cases researchers
allow a trend break between the waiver era and TANF era (Blank, 2002). If welfare
reform succeeded in reducing the transmission across generations, then one would expect
that θ < 0.
A ubiquitous challenge across the intergenerational transmission literature has been
establishing a causal pathway from parent to child, that is, separating out the poverty
trap from the welfare trap, because the conditional mean assumption for consistency of
least squares that E
[
vdist
∣∣Wmis,∀j<t, •] = 0 is generally violated. While the state and year
effects are likely to control for some forms of endogeneity, it is still possible that the
remaining time-varying error term vdist can be correlated with mother’s welfare use by
endogenous selection and measurement error. Below, I offer a detailed discussion of each
of these threats to identification, and how I address them. I also investigate other possible
identification issues (i.e., life-cycle factors and geographic mobility) later in Section 1.5.3.
4Ziliak et al. (2000) show that a state’s decision to apply for an AFDC waiver was not an endogenous
response to caseload size, which supports the use of the waiver reform period as identifying variation for
welfare participation.
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1.3.1 Selection Bias
The conditional mean independence assumption for consistent causal estimates of the
intergenerational parameters δ and θ will break down if there are unobserved characteris-
tics common to the mother and daughter that affect the decision to participate. That is,
if equation (1.1) is backdated by a generation, say −t, and write a model of the mother’s
participation as a function of her demographics (xmis,−t) and the welfare choice of her
mother (i.e. the daughter’s grandmother, W gis,∀k<−t), then shared tastes for work and
welfare within families would imply that
E
[
vdistv
m
is,−t
∣∣xdist,Wmis,∀j<t, Rmst ,xmis,−t,W gis,∀k<−t] 6= 0.
The quasi-experimental design of using cross-state variation over time in adoption of
welfare reform allows us to separate the pre- and post-reform eras, but within the AFDC
and TANF eras there still remains a possible convolution of state dependence (welfare
trap) and unobserved heterogeneity (poverty trap).
There have been several efforts over the years to control for endogenous selection in
intergenerational welfare participation. In an early study, Solon et al. (1988) used pairs
of sisters in order to control for shared family background (i.e. family fixed effects) in
identifying the effect of parental welfare participation. Antel (1992) adopted Heckman’s
(1978) dummy endogenous variable model within the context of a two-limit tobit specifi-
cation. He included exclusion restrictions in the mother’s reduced form equation such as
the state’s AFDC benefit guarantee and local labor market conditions as proxied by net
migration flows. In lieu of exclusion restrictions, Gottschalk (1996) addressed unobserved
heterogeneity by modeling the event histories of daughter’s and mother’s welfare usage
in order to identify causal effects relative to a mother’s past participation. Levine and
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Zimmerman (1996) used mother’s background as additional control variates, as well as
state (e.g. welfare generosity) and local (e.g. county unemployment rate) variables as
instruments for mother’s welfare participation. Dahl et al. (2014), who examined dis-
ability insurance in Norway, used the random assignment of appellate-court judges as
an instrumental variable to identify parent’s disability participation on child’s disability
insurance claims. Pepper (2000) eschewed point identification methods of the latter au-
thors in favor of nonparametric bounding techniques to control for selection as proposed
by Manski (1995). Antel, Gottschalk, Pepper, and Dahl, et al. all conclude that parent’s
participation in welfare is causal for the child and not spurious, while Solon, et al. and
Levine and Zimmerman provide evidence more in favor of spurious poverty traps.
My approach to address possible endogenous selection within welfare regimes is to
extend the prior point identification literature by exploiting the comparatively long time
histories now available in the PSID and estimate equation (1.1) via instrumental vari-
ables. Specifically, I instrument for mother’s previous welfare participation using the
policy parameters defined by the state maximum AFDC/TANF benefit guarantee and
the combined Federal and state maximum EITC. Each of these instruments vary across
states, time, and family size—the maximum AFDC/TANF guarantee is set by state leg-
islatures, while the maximum Federal EITC is set by the U.S. Congress to vary by the
number of qualifying children in the family and the state portion is set by state legislatures
as a fixed percentage of the Federal credit. Both of the variables speak to the prospect
of the welfare trap, but in opposite directions. A higher maximum AFDC/TANF benefit
guarantee means that all else equal welfare is more attractive to the mother, while a higher
maximum EITC means that work is more attractive than welfare since EITC eligibility is
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work conditioned. To ensure that the policy instruments are most salient to the mother’s
welfare choice, I restrict the time period of the instruments by aggregating over values
that are applicable to the mother when her daughter is in the critical exposure ages of
12-18 years old and not an adult living independently. Note that because the models are
estimated with state and time effects, these instruments are demeaned variables by state
and year, and therefore, they exploit exogenous transitory policy changes at the state
level during a daughter’s childhood. These welfare policies while the daughter is young
should have no effect on her subsequent welfare decisions in adulthood except via the
welfare choice of her mother (Antel, 1992; Levine and Zimmerman, 1996; Moffitt, 1992).
Four measures of welfare generosity are used for constructing instruments: the average
and maximum of the state-specific AFDC/TANF benefit standard for families of 2, 3,
or 4 or more persons, and the average and maximum of the combined Federal and state
EITC maximum credit amounts for 0, 1, or 2 or more dependents. The EITC benefit
is defined as EITCit · (1 + pist), where EITCit is the Federal credit that varies by the
number of qualifying children and year and pist is the fraction of the Federal EITC that
a state refunds on the state return. The Federal EITC was begun in 1975, and expanded
in 1986, 1991, 1993, and 2009, while states began introducing the refundable state EITC
in the late 1980s. By the mid 2000s, nearly half the states had a separate EITC, provid-
ing cross-state and family-size variation over time in the instrument. In equation (1.1)
both mother’s welfare participation and its interaction with welfare reform are treated
as endogenous, and thus the full set of instruments enter directly and interacted with
the welfare reform indicator. Tests for both the first-stage strength and the validity of
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overidentifying restrictions are included in the results section. I also test the robustness
to additional policy and economic instruments.
1.3.2 Misclassification Bias
Misreporting of welfare is present both at the extensive participation margin and the
intensive dollar margin, it pervades all social surveys, and has gotten worse over time
(Meyer et al., 2015a,b). In the case of welfare participation, misreports can be in the
form of “false negatives”—the respondent states they do not receive assistance when
in fact they do—and “false positives”—the respondent states they receive assistance
when in fact they do not. Based on validation studies of the Food Stamp Program
and TANF, most misclassifications are false negatives (Bollinger and David, 1997, 2001;
Meyer, Goerge, and Mittag, 2014; Meyer and Mittag, 2014, 2015).5 The reasons for the
increase in misreporting are generally unknown, but this trend may in part be a result of
the increasing importance of in-kind transfers in the TANF program, which are generally
more difficult for the respondent to place a monetary value.
Remedies for classification bias are not straightforward in the context of dichotomous
variables. A standard approach for continuous variables in the intergenerational income
literature with classical measurement error is to take 3- or 5-year averages of parent’s (and
possibly child’s) income (Mazumder, 2005; Solon, 1992, 1999). While such averages are
likely to improve things in dichotomous participation models, this is not ensured as the
errors have been found to vary systematically with characteristics and are nonclassical.
Some have proposed parametric or semiparametric adjustments to the likelihood func-
5When false positives do occur, the issue is often misreporting the correct source of actual transfer
income or mistaking the timing of receipt, thus aggregate measures of welfare participation over time or
across survey questions should diminish the relevance of this error type given the independent variable
definition.
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tion to incorporate misclassification (Bollinger and David, 1997, 2001, 2005; Hausman
et al., 1998; Meyer and Mittag, 2014), while others have proposed partial-identification
nonparametric bounding techniques (Black, Berger, and Scott, 2000; Bollinger, 1996;
Kreider et al., 2012; Kreider, Pepper, and Roy, 2016; Molinari, 2008). These solutions
have been proposed for cross-sectional data either for measurement error in the dichoto-
mous dependent variable, or the independent variable, though the setting for this study
has potentially mismeasured dichotomous variables on both the left- and right-hand sides
of the equation.
I consider several potential remedies for misclassification bias. First, evidence in
Bollinger and David (2005) showed that respondents have a latent propensity to report or
not report, and that cooperation increases with length of panel participation. Since the
data follow mothers for at least 14 years on average and daughters for 25 years, correct
reporting should be more prevalent than in a sample with short observation windows.
Second, for right-hand-side mismeasurement of mother’s participation, again recall that I
measure if the mother ever participates, which is likely to be less noisy than contempora-
neous participation.6 Moreover, the instrumental variables discussed in the prior section
on selection bias are also likely to improve matters for misreports of mother’s participa-
tion. Third, for left-hand-side classification error, I consider parametric bias-corrections
along the lines proposed in Bollinger and David (1997, 2001) and Hausman et al. (1998).
Specifically, I follow Hausman et al. (1998) and assume that misreporting is independent
of model covariates and constant across individuals, which implies that the partial effect
of mother’s participation on daughter’s participation in equation (1.1) from observed data
6For further support that the mother’s indicator for any prior welfare participation is measured more
accurately, Appendix A demonstrates how the probability of ever misreporting tends to zero as the
number of mother observations increases.
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is proportional to the true partial effects,
Pr
(
W dist = 1
∣∣Wmis,∀j<t = 1, •)− Pr (W dist = 1∣∣Wmis,∀j<t = 0, •) =
(1− τ0t − τ1t) (δ + θRmst) , (1.2)
where • represents other controls, τ0t is the false positive reporting rate at time t, and τ1t
is the false negative reporting rate at time t. To implement this correction, I set the false
positive rate to 0, and for the linear probability models rescale all the right-hand-side
variables in equation (1.1) by (1− τˆ1t), which is based on estimates of AFDC/TANF
reporting rates in the PSID by Meyer et al. (2015b) as depicted in Appendix Table A.1.
Refer to Appendix A for additional details on the two-stage approach used to estimate
the parameter of interest in equation (1.2).
A convenient aspect of the proposed methodology is that it allows us to estimate
models with endogenous variables using instrumental variables. This is an important
innovation because, as discussed in the previous section, selection bias due to correlation
of unobservables is likely to create biased estimates of the effect of welfare reform on the
transmission parameter.
1.4 Data
The data come from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which was begun in
1968 as a survey of 4,800 American families. The survey has followed the children and
grandchildren of original sample parents as they split off to form their own households
so that today there are over 10,000 PSID families and 24,000 individuals. As the longest
continuously running longitudinal survey, the PSID is ideally suited for the study of
intergenerational transmission, and has been found to be robust over time to changes in
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sample composition (Fitzgerald, 2011; Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, and Moffitt, 1998). The
original sample drew about 60 percent of the families from the nationally representative
Survey Research Center (SRC) subsample, and the other 40 percent from an oversample
of low-income and minority families as part of the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO)
subsample. I focus on linked mother-daughter pairs over the entire life of the PSID survey
years from 1968-2013, and in order to ensure adequate sample sizes I include observations
from both the SRC and SEO subsamples.
The oversample of low-income families in the PSID allows for more precise estima-
tion of welfare participation, yet this unrepresentative sample will yield biased causal
estimates if, after conditioning on control variables, the selection probability remains
endogenous to daughter’s welfare participation, or if there exist heterogeneous transmis-
sion effects relative to the oversampled population (see Solon, Haider, and Wooldridge,
2015).7 Some examples in the literature have addressed endogenous sampling directly
by controlling on observed characteristics (Corcoran et al., 1992; Pepper, 2000), or by
restricting the estimation sample to the SRC only (Lee and Solon, 2009; Moffitt and
Gottschalk, 2002). Other examples have used weights for estimators that are based on
frequency counts (Page, 2004; Solon et al., 1988), as a sensitivity check (Solon, 1992),
or in the main estimation Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2012). A primary concern for es-
timates in this study is the potential heterogeneity of welfare participation transmission
by race coupled with overrepresented low-income, minority families, and my model main-
tains a fairly parsimonious structure that may not adequately account for this source of
bias. Therefore, in all of the estimation results, I provide weighted estimates and also
7See PSID documentation for background on survey selection procedures and sample weight construc-
tion. For detailed issues relate to the Survey of Economic Opportunity, see Brown (1996).
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demonstrate that the results are robust to the use of weights or restriction to the SRC
subsample.
The baseline sample consists of mother-daughter pairs that are observed for at least
five years while the daughter is living in the same household during the critical exposure
period spanning the ages of 12-18, and that the daughter is observed at least five years
as the head of her own family unit. Selecting adolescence and teenage years as the
observation window for childhood exposure pervades the welfare transmission literature
(Duncan and Yeung, 1995; Gottschalk, 1996; Page, 2004; Pepper, 2000; Solon et al.,
1988). Part of this stems from data needs; that is, requiring the observation of early
childhood as well as enough years in adulthood would impose greater demands on the
data in terms of length of time in the panel, and in turn, end up with fewer mother-
daughter observations. The other reason for focusing on adolescent and teenage years is
that cognitive, emotional, and physiological development are sufficiently advanced for the
potential of “welfare learning” from the parent. However, it remains an open question in
the literature which stage of childhood development is most important for the potential
of welfare learning. Research shows that economic deprivation in early childhood has
more deleterious effects in terms of achievement and health in early adulthood than does
similar deprivation during adolescence (Duncan and Brooks-Gunn, 2000; Duncan et al.,
1998; Elango et al., 2016; Ziol-Guest et al., 2012). But this research has not separated
out the independent role of welfare in this process. As such, I follow convention and focus
on the five years observed during the ages 12-18 as a key period of welfare exposure for
the baseline models, and then explore how the estimates change as the age and length of
exposure changes.
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Table 1.1. Descriptive Statistics
A. Daughter’s Characteristics as an Adult Before Reform After Reform Pooled
Currently Receiving Welfare?
AFDC/TANF (%) 0.080 0.025 0.044
(0.271) (0.157) (0.206)
AFDC/TANF, SNAP, SSI (%) 0.132 0.112 0.119
(0.338) (0.315) (0.323)
Years Before/After Welfare Reform (%) 0.348 0.652
(0.476) (0.476)
Age 28.245 38.666 35.041
(5.572) (9.009) (9.400)
Number of Children 1.249 1.186 1.208
(1.169) (1.273) (1.238)
Race:
Black (%) 0.161 0.170 0.167
(0.368) (0.375) (0.373)
White (%) 0.812 0.805 0.807
(0.391) (0.396) (0.394)
Other (%) 0.027 0.025 0.026
(0.162) (0.157) (0.159)
Resides in Same State as Birth (%) 0.759 0.703 0.723
(0.428) (0.457) (0.448)
B. Mother’s Characteristics Before Reform After Reform Pooled
Any Previous Welfare?
AFDC/TANF (%) 0.269 0.066 0.271
(0.444) (0.248) (0.444)
AFDC/TANF, SNAP, SSI (%) 0.428 0.190 0.433
(0.495) (0.392) (0.496)
Years Before/After Welfare Reform (%) 0.858 0.142
(0.158) (0.158)
Age 42.472 59.357 61.429
(8.841) (10.512) (11.425)
Policy Measures when Daughter Aged 12-18
(in thousands of 2012 dollars):
AFDC/TANF Benefit Standard, Average 0.736 0.393 0.724
(0.334) (0.213) (0.336)
AFDC/TANF Benefit Standard, Maximum 0.913 0.476 0.904
(0.363) (0.226) (0.365)
EITC Federal/State Credit, Average 0.801 3.223 0.876
(0.726) (1.417) (0.878)
EITC Federal/State Credit, Maximum 1.208 3.873 1.318
(0.886) (1.405) (1.085)
Mother-Child Family Unit Observations 14.212
Daughter-as-Adult Observations 25.085
Total Observations 25331 30737 56068
Notes: Sample averages are weighted by the daughter’s PSID core longitudinal weights for both daughters’ and mothers’
statistics. Further, the pooled statistics for mothers are not a simple weighted average of before/after reform. Mothers’
statistics before/after reform reflect her observed history during potential welfare participation years, 1967-2007, and
the pooled statistics correspond to the daughter’s current observation year in the estimation sample. Abbreviations:
Food Stamps/Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).
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A daughter is considered an adult at first childbirth or when establishing a new family
unit if she is at least age 14, though she may continue to live at home as a subfamily. This
yields a baseline sample of 2,961 mother-daughter pairs spanning 56,067 observation years
of the daughter as an adult. Table 1.1 contains the key variables from the baseline sample
used in estimation of equation (1.1), separated into the pre- and post-welfare reform eras,
and weighted by the daughter’s core longitudinal weight. While 4.4 percent of daughters
receive AFDC/TANF as an adult in the sample period, the odds of participation are
nearly 70 percent lower after welfare reform, falling from 8 percent to 2.5 percent.8 On
the other hand, there is much more stability over time in participation in any of the three
programs, with 13.2 percent receiving AFDC/TANF, food stamps/SNAP, or SSI before
reform and 11.2 percent afterwards. Almost all of the additional uptake in welfare use
is from food stamps/SNAP. The bottom panel of Table 1.1 shows that about 27 percent
of mothers were ever on AFDC/TANF prior to welfare reform, and 6.6 percent were
ever on during the period after reform, while those figures jump to 43 and 19 percent,
respectively, if the mother ever received AFDC/TANF, food stamps/SNAP, or SSI. Note
that it is possible for the mother to first participate on welfare after the daughter forms
her own family unit. For AFDC/TANF participation, this can occur only if the mother
has children (or dependents) under age 18 remaining in the household other than the
focal daughter. Learning thus can occur from direct exposure while the daughter resides
8The PSID asks about AFDC/TANF receipt of the family head, spouse, and other family members,
as well as an “other welfare” category (not including SSI, food stamps, workers’ compensation, housing,
Social Security). This other welfare category can contain assistance from various public sources including
General Assistance. If the percent of daughters participating in AFDC/TANF are adjusted for misclas-
sification (by inflating sample statistics by the reporting rates shown in Appendix Table A.1), then the
baseline participation over the sample period would be 7.8 percent of daughters, which then falls to an
adjusted 5.6 percent after welfare reform.
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in the household with her mother, or from indirect “word of mouth” once the daughter
forms her own family unit. This mechanism is discussed in the results section below.
The other focal regressor in equation (1.1) is the indicator for welfare reform. As
discussed previously, states began reforming AFDC in earnest starting in 1992, four years
prior to passage of PRWORA. States had to submit requests for waivers from Federal
rules to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, e.g., to introduce a time
limit on benefits or to expand asset limits for eligibility. If the waiver was approved,
then there was generally a lag between the time of approval and when the policy was
implemented. Indeed, some approved waivers never were implemented (Grogger and
Karoly, 2005). I thus use the implementation date of the waiver as the date when reform
is first in place, and the variable remains on for each year thereafter. For those states that
did not implement waivers I use the implementation date of their TANF program. While
the major AFDC waiver implementation period is defined as 1992-1996, the earliest major
waivers were officially implemented in Michigan and New Jersey as of October 1992, and
the latest implementation of TANF was in New York as of November 1997. In the data,
the implementation of welfare reform is denoted by the earliest year in which at least
3 quarters of the year are observed after reform (either by waiver or TANF), implying
that the reform variable spans 1993-1998.9 As seen in Table 1.1, about 65 percent of
daughter-year observations occur after welfare reform, while for mothers it is only around
14 percent.
Table 1.1 also contains demographic characteristics of the daughter and mother, as well
as the main instrumental variables. Daughters are 28 years old on average before reform
and 39 after reform, while mothers are 42 and 59 years old, respectively, highlighting
9For specific dates of welfare reform waiver approval and implementation, see Crouse (1999).
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the long observation windows I observe families compared to prior research. For the
estimation sample, approximately 72 percent of daughters reside in their state of birth
during adulthood.10 The nominal values of the maximum guarantees and credit are
converted to real 2012 dollars using the personal consumption expenditure deflator.11
The average real maximum AFDC/TANF benefit standard facing mothers was $724 over
the entire sample period, but fell nearly in half in the post reform era which reflects the
fact that most states have left the nominal guarantees unchanged for decades (Ziliak,
2007). On the other hand, the real value of the EITC facing mothers in the welfare/no-
welfare decision increased by a factor of three, highlighting the push to a work-based
safety net in recent decades.
1.5 Estimates of Welfare Reform on Intergenerational Transmission
In presenting the empirical results, I first focus on the baseline linear probability model
correcting for nonrandom selection and misclassification error, and then expand the out-
comes to include participation in additional transfer programs as well as human capital
and employment. Having established that welfare reform only affected the intergenera-
tional transmission of AFDC/TANF and not additional outcomes, I then return to the
AFDC/TANF model to assess the robustness of the findings to life-cycle bias and cross-
state mobility. All models control for time-varying demographic controls of the daughter
(a quadratic in her age and indicators for the number of children in her home) as well
as dummy variables for state of residence and year. The standard errors are robust to
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the state level given the focus on state welfare reforms.
10Also, statistics not shown in Table 1.1 indicate that 63 percent of daughters live in the same state
as their mothers, while 57 percent never change states during the entire observation period.
11Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2016, Personal Consumption Expenditures Excluding
Food and Energy, Chain-Type Price Index [series: DPCCRG3A086NBEA], retrieved from FRED, Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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1.5.1 Baseline Estimates
The first four columns of Table 1.2 contain the baseline estimates of the parameters of
interest in equation (1.1), with and without instrumental variables and corrections for
misclassification of the dependent variable. The IV estimate of the effect of mother’s
AFDC participation prior to welfare reform in column (2) is 0.281 (s.e. = 0.056), mean-
ing that if the daughter’s mother ever participated in AFDC then the daughter is 28
percentage points more likely to participate as an adult. This estimate, which corrects
for correlated unobservables between mother and daughter and possible measurement
error in mother’s survey reports, is economically large and nearly double the OLS esti-
mate in column (1), but is within the range of estimates among studies from that era
surveyed in Page (2004).12 That correlation falls 70 percent after welfare reform to 0.084
(= 0.281−0.197). Because the underlying probability of being on welfare fell by a similar
proportion as seen in Table 1.1, if considering percent changes in transmission as a frac-
tion of the baseline probability, then the effect of welfare reform in column (1) would be a
48 percent reduction (= 1− ((0.281− 0.197)/0.025)/(0.281/0.044)). The p-value of these
changes is less than 0.005. This suggests that two-thirds of the post-reform reduction
in the probability of AFDC/TANF participation came about from reduced transmission
from mother to child. Note that the after-welfare reform variable has a positive effect
on daughter’s participation, suggesting that in the absence of welfare reform the trend
increase in intergenerational transmission would have continued.
12Note that this estimate is lower than a simple average of the trend estimates in Figure 1.2 because
the samples differ. Figure 1.2 depicts whether the daughter is ever on welfare before age 27, while the
sample used in estimating equation (1.1) is for any contemporaneous welfare use after forming a family
unit, regardless of daughter age. Table 1.2 also includes state and year effects as well as daughter control
variables, while the figure shows unconditional correlations.
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Table 1.2. Intergenerational Transmission of Mother’s AFDC/TANF Participation
Daughter’s Outcome: AFDC/TANF AFDC/TANF, SNAP, SSI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mother’s Participation 0.146 0.281 0.236 0.428 0.226 0.279 0.294 0.349
(0.014) (0.056) (0.022) (0.093) (0.019) (0.070) (0.024) (0.091)
After Welfare Reform 0.036 0.072 0.047 0.087 0.003 −0.016 −0.011 −0.049
(0.007) (0.022) (0.014) (0.033) (0.013) (0.031) (0.020) (0.043)
Mother’s Participation × −0.101 −0.197 −0.134 −0.234 −0.044 0.055 −0.020 0.159
After Welfare Reform (0.015) (0.050) (0.030) (0.081) (0.021) (0.080) (0.030) (0.109)
Instrumental Variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Misclassification Correction No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Weak IV Test Statistic 23.092 21.083 23.092 21.739
p-value 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.003
Hansen J Statistic 2.370 2.069 9.970 9.792
p-value 0.883 0.913 0.126 0.134
Percent Change in Levels -70% -70% -57% -55% -19% 20% -7% 46%
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.552 0.495 0.268
Percent Change over Baseline -47% -48% -40% -37% -14% 27% -6% 47%
p-value 0.000 0.004 0.006 0.031 0.118 0.439 0.548 0.259
Number of Daughters 2961 2961 2961 2961 2961 2961 2961 2961
Observations 56068 56068 56068 56068 56068 56068 56068 56068
Notes: Robust standard errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. All specifications control for state
and year effects in addition to time-varying controls for daughter’s age, age squared, and indicators for number of
children equal to 1, 2, 3, or at least 4. Instrumental variables include average and maximum measures of the mother’s
AFDC/TANF benefit standard and federal/state EITC maximum credit by family size, which are defined over the
daughter’s critical exposure ages 12-18, and interactions of each with an indicator for welfare reform. The weak IV test
statistic is a Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank statistic. The misclassification correction uses reporting rates in the PSID to
address potential misreporting for the daughter’s welfare participation (see Appendix A for details). Daughters’ PSID
core longitudinal weights are used in estimation. Abbreviations: Food Stamps/Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP), and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).
While the baseline estimates intrinsically address misclassification of the mother’s
welfare participation by design (longer panels of nonattriters, instrumental variables, and
ever on welfare instead of contemporaneous), they do not directly address the possibility
of a binary mismeasured dependent variable. Columns (3) and (4) in Table 1.2 show the
baseline estimates with misclassification bias corrections. As expected, the estimates are
larger than those with no correction in columns (1) and (2), and indeed the corrected esti-
mates without instruments in column (3) are on par with the uncorrected IV estimates in
column (2). The IV estimates in column (4) suggest that the transmission from mother to
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daughter is stronger in the pre-reform AFDC period after adjusting for misclassification,
but the post reform reduction is still a large and statistically significant 55 percent, or 37
percent over the baseline odds of participation. Note that the bias-corrected IV estimates
are likely to be upper-bounds because the estimates of reporting rates from Meyer et al.
(2015b) come from annual cross sections of the PSID but the estimation sample consists
of a long panel of stayers who tend to be more accurate in reporting (Bollinger and David,
2005).
A standard concern with IV estimates is the quality and exogeneity of the instruments.
In Appendix Table B.1 I present the first stage estimates of the effect of the instruments
on the mother’s participation decision in the pre-reform period (recall that the model
also instruments the interaction between mother’s welfare and her state-by-year welfare
reform indicator), and in the middle of Table 1.2 I present standard tests of instrument
strength and exogeneity. The null hypothesis of weak instruments is strongly rejected
using the Kleibergen-Paap rank test, while the null of valid overidentifying restrictions
from the Hansen J-test is not, suggesting the IV estimates are consistent.
In Appendix Tables B2-B7 I subject the baseline IV estimates to a number of spec-
ification checks. In Table B.2 I consider several additional state-by-year instruments,
including the overall application denial rate in AFDC/TANF, the application denial rate
for procedural reasons, the rate at which hearing requests are disposed in favor of the
claimant, and the state unemployment rate. The first three of these are indicators for
how administratively stringent the states application procedures are and are potentially
strong instruments for separating the welfare and poverty trap arguments. I do not in-
clude the overall application denial rate in the baseline Table 1.2 estimates because the
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denial rate includes not only exogenous procedural denials but also legitimate denials
based on failing income and asset tests, while the other two are not included because I
was unable to construct a full state-by-year time series over the 45 years of the sample
(note the loss of over 23,000 observations). Although prior research has demonstrated the
strong role the macroeconomy plays in determining participation in AFDC/TANF, it also
is a key determinant of the cyclicality of poverty rates and thus may not be as effective
in separating out the poverty trap from the welfare trap and thus I do not include it in
Table 1.2. Regardless, across the 6 columns in Table B.2 I get nearly identical transmis-
sion effects both before and after welfare reform as in Table 1.2. Likewise, the results are
little changed when I add controls for mother’s background like education and income
(Table B.3), when I do not weight the estimates or when I drop the SEO oversample of
the poor (Table B.4), when I limit attention to eldest daughters only (Table B.5), and
when I restrict the sample to those mothers at greatest risk of welfare participation, i.e.
low education or ever in poverty or near poverty (Table B.6).13
In all variants of equation (1.1) estimated in Table 1.2, I find that the OLS estimate
of mother’s participation is smaller than the IV estimate, a result that is consistent
with other papers in the literature (see, for example, Dahl et al., 2014). Generally, the
OLS can be different from the IV estimate for, at least, three reasons: selection bias,
heterogeneous effects, and measurement error. In this setting, it is difficult a priori to
predict the sign of the bias of OLS. For instance, it may be natural to expect upward-
biased OLS estimates under the assumption that unobservables are positively correlated
13Regarding controls for mother’s income and education, Levine and Zimmerman (1996) note that these
variables could be endogenous to the daughter’s welfare choice for the same reasons that the mother’s
welfare participation is likely to be endogenous. The unweighted estimates are larger in magnitude due
to the oversample of the poor, suggesting that weights are needed as the weighted estimates are more
comparable to the SRC subsample estimates.
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over generations. However, the effects could be heterogeneous, too. The estimation
sample includes a subpopulation of mothers who are not likely to be affected by the
instruments because their family income is above the poverty line over the entire period
of analysis. Appendix Figure B.1 shows, as expected, that mothers exposed to higher
ADFC/TANF benefits were more likely to participate on welfare, with the exception
of mothers whose average family income is more than twice the poverty line. When
I consider a subsample of mothers with less than 9 years of education in Table B.6, I
find smaller IV estimates of welfare transmission compared to the corresponding OLS
estimates in Table 1.2.14 These results and the instrument-induced probabilities shown
in Figure B.1 suggest that the difference between IV and OLS estimates can be attributed
to heterogeneous effects.
The last initial check is in Table B.7. As a falsification exercise, I investigate whether
mother’s future welfare use in any year from t+5 to t+11 correlates with daughter’s wel-
fare use at time t. The OLS estimates suggest that among mothers who previously partic-
ipated on welfare, future participation significantly increases the likelihood of daughter’s
participation by 25 percentage points (column 3). This point estimate is naturally biased
and a probable explanation is failure of controlling for lack of economic opportunities
which creates dependence between mother’s and daughter’s unobservables in this speci-
fication. On the other hand, using the same set of instruments as in Table 1.2, I find an
estimate that it is not statistically significantly different from zero. The results for the
broader safety net suggest similar conclusions. Overall, these results offer suggestive em-
14In the case of the broader safety net, the targeted-population IV estimate in Table B.6 column (5)
is smaller than the corresponding full-population OLS estimate in Table 1.2 column (5).
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pirical evidence that the IV approach seems to attenuate, and possibly eliminate, biases
in the estimation of the impact of the reform.
1.5.2 Participation in the Wider Safety Net and Economic Outcomes
Even if welfare reform reduced the causal transmission of AFDC/TANF participation, a
relevant policy question is the extent to which welfare participation defined more gener-
ally is transmitted across generations. In columns (5)-(8) of Table 1.2, I examine what
effects mother’s AFDC/TANF participation and welfare reform had on the daughter’s
decision to participate in AFDC/TANF, food stamps/SNAP, or SSI. The specifications
exactly parallel those in columns (1)-(4) and with the same controls for daughter’s char-
acteristics and state and year fixed effects. The estimates in columns (5)-(8) show that
the magnitude of intergenerational transmission is very similar prior to welfare reform—
mother’s use of AFDC/TANF increased the odds of the daughter using welfare, food,
or disability assistance in adulthood by 25-35 percentage points. But this is where the
similarity with columns (1)-(4) end as I find no evidence that this transmission channel
was changed after welfare reform.15 In results not tabulated I obtain a similar result if I
also define mother’s participation as welfare, food, or disability assistance.
In addition to reducing welfare participation, the architects of welfare reform aimed
to improve the long-term economic outcomes of children. In Table 1.3 I present least
squares and instrumental variables estimates of equation (1.1) where I alternately replace
the dependent variable of daughter’s welfare participation with indicators equal to 1 for
(i) whether her educational attainment is less than or equal to a high school diploma
(ii) years of no earnings, (iii) years with earnings less than the poverty line, and (iv)
15For misclassification-corrected estimates in Table 1.2 columns (7) and (8), the reporting rate (1− τˆ1t)
used in estimation is the maximum reporting rate for AFDC/TANF and food stamps/SNAP shown in
Appendix Table A.1.
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Table 1.3. Mother’s AFDC/TANF Participation Effect on
Daughter’s Human Capital and Labor Market Outcomes
Daughter’s Outcome: High School No Earnings Below Earnings Below
Education or Less Earnings 100% Poverty 200% Poverty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mother’s Participation 0.251 0.698 0.134 0.181 0.252 0.365 0.313 0.488
(0.049) (0.326) (0.019) (0.057) (0.023) (0.076) (0.023) (0.094)
After Welfare Reform 0.026 0.120 0.014 0.022 0.012 0.012 0.014 0.006
(0.044) (0.093) (0.012) (0.023) (0.020) (0.032) (0.021) (0.041)
Mother’s Participation × 0.005 −0.167 −0.023 −0.037 −0.049 −0.002 −0.041 0.063
After Welfare Reform (0.064) (0.274) (0.017) (0.056) (0.022) (0.076) (0.032) (0.109)
Instrumental Variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Weak IV Test Statistic 22.238 23.191 23.191 23.191
p-value 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Hansen J Statistic 2.430 7.978 6.586 7.137
p-value 0.876 0.240 0.361 0.308
Percent Change in Levels 2% -24% -17% -20% -19% -1% -13% 13%
p-value 0.938 0.416 0.117 0.472 0.015 0.978 0.173 0.586
Percent Change over Baseline 11% -18% -25% -28% -19% 0% -9% 18%
p-value 0.705 0.584 0.009 0.264 0.019 0.991 0.358 0.471
Number of Daughters 2873 2873 2961 2961 2961 2961 2961 2961
Observations 2873 2873 55906 55906 55906 55906 55906 55906
Notes: Robust standard errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. All specifications control for state
and year effects in addition to time-varying controls for daughter’s age, age squared, and indicators for number of
children equal to 1, 2, 3, or at least 4. Instrumental variables include average and maximum measures of the mother’s
AFDC/TANF benefit standard and federal/state EITC maximum credit by family size, which are defined over the
daughter’s critical exposure ages 12-18, and interactions of each with an indicator for welfare reform. The weak IV test
statistic is a Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank statistic. Daughters’ PSID core longitudinal weights are used in estimation.
years with earnings less than twice the poverty line. I present IV estimates because of
possible shared unobservables that spill over from mother to daughter into wider economic
domains. Here I find a consistent pattern that daughters exposed to welfare are at risk of
worse economic outcomes in adulthood. The IV estimates suggest they are 18 percentage
points more likely to have episodes of nonemployment compared to daughters not exposed,
37 percentage points more likely to have incomes under poverty in a given year, 49 points
more likely to have episodes of near poverty, and 70 percentage points more likely to have
lower human capital attainment. The findings in Table 1.3 indicate that the 1996 reform
to welfare did not substantively alter these risks for daughters.
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Because the evidence thus far points to a reduced transmission in AFDC/TANF par-
ticipation across generations after welfare reform, but not on wider use of the safety net
or risk of worse economic outcomes in adulthood, in the remaining sections I focus on
potential mechanisms of the AFDC/TANF transmission pathway. The next section ex-
plores how the IV estimates (with and without misclassification corrections) vary once I
adjust the length of observation window for mother and daughter living together during
potential years of welfare exposure, which may be critical years susceptible to life-cycle
bias. It also investigates the sensitivity of the results to daughters’ geographic movements
that may be an endogenous response to the welfare climate in the state.
1.5.3 Sensitivity Analysis for Life-Cycle Bias and Geographic Mobility
A data constraint facing most intergenerational research is that full life cycles of daugh-
ters and mothers are generally not available. This leads to two related forms of bias,
potentially reinforcing. One form of bias results from the fact that mothers and daugh-
ters are typically observed at different points of their life cycles. In the intergenerational
income mobility literature, this has come to be known as life-cycle bias (Grawe, 2006;
Haider and Solon, 2006; Jenkins, 1987; Lee and Solon, 2009; Nybom and Stuhler, 2016).
The issue with income is that daughters tend to be observed when young and incomes low
(but rising), and mothers at middle age when incomes are high (and stable or perhaps
falling). This systematic deviation of current income from lifetime income is a form of
nonclassical measurement error and tends to attenuate the intergenerational correlation
of incomes. In the welfare context, participation tends to be high when young, both be-
cause incomes are low and odds of the presence of young children high, and participation
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is low when older (for the opposite reason of the young), again leading to attenuation in
the intergenerational correlation.
A related measurement issue, frequently referred to as the “window problem” in the
welfare literature (Gottschalk, 1992, 1996; Page, 2004; Wolfe et al., 1996), occurs when
the length of observation is too short for either, or perhaps both, generations. The win-
dow problem is a form of measurement error in the sense that limited observations of
an individual’s welfare participation is an underreporting issue when complete histories
are not available. Short windows could lead to underestimation of parameters if true
participation is omitted, yet it could also lead to overestimation if long-term spells are
overrepresented in the short window and long-term exposure matters more for transmit-
ting dependency.
My primary solution to the life-cycle bias and window problem is to utilize the much
longer time series now available in the PSID compared to prior studies. For each mother-
daughter pair, I observe the daughter as head/spouse of her own family unit for 25 years
on average and for as long as 38 years. In addition, I observe the mother and daughter
co-residing for 14 years on average with at least 5 years during the daughter’s ages 12-18
when the potential for welfare learning is heightened. Thus, the data come much closer
to covering the entire life cycle of welfare participation. As a first check, in Appendix
Table B.8 I examine the window problem by extending the minimum requirement that
the pairs be observed for at least ten and fifteen years, respectively. In those cases, the
reduction in the level of mother’s transmission after welfare reform ranges between 56
percent to 77 percent, while the reduction in terms of baseline probability of participation
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Table 1.4. Intergenerational Transmission of AFDC/TANF Participation
with Lee-Solon-type (2009) Life-Cycle Adjustments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mother’s Participation 0.114 0.254 0.223 0.443
(0.012) (0.042) (0.020) (0.081)
After Welfare Reform 0.024 0.062 0.032 0.065
(0.008) (0.017) (0.015) (0.038)
Mother’s Participation × −0.066 −0.140 −0.108 −0.192
After Welfare Reform (0.015) (0.043) (0.035) (0.100)
Instrumental Variables No Yes No Yes
Misclassification Correction No No Yes Yes
Weak IV Test Statistic 31.231 36.102
p-value 0.455 0.242
Hansen J Statistic 30.746 31.094
p-value 0.428 0.411
Percent Change in Levels -58% -55% -49% -44%
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010
Percent Change over Baseline -26% -21% -29% -22%
p-value 0.151 0.343 0.134 0.351
Number of Daughters 2961 2961 2961 2961
Observations 56068 56068 56068 56068
Notes: Robust standard errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. All specifications control for state and
year effects in addition to time-varying controls for daughter’s age, age squared, and indicators for number of children
equal to 1, 2, 3, or at least 4. Additional controls for Lee-Solon-type age adjustments include a quartic on mother’s
mean age during prior years of potential welfare participation, a quartic on daughter’s current age detrended by 25, and
mother’s participation indicator interacted with the quartic on daughter’s detrended age. Instrumental variables include
average and maximum measures of the mother’s AFDC/TANF benefit standard and federal/state EITC maximum
credit by family size, which are defined over the daughter’s critical exposure ages 12-18, and interactions of each with
an indicator for welfare reform as well as interactions with a quartic in daughter’s detrended age. The weak IV test
statistic is a Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank statistic. The misclassification correction uses reporting rates in the PSID to
address potential misreporting for the daughter’s welfare participation (see Appendix A for details). Daughters’ PSID
core longitudinal weights are used in estimation.
ranges between 43 percent and 60 percent, both of which are comparable to the estimates
reported in Table 1.2.
I next present estimates in Table 1.4 that implement a life-cycle age adjustment pro-
posed by Lee and Solon (2009) in the context of income mobility. Specifically, I augment
the model with a quartic in the average age of the mother during prior (to time t) periods
of potential welfare participation, a quartic in the detrended daughter’s current age, and
the interactions between the quartic in daughter’s detrended age and mother’s participa-
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tion as well as the indicator for mother’s participation after welfare reform. Note that as
before the interactions with mother’s welfare participation are endogenous in this setting,
and therefore, in the IV models of columns (2) and (4), the instrument set includes a
detrended quartic in daughter’s age times the average of mother’s AFDC/TANF benefit
standard and federal/state EITC by family size when the daughter was living with the
mother and she was between 12 and 18 years old, and these instruments are also inter-
acted with reform. Because fertility rates among low-income women peak in their mid
20s (Lopoo, 2007), I detrend around daughter’s age of 25. Comparing the OLS estimates
in column (1) of Tables 1.2 and 1.4, it is clear that the age adjustments do not influence
the results qualitatively, and with only small quantitative differences in the pre-reform
era and slightly larger attenuation in the post-reform era (in absolute value).16
Up to this point, the models have allowed for the possibility that daughters reside in a
different state than their mothers and/or have moved to another state during adulthood.
If such movements are an endogenous response to the welfare climate in the state, then
this could lead to biased estimates of welfare reform and the transmission across gener-
ations. The power and exogeneity of the instrumental variables hinge on the degree to
which welfare policies determine participation, and on the extent to which families have
no control over welfare policy, especially via endogenous migration. The evidence on
whether there is endogenous internal migration in response to welfare generosity in the
U.S. is mixed (Gelbach, 2004; Kennan and Walker, 2010; Levine and Zimmerman, 1999;
McKinnish, 2007), yet when effects are found, they are very small in magnitude. Also,
16While the IV estimates of percent reductions after reform are smaller, the Lee-Solon age adjustment
introduces multiple endogenous variable interactions leading to lower instrument efficiency in estimation.
Overall, the evidence is suggestive that a long panel is adequate to account for potential life-cycle bias
in intergenerational transmission of welfare.
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Table 1.5. IV Estimates of the Intergenerational Transmission of AFDC/TANF
Participation by Daughter’s Geographic Mobility Status
Daughter’s State of Residence: Same as Birth Same as Mother Never Moves
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mother’s Participation 0.331 0.527 0.379 0.534 0.414 0.644
(0.081) (0.140) (0.082) (0.133) (0.105) (0.168)
After Welfare Reform 0.084 0.103 0.079 0.086 0.107 0.132
(0.030) (0.050) (0.019) (0.034) (0.046) (0.070)
Mother’s Participation × −0.235 −0.273 −0.265 −0.279 −0.297 −0.348
After Welfare Reform (0.075) (0.125) (0.070) (0.116) (0.104) (0.160)
Misclassification Correction No Yes No Yes No Yes
Weak IV Test Statistic 18.419 17.718 18.119 16.813 13.906 13.735
p-value 0.010 0.013 0.011 0.019 0.053 0.056
Hansen J Statistic 3.924 3.427 3.834 3.432 3.279 3.570
p-value 0.687 0.754 0.699 0.753 0.773 0.735
Percent Change in Levels -71% -52% -70% -52% -72% -54%
p-value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Percent Change over Baseline -49% -33% -48% -36% -52% -38%
p-value 0.034 0.124 0.001 0.042 0.010 0.051
Number of Daughters 2618 2618 2757 2757 1961 1961
Observations 44122 44122 36823 36823 36404 36404
Notes: Robust standard errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. All specifications control for state
and year effects in addition to time-varying controls for daughter’s age, age squared, and indicators for number of
children equal to 1, 2, 3, or at least 4. Instrumental variables include average and maximum measures of the mother’s
AFDC/TANF benefit standard and federal/state EITC maximum credit by family size, which are defined over the
daughter’s critical exposure ages 12-18, and interactions of each with an indicator for welfare reform. The weak IV test
statistic is a Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank statistic. The misclassification correction uses reporting rates in the PSID to
address potential misreporting for the daughter’s welfare participation (see Appendix A for details). Daughters’ PSID
core longitudinal weights are used in estimation.
Ziliak et al. (2000) show that states’ decisions to adopt waivers were not an endogenous
response to the growing welfare caseload in the early 1990s. Both of these suggest that
state-level welfare policies like the maximum guarantee are exogenous to an individual’s
welfare choice.
As a test on the baseline sample, I consider three alternatives to the IV models in Table
1.2: restricting the sample of daughters to those who reside in the same state as their
birth state, restricting the sample of daughters to those residing in the same state as their
mothers, and restricting the sample of daughters to those who never move during their
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observed lifetime. Table 1.5 shows that both the direct effect of mothers’ participation and
the interaction with welfare reform are larger in absolute value in Table 1.5 compared
to estimates in Table 1.2, yet the changes are relatively proportional such that both
the percent reduction in levels and percent-over-baseline reduction of transmission after
welfare reform are roughly the same. The magnitudes of estimates in Table 1.5 get
successively larger in absolute value as I tighten the geographic link between mother and
daughter, and are suggestive that the mobility of daughters across state lines can “undo”
some of the intergenerational transmission of welfare, although the differences from the
baseline estimates are modest.
1.6 Heterogeneity of Policy Effects
I next investigate timing of transmission by age and duration of exposure, and hetero-
geneity by race and welfare reform aggressiveness.
1.6.1 Timing of Welfare Transmission Effects
In the first set of results, I examine how the base-case IV estimates with and without
misclassification corrections in Table 1.2 change if I restrict the daughter’s potential
welfare exposure to only periods of co-residence. Recall that in Table 1.2, the daughter
could be exposed to her mother’s welfare use at any time in the life cycle provided it was
prior to the current period t, including those periods when the daughter no longer lived at
home but had younger siblings at home that make her mother welfare-eligible. In the first
two columns of Table 1.6, the pre-reform transmission effect is little changed relative to
the baseline in Table 1.2, and again, the post-reform interaction changes proportionally.
This implies that welfare reform had the same percent reduction of welfare transmission
among those daughters exposed only during co-residence.
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Table 1.6. Intergenerational Transmission of AFDC/TANF Participation
by Exposure Mechanism via “Word of Mouth”
Any Prior Exposure with
Exposure During Daughter Fixed Effects and
Co-Residence Only “Word-of-Mouth” Learning
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mother’s Participation 0.272 0.413 0.079 0.218
(0.058) (0.070) (0.023) (0.032)
After Welfare Reform 0.058 0.070 0.052 0.073
(0.018) (0.029) (0.011) (0.020)
Mother’s Participation × −0.188 −0.213 −0.128 −0.175
After Welfare Reform (0.058) (0.070) (0.019) (0.034)
Daughter Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Instrumental Variables Yes Yes No No
Misclassification Correction No Yes No Yes
Weak IV Test Statistic 17.399 16.969
p-value 0.015 0.018
Hansen J Statistic 6.285 6.123
p-value 0.392 0.410
Percent Change in Levels -69% -52% -100% -81%
p-value 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000
Percent Change over Baseline -46% -33% -100% -72%
p-value 0.062 0.206 0.010 0.003
Number of Daughters 2961 2961 2961 2961
Observations 56068 56068 56068 56068
Notes: Robust standard errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. All specifications control for state
and year effects in addition to time-varying controls for daughter’s age, age squared, and indicators for number of
children equal to 1, 2, 3, or at least 4. Instrumental variables include average and maximum measures of the mother’s
AFDC/TANF benefit standard and federal/state EITC maximum credit by family size, and interactions of each with
an indicator for welfare reform. Given the independent variable definition in columns (1) and (2), the instruments
are defined over the years of mother-daughter co-residence only (elsewhere, instruments are defined over the critical
exposure years when the daughter is aged 12-18). The weak IV test statistic is a Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank statistic.
The misclassification correction uses reporting rates in the PSID to address potential misreporting for the daughter’s
welfare participation (see Appendix A for details). Daughters’ PSID core longitudinal weights are used in estimation.
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In the baseline models, the estimation sample requires mothers and daughters to co-
reside at least five years during the ages of 12-18. As discussed in the data section, this
age range was selected in part from convention in the literature, but there is little prior
evidence on whether “age of exposure” mattered for welfare learning. In Figure 1.3, I
present new empirical evidence of age at critical exposure windows by using rolling five-
year and ten-year windows from age 4 through age 17. The figure presents IV estimates of
the pre-welfare reform effect of mothers’ AFDC participation and the interaction between
mother’s participation and reform, along with 95-percent pointwise confidence intervals.
Figure 1.3 shows that the magnitude of the direct effect of the mother’s participation
increases as the age of first exposure increases, suggesting that the learning effect is
stronger during adolescence and teen years relative to early childhood. The definition of
a critical exposure period matters more for shorter windows given that larger windows
are more likely to include some critical learning period.
As a further exploration of age of exposure, columns (3)-(4) in Table 1.6 present panel-
data fixed-effects estimates of the welfare transmission with and without misclassification
corrections. Specifically, I admit error components into the model consisting of latent
person-specific heterogeneity as vdist = λ
d
i + u
d
ist, where λ
d
i is a time-invariant daughter
fixed effect and udist is an error term. I assume that the daughter fixed effect contains
a component common to the daughter and the mother from shared family heritage and
experiences (including health status, attitudes), as well as that which is daughter-specific
such as school quality and neighborhood. Identification of the direct, pre-reform effect of
mother’s participation is subtler in the fixed-effects specification. Namely, transmission
can only occur via “word-of-mouth” from mother to daughter after the daughter has left
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Figure 1.3. Critical Exposure Period for AFDC/TANF
Transmission Through Age 17
A. 5−Year Window
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B. 10−Year Window
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Notes: The dependent variable is daughter’s current AFDC/TANF status, and the independent variables
include any previous AFDC/TANF participation for the mother, an indicator for after welfare reform, an
interaction term for mother’s participation after welfare reform, state and year effects, daughter time-varying
controls, and instrumental variables including the average and maximum of mother’s AFDC/TANF benefit
standard and federal/state EITC maximum benefit by family size during the daughter’s critical age period,
and interactions of each with an indicator for welfare reform.
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home to form her own family unit. This follows from my definition of mother’s prior
welfare use that once the variable “turns on” it remains on for the duration that they
remain in the sample. If the mother joins welfare while the daughter co-resides then I
cannot separate this from the fixed effect; however, if she joins after the daughter leaves
because of younger children present, then verbal transmission of the program can still
occur and identify the parameters of interest.
The direct effect of mother’s transmission in column (3) of Table 1.6 is almost half
the size of the estimate from column (1) of Table 1.2, suggesting that a sizable fraction
of the transmission that is passed from parent to child occurs after the daughter leaves
home. In fact, the total effect after welfare reform is negative (0.079− 0.128), suggesting
that welfare reform shut down this transmission channel. However, fixed-effects methods
exacerbate attenuation bias, so it is natural to find estimates lower in absolute value.17
Once I make time-varying corrections for misclassification in column (4), the mother’s
direct effect only drops about one tenth from the estimate in column (3) of Table 1.2,
though the percent change after reform is larger and I find that the level and percentage
of the word-of-mouth transmission channel declines significantly.
A daughter’s exposure to welfare and her resulting propensity for dependence will
likely vary as a function of her mother’s duration of participation, or otherwise stated, her
intensity of treatment exposure. Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) propose measuring welfare
dependence as the total time on welfare or the total percent of income from transfers, and
Pepper (2000) models daughters’ welfare outcomes depending on categorical definitions
of mother’s duration in years. In order to allow the mother’s effect to vary by duration,
17For measurement error in a dichotomous independent variable in a panel setting, see Freeman (1984);
the case for errors in continuous variables in panels is addressed by Griliches and Hausman (1986).
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Figure 1.4. AFDC/TANF Transmission Effects by Duration
of Mother’s Longest Spell on Welfare
A. OLS Estimates
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B. IV Estimates
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Notes: The dependent variable is daughter’s current AFDC/TANF participation status, and the inde-
pendent variables include an indicator for whether the mother’s maximum welfare spell duration is greater
than t′ = {1, 2, . . . , 6} (see x-axis), an indicator for after welfare reform, an interaction term for mother’s
longest spell duration indicator and after welfare reform, state and year effects, and daughter time-varying
controls for her age, age squared, and indicators for number of children 1, 2, 3, or 4 or more. Instrumental
variables for the mother’s participation in Panel B include average and maximum measures of the mother’s
AFDC/TANF benefit standard and federal/state EITC maximum credit by family size and interactions of
each with an indicator for welfare reform. Dashed lines represent 95-percent pointwise confidence intervals
with state-level clustering.
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I successively redefine mothers’ welfare participation as at least 1 year, at least 2 years,
and so on, until at least 6 years and re-estimate the model with each specification.
Figure 1.4 shows the effects of mother’s welfare participation differentiated by short-
and long-term welfare dependence on the same dependent variable described above, that
is, a daughter’s extensive-margin decision to participate in a given year. While the OLS
estimates suggest that the transmission effect is constant regardless of length of exposure,
the IV estimates in Panel B indicate that the level of transmission effect of long-term
mother’s participation on welfare is larger than the effect of short-term participation.
However, because the post-reform coefficient is getting larger in absolute value as the
length of exposure increases, the percent reduction in transmission after welfare reform
is fairly stable post reform.
1.6.2 Welfare Transmission Effects by Race and Strictness of Reform
There is a vast literature on the socioeconomic differences between blacks and whites
(see, for example, Donohue and Heckman, 1991; Duncan and Hoffman, 1990; Smith and
Welch, 1989), but with the notable exceptions of Gottschalk (1996) and Pepper (2000),
whether or not there are racial differences in the transmission of intergenerational welfare
has received less attention compared to other outcomes. The issue is salient in part
because the risk of out-of-wedlock births is at least two times higher among blacks than
whites, as is the risk of poverty in childhood.
The first two columns of Table 1.7 present OLS and IV estimates for the transmission
of AFDC/TANF from mother to daughter separated by blacks and whites. Specifically,
I include an indicator variable for whether the daughter is black, and I interact that with
both mother’s participation and welfare reform (and interact all instrumental variables
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Table 1.7. Heterogeneous Intergenerational Transmission of AFDC/TANF
Participation
Transmission Effects by: A. Race B. Reform Aggressiveness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Black Aggressive States
Mother’s Participation 0.166 0.442 0.139 0.184
(0.027) (0.173) (0.016) (0.040)
Mother’s Participation × −0.101 −0.233 −0.099 −0.133
After Welfare Reform (0.032) (0.185) (0.022) (0.040)
White Non-Aggressive States
Mother’s Participation 0.068 0.146 0.148 0.305
(0.013) (0.073) (0.018) (0.074)
Mother’s Participation × −0.057 −0.125 −0.102 −0.228
After Welfare Reform (0.014) (0.071) (0.018) (0.065)
Instrumental Variables No Yes No Yes
Weak IV Test Statistic 25.131 26.612
p-value 0.022 0.014
Hansen J Statistic 8.813 9.567
p-value 0.719 0.654
Black Aggressive States
Percent Change in Levels -61% -53% -71% -72%
p-value 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.000
Percent Change over Baseline -31% -17% -50% -51%
p-value 0.193 0.703 0.087 0.035
White Non-Aggressive States
Percent Change in Levels -84% -85% -69% -75%
p-value 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
Percent Change over Baseline -72% -74% -46% -56%
p-value 0.001 0.115 0.002 0.001
Number of Daughters 2848 2848 2961 2961
Observations 54956 54956 56068 56068
Notes: Robust standard errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. All specifications control for state
and year effects in addition to time-varying controls for daughter’s age, age squared, and indicators for number of
children equal to 1, 2, 3, or at least 4. Instrumental variables include average and maximum measures of the mother’s
AFDC/TANF benefit standard and federal/state EITC maximum credit by family size, which are defined over the
daughter’s critical exposure ages 12-18, interactions with an indicator for welfare reform, and interactions of each with
an indicator for daughter’s race is black in columns (1)-(2) or state’s reform is stringent in columns (3)-(4). The weak
IV test statistic is a Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank statistic. Daughters’ PSID core longitudinal weights are used in
estimation.
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with the indicator for daughter’s race). As before, all models control for state and year
effects, a quadratic in daughter’s age, and indicators for the number of children in the
daughter’s family. The first two columns in the upper panel of Table 1.7 suggest that the
pre-reform effect of welfare transmission was much stronger among blacks than whites
(in column (2), 0.442 compared to 0.146). However, while the transmission channel was
substantively reduced among both blacks and whites after welfare reform, the percent
change is much larger among whites.
States differed dramatically in the degree of aggressiveness in implementation of wel-
fare reform, both in the waiver era and after TANF. While there is no agreed upon
measure of strictness in the literature, I follow Grogger and Karoly (2005, Table 4.2) and
define strict states as those whereby all main studies surveyed agree that the sanctions
policy adopted by the state during 1992-1996 was strict (there were 13 states that met
this criteria). Ziliak (2007) examined five different categories of welfare reform aggressive-
ness and concluded that the latter measure was the best proxy for strict policy reforms.
I then include this measure of welfare reform stringency in a triple-difference framework
to test whether there were differences in intergenerational transmission in those states
that adopted more-strict reforms compared to states with less-strict reforms.
The last two columns of Table 1.7 report estimates corresponding to the effects of
interest for the triple-difference model based on state reform aggressiveness. Across both
specifications, the transmission mechanisms between mother and daughter before welfare
reform were qualitatively smaller in aggressive states than in non-aggressive states. This
suggests that there was some permanent difference among residents in states adopting
strict reforms versus less strict reforms (even after controlling for state fixed effects).
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However, after reform, this difference was attenuated, resulting in very similar percent
reductions in both the levels and probability of participation, suggesting some degree of
convergence in welfare climates across states after welfare reform.
1.7 Discussion and Conclusion
A focal aim of policymakers with the 1990s welfare reform was to end dependence on
welfare, and based on the metric of the intergenerational transmission between mother
and daughter, the evidence presented here suggests partial success toward meeting that
goal. Viewed narrowly from the lens of participation in the AFDC/TANF program, I find
strong evidence that the level of transmission from mother to daughter was reduced by at
least 50 percent, and by at least 30 percent over the baseline odds of participation. These
results are robust across a variety of specifications that address major threats to iden-
tification including selection bias, misclassification bias, life-cycle bias, and geographic
mobility. Despite the statistical challenges faced in this work, one consistent interpre-
tation of these results implies that when the AFDC/TANF use fell precipitously after
1996, the reform had a differential impact among adult daughters who were exposed to
welfare in their childhood and those who were not. The change of at least 30 percentage
points over the odds of participation suggests that between one-half and two-thirds of
the caseload decline comes from reduced transmission.
Beyond participation in AFDC/TANF, however, the 1996 welfare reform did not alter
the generational economic bonds between mother and daughter. These findings suggest
that welfare reform did not change the transmission of participation in the wider safety net
including food and disability assistance, nor did it alter the ties between mothers welfare
use and daughters later life outcomes of human capital or labor market success. This
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finding is consistent with the previous welfare reform research on mothers’ outcomes—
the reforms explained some of the decline in AFDC/TANF participation but had no
substantive effects on work, earnings, marriage, health, or wealth (Blank, 2002; Moffitt,
2003; Ziliak, 2016). That research also found no substantive changes on the well-being
of children, although the evidence in that domain is more limited. The results of this
study expand upon the previous null effects of welfare reform on the wider domain of
intragenerational economic outcomes to the intergenerational context.
At first blush this lack of effect on economic success seems surprising given the scale
and scope of the reform. However, this becomes more clear when examining how states
chose to allocate their block grants. Prior to reform states spent around $0.75 of every
$1 of benefit in the form of cash assistance, whereas today only about $0.20 goes toward
cash, and another $0.20 toward child care. Moreover, there is great variation across states,
ranging from less than $0.15 on cash assistance and child care in Arizona to nearly $0.70 in
Pennsylvania. The remaining funds are known as “non-assistance” and states have great
leeway in how those funds get allocated, ranging from marriage preparation programs to
middle class tax cuts (Bitler and Hoynes, 2016). That is, the program is substantially less
target-efficient and does not entail much investment in long-term economic self-sufficiency.
A potential consequence is the stagnating mobility of daughters. I explore this possibility
in Figure 1.5 where I present descriptive trends in intergenerational correlations between
mothers and daughters akin to Figure 1.2, but now for four measures of economic status:
(1) poverty status defined as an income-to-needs ratio less than 1, where needs is defined
by the U.S. Census Bureau poverty line that varies by family size; (2) poverty status
defined as an income-to-needs ratio less than 1.3 (the cutoff for food stamps); (3) poverty
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Figure 1.5. Trends in the Intergenerational Transmission of
Poverty Status and Family Income
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status defined as an income-to-needs ratio less than 2; and, (4) log family income.18 In
the two decades from the late 1970s to 2000, the income mobility of daughters declined
(i.e. the correlation was increasing). And while immobility has not deteriorated further
in the past decade, the income correlations suggest daughters had continued economic
need for assistance from the wider safety net.
I conclude by noting that implicit in most discussion surrounding welfare reform is that
the transmission of welfare reliance from parent to child is inherently a bad outcome. It is
not obvious, however, what is the socially efficient intergenerational correlation of welfare
outcomes. For example, a correlation of zero—perfect mobility with respect to welfare
use—would imply that accumulating “family capital” (wealth, culture, information, and
skills) does nothing to ensure the self-sufficiency of future generations. In some cases,
though, there may be positive attributes to intergenerational transmission of welfare
knowledge if take-up rates are low and learning the welfare system helps needy recipients
(Currie, 2006). Indeed, in the few years after welfare reform, take-up rates of food
stamps among those eligible fell about 20 percentage points to just over 50 percent,
mainly because potential recipients were not aware of their eligibility in a post-reform
environment that discouraged welfare more generally (Ganong and Liebman, 2013; Ziliak,
2015). The policy response by USDA was to grant more authority to states to design
their programs to improve take up. Presumably, among those 50 percent who continued
participation, some retained eligibility was because of shared information from parent
to child. This suggests a need for future theoretical and empirical research on optimal
transfer program design that incorporates knowledge spillovers across generations.
18Income-to-needs ratios are constructed as the mean income to mean poverty threshold for a daugh-
ter’s adult life through age 27, and for the mother’s years while the daughter lives at home.
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2 BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES AND WELFARE REFORM: EVIDENCE
FROM A RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENT
2.1 Introduction
Distributional effects of policies are increasingly the causal effect of interest among so-
cial scientists. For example, policy evaluation for experimental reforms may depend on
considerations of target efficiency, such as whether program features induce behavioral
responses where individuals reduce labor supply in order to become income-eligible for
participation. Questions of equity and efficiency were prominent in the public debate
leading up to the largest policy reforms in U.S. welfare history during the 1990s. By
1995, at least 40 states had implemented a policy waiver from the federal rules under Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in order to experiment with work incen-
tives and restrictions. Connecticut was a prime example for policy evaluation in that its
reforms were a combination of the most generous earnings disregards (earnings not used
in benefit reductions) and the most strict time limits. Beginning in 1996, Connecticut
implemented a welfare waiver program called Jobs First, under which women could in-
crease earnings up to the federal poverty line without any reduction in benefits. Welfare
recipients and applicants were randomized into either Jobs First or AFDC, making the
identification of quantile treatment effects (QTEs) possible by experimental design and
under selection on observables. This leads to the key contribution of this study, which
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is to investigate empirically whether unobserved heterogeneity, possibly associated with
welfare participation costs, is relevant for considerations of target efficiency.
The behavioral effects of welfare reform on low-income single mothers, especially re-
garding intensive margin responses on labor hours supplied, is an area of great interest
in policy discussions and within the research literature. For the historical context and
details of welfare policy reform from AFDC to the creation of Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF), see Moffitt (2003) and Ziliak (2016). For a review of welfare
reform effects across 15 European countries, see Immervoll et al. (2007). Bargain and
Orsini (2006), Brewer et al. (2006), and Gonza´lez (2008) investigate other welfare reform
responses in Europe. Beffy et al. (2016) demonstrate the importance of restrictions on
offered hours for low-income mothers in the United Kingdom. Mogstad and Ponzato
(2012) compare work hours for married and single mothers after welfare reform in Nor-
way. Similar work is beginning to look at behavioral responses to transfer programs in
developing economies where the informal labor market provides an alternative margin of
response (Banerjee et al., 2017; Bergolo and Cruces, 2016).
It has been recognized in the literature that AFDC-assigned women leave welfare at
different rates over time than those assigned to Jobs First since these programs have
different features including earnings disregards and time limits (Bitler, Gelbach, and
Hoynes, 2006). It is also known that welfare imposes costs on participants including
transactions costs and stigma (Blank, Card, and Robins, 2000; Blank and Ruggles, 1996;
Currie, 2006; Moffitt, 1983). It is natural then to expect that these factors vary by
treatment status after the random assignment, leading to a framework where AFDC-
assigned women who exited welfare have no participation costs and Jobs First-assigned
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women who did not exit welfare have non-zero participation costs. In order to address the
plausible cost differentials by treatment status, I use a semiparametric quantile estimator
for a sparse econometric model and revisit the distributional analysis of the Jobs First
welfare reform experiment.1 Keys to the identification and estimation of QTEs are the
use of experimental data and an assumption of zero participation costs for women who
exited welfare at conditionally high earnings.
Consistent with the literature, I find a treatment effect estimate at the 0.90 quantile
of -200 dollars of quarterly earnings which suggests that women reduced hours to become
income-eligible for participation. In contrast, once I allow for costs of welfare partici-
pation to be different by individuals and treatment status (e.g., zero participation costs
for AFDC-assigned women), I find evidence suggesting a positive treatment effect of 300
dollars. I propose and perform a test that indicates that these QTEs are significantly dif-
ferent at standard levels. At other quantiles, however, there is no statistically significant
difference between estimates. To put the size of estimated treatment effect differences
in context, Moffitt (1983) estimates that AFDC participation imposes a cost of about 4
hours of labor supply per week, which corresponds to around 520 dollars per quarter at
an hourly wage of 10 dollars (the 90th percentile wage at quarter 1).2 I interpret this
evidence as indicative that women make choices regarding work and welfare based on
their opportunity cost of time, which is increasing in earnings and depends on family
1This approach relates to recent penalized estimators for sparse models proposed in the literature (see,
for example, Belloni and Chernozhukov, 2011; Belloni et al., 2017; Imai and Ratkovic, 2013; for panel
data, see also Harding and Lamarche, 2017). For theory and application of distributional analysis for
welfare programs and treatment effects, see Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997), Bollinger, Gonzalez,
and Ziliak (2009) and Blundell, MaCurdy, and Meghir (2007), among others. Burtless and Hausman
(1978) and Moffitt (2002) investigate the importance of individual parameters in the specification of
econometric models.
2Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) incorporate variable stigma/transaction costs in a structural model
with panel data and estimate that the monetized cost of working while on welfare is approximately $643
per quarter.
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structure, preferences, and program features given treatment status. Further, I expand
the empirical analysis by estimating QTEs for continuing welfare recipients and new ap-
plicants given possible differences in participation costs. Long-term welfare participation,
associated with ongoing recipients, may imply higher informational costs to labor supply
due to limited labor market experience or the effects of persistent stigma. I find evidence
that controlling for latent individual heterogeneity affects behavioral-induced participa-
tion more for those with less labor market experience and longer, more frequent welfare
spells compared to new applicants.
Heterogeneous impacts of the Jobs First experiment have already received notable
attention. Bitler et al. (2006) illustrate the importance of estimating the distributional
effects of a welfare reform experiment by using a nonparametric estimator for the dif-
ference between the treatment and control distributions at given quantiles. According
to their estimates, the reform had no impact at the lower tail of the conditional distri-
bution of earnings, it increased the conditional median of earnings, and it reduced the
upper tail of the earnings distribution. While the mean treatment effect provides an un-
informative summary of opposing effects, treatment effects exhibit significant differences
across quantiles. More recently, Kline and Tartari (2016) estimate bounds for individual
behavioral responses based on revealed preference assumptions. For women who would
earn above the federal poverty line under AFDC, the authors estimate that at least 20
percent would reduce earnings in order to participate under Jobs First. Both of these
studies find evidence that women in the upper earnings distribution reduce labor sup-
ply in order to receive welfare transfers, an example of behavioral-induced participation
(Ashenfelter, 1983). Consistent with these studies, I employ experimental data for Con-
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necticut’s Jobs First waiver program and estimate distributional effects. I distinguish my
approach from the previous literature, however, by incorporating the panel nature of the
Jobs First experiment and allowing a behavioral component of program participation. My
results compare directly to the nonparametric quantile treatment effect as constructed in
Bitler et al. (2006), and I also discuss this design-based approach in comparison to the
methodology and findings of Kline and Tartari (2016). The policy implications regard-
ing behavioral-induced participation as described in the literature do not generalize to
all individuals on welfare near the eligibility threshold, especially regarding continuing
recipients.
This essay is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a simple framework for motivat-
ing the economic model and making testable predictions for heterogeneous labor supply
responses to treatment. Section 2.3 introduces an econometric model consistent with the
framework developed in Section 2.2 and then proposes a new approach for estimating
QTEs in a regression setting. While Section 2.4 discusses the data, Section 2.5 presents
the empirical analysis including regression results and inference on estimated quantile
treatment effects. Section 2.6 offers a discussion on estimation issues and interpretation
of results. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Economic Implications of Jobs First and AFDC programs
Connecticut implemented Jobs First as a welfare reform waiver program beginning in
1996. Approximately half of the cash welfare participants were assigned to Jobs First
and the other half to AFDC. The key feature of this waiver program is a 100-percent
earnings disregard up to the federal poverty line, which leads to an implicit marginal tax
of zero percent. In contrast, AFDC disregarded $120 of monthly earnings for the first year
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in the program and $90 after the first year. The statutory marginal tax rate on earnings
under AFDC is 100 percent such that each additional dollar earned reduces transfers by
one dollar. This dramatic policy change with respect to earnings creates a strong work
incentive for many welfare participants, but it also creates a work disincentive around a
significant notch at the federal poverty line above which Jobs First participants become
income-ineligible for transfers.
While earnings disregards provide a strong motivation for predicting labor supply, the
policy reform included other features that may be salient for behavioral responses. For
instance, earnings were also fully disregarded in Food Stamp benefit determination for the
treatment group. The experimental programs differed along other policy dimensions such
us work requirements, sanctions, and time limits. While Jobs First has a strict 21-month
time limit, AFDC has no time limits. Additionally, Jobs First participants were eligible
for more generous transition benefits for child care and Medicaid after exiting welfare.3
The program features of Jobs First demonstrate a range of policies implemented at the
state level after the transition from AFDC to Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF).
Bitler et al. (2006) note that static labor supply theory motivates the prediction of
heterogeneous treatment effects across the distribution of total income (earnings plus
cash welfare and Food Stamp benefits). Panel A in Figure 2.1 reproduces their stylized
budget constraint with monthly income on the vertical axis and monthly work hours
from 0 to M on the horizontal axis. The federal poverty line is indicated by FPL, and
the welfare benefit guarantee amount by G. The Jobs First budget constraint with 100-
3See Bloom et al. (2002) for a detailed description of differences between Jobs First and AFDC
programs.
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Figure 2.1. Stylized Budget Constraints under Jobs First and AFDC
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Notes: Panel A is reproduced from Bitler et al. (2006) Figure 1. Panel B shows a hypothetical
constraint for Jobs First given nonlinear costs of welfare program participation.
percent earnings disregards is shown by segment AF, and the AFDC constraint is shown
by segment AB.4 Most women in the Jobs First study would begin at a location near
point A, so the figure represents points where women might locate over time under the
AFDC policy in order to predict how their behavior would change under Jobs First. In
panel A, women who would locate at points like D and E under AFDC might be induced
to participate in welfare under Jobs First. For instance, at point D, a woman under
AFDC would become mechanically eligible for welfare under Jobs First and therefore
might be induced to participate by income effect if leisure and consumption were normal
goods. A woman located at point E under AFDC might be behaviorally induced to
participate in Jobs First if the utility gain from participation compensates the reduced
earnings necessary to become eligible below the federal poverty line.5 If women in Jobs
4Whereas the AFDC statutory implicit tax rate is 100 percent, the effective tax rate would be some-
what lower in practice, as shown for segment AB.
5Ashenfelter (1983) emphasizes the distinction between behavioral components of participation, where
an individual changes labor supply behavior in order to meet program eligibility, and mechanical com-
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First are able to increase utility by reducing hours, this would imply a negative treatment
effect at the upper tail of the earnings distribution.
The stylized budget constraint in Figure 2.1 illustrates points to which women may
potentially relocate over time according to Bitler et al. (2006, pg. 994–995). Thus,
treatment effect predictions presume that women in both experimental groups will likely
increase earnings and relocate along their respective budget constraints. In order to
observe behavioral-induced participation, the mechanism must either be reduced exits or
reentry after exit. For both groups, there will be a natural rate of exit from welfare that
may depend on program features. For instance, low-income women assigned to AFDC can
locate at points like D or E after random assignment, and consequently, one can expect a
relative increase in participation due to Jobs First assignment. Therefore, policy impact
estimates should take into account changes in work and participation decisions related
to exposure to treatment over time as well as possible nonlinear changes in participation
costs as hours increase. Becker (1965) motivates the relevance for one’s cost of time with
respect to labor market activities and household production. A woman’s implicit time
costs of working while also meeting welfare program requirements will depend on her
characteristics such as family structure, neighborhood, preferences, or social capital.6
Suppose that women experience individual-specific costs of welfare participation that
are increasing in hours of labor supply. Those with higher earnings have a higher oppor-
tunity cost of time, and thus transaction costs associated with welfare participation may
ponents of participation, where changes in program rules make participation preferable given newly
available choices in an individual’s budget constraint.
6Given that the Jobs First and AFDC programs differ by other features besides earnings disregards
and time limits, there might be other behavioral responses that could differ by treatment status over
time.
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be more relevant for women who are still eligible for welfare while working more hours.7
Therefore, panel B suggests some hypothetical cost for participation that is increasing
with labor hours such that a woman would have to work more hours to reach the same net
earnings.8 Note that women assigned to AFDC would not face such participation costs
at higher earnings since participation eligibility is phased out at lower income levels. In
this case, Jobs First would not be interpreted as a pure income shift at points like D and
E, and thus the labor supply predictions become ambiguous depending on an individual’s
preferences and participation costs.
2.3 A Model and the Proposed Methodology
2.3.1 Economic Model
To start analyzing the economic implications of the Jobs First program, I turn to the
standard potential outcome approach to causal inference. A response variable or potential
outcome has two values for a low-income woman i at quarter t, (Y0,it, Y1,it), one of which is
observed and is labeled Yit. The observed outcome depends upon the random treatment
assignment, Dit, which can take {0, 1} values indicating AFDC or Jobs First status,
respectively. I then write Yit = DitY1,it+(1−Dit)Y0,it and assume that Dit is independent
of the potential outcome.
Let QY (τ) denote the τ -th quantile of the distribution of Y . The outcome variable
Y is continuous and the treatment status D is independent of a p-dimensional vector of
observed covariates, x, as well as unobserved covariates, by the experimental design of
7Also, Gottschalk (2005) shows that the preferences of low-income women may change with exposure
to work and welfare participation, which implies that program features may influence women differently
regarding the disutility of work or welfare.
8Moffitt (1983) illustrates stigma costs through lower levels of utility, though he notes that the utility
model is “closely analogous to one in which costs of participation are monetized and included in the
budget constraint.” In Figure 2.1 panel B, the dashed line indicates the implicit budget constraint (with
monetized participation costs) for Jobs First. A dotted guideline is shown as parallel to net income by
a height equal to the guarantee amount, G, and it continues up to an intersection with the FPL.
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the program. The parameter of interest is the quantile treatment effect (QTE) defined
as
∆ (τ) = QY (τ |D = 1)−QY (τ |D = 0) , (2.1)
representing the change in earnings resulting from treatment at a given quantile. It
is known that the QTE can also be obtained as a parameter of interest in a quantile
regression model. It is immediately apparent that Yit can be written as Yit = Y0,it +
∆Dit where ∆ = Y1,it − Y0,it. Therefore, ∆(τ) can be obtained from the quantile model
associated with the following equation: Yit = ∆Dit + uit, where the error term is uit =
Y0,it.
9
As an extension to the previous model, consider now that the treatment is subject-
specific satisfying ∆i + Y0,it = Y1,it. This can be motivated by individual costs associated
with welfare participation. Without loss of generality, let ∆i = vi + ∆. It follows
then that the treatment effect can be estimated using Yit = Y0,it + viDit + ∆Dit, or,
if the treatment indicator is considered time-invariant given assignment at t = 0, then
Yit = Y0,it + αi + ∆Di0, where unobserved individual heterogeneity is represented by
αi = viDi0. A distinctive feature of this extension is that it leads to a sparse model
where αi is equal to zero if Di0 = 0 and αi = vi if Di0 = 1, which leads to the following
QTE parameter:
∆˜ (τ) := ∆ (τ) + α(τ) = QY (τ |D = 1, α)−QY (τ |D = 0) . (2.2)
The QTE parameter in equation (2.2), ∆˜ (τ), is identical to that in (2.1), ∆ (τ),
in two cases. First, participation costs are not different by treatment status, implying
that QY (τ |D = 1, α) − QY (τ |D = 0, α) = ∆(τ). Note however that this case is not
9Naturally, the model includes an intercept, but it is omitted here to simplify the presentation of the
model and parameter of interest.
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consistent with the empirical observation that women assigned to AFDC leave welfare at
different rates over time than those assigned to Jobs First. Moreover, ∆˜ (τ) = ∆ (τ) if
Y1 is independent of v. However, the assumption QY (τ |D = 1, α) = QY (τ |D = 1, v) =
QY (τ |D = 1) contradicts the mechanism discussed in Figure 2.1 where participation costs
vi are not independent of Y1,it.
At the upper quantiles of earnings, the model has a natural interpretation. Women
assigned to AFDC would not face participation costs at higher earnings (since they are
not likely to participate), while women assigned to Jobs First do face participation costs.
Returning to Figure 2.1, a woman i that would locate, for example, at point E (above
the poverty line) would only reduce hours if the decreased earnings plus her individual
cost of welfare participation, αi = vi, are compensated by the increased transfers under
Jobs First. Therefore, there is a range of earnings toward the upper conditional quantiles
where welfare participation costs are relevant to evaluate behavioral-induced effects.
To evaluate the role of participation costs, I briefly focus on two particular quantile
functions and discuss their interpretation within the literature.
Example 1 Consider the following simple model for earnings similar to those estimated
in the literature: Yit = β + ∆Di0 + αi + (1 +Di0γ0 + αiγi)uit, where γ0 is a scale param-
eter, γi is a function of the transfer benefit, and the error term is distributed as F with
location zero and unit variance. The corresponding quantile function is QYit(τ |Di0, αi) =
β(τ) + ∆(τ)Di0 + αi(τ), where β(τ) = β + F
−1
u (τ), ∆(τ) = ∆ + γ0F
−1
u (τ) and αi(τ) =
αi (1 + γiF
−1
u (τ)) = viDi0 (1 + γiF
−1
u (τ)). If Di0 = 0, then αi(τ) = 0, representing the
case of no participation costs. If Di0 = 1, then αi(τ) = vi(1 + γi(τ)), which is expected
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to be increasing on τ . In this model, vi might be interpreted as ‘flat’ stigma and γi(τ) as
‘variable’ stigma (Moffitt, 1983).10
Example 2 Consider the model presented in Example 1 where participation affects hours
offered, and consequently it affects earnings. For simplicity, assume that scale parame-
ters (γ0, γi) are zero for all mothers. Then, Yit = β + ∆Di0 + αiRi + uit, where Ri is
an indicator variable for whether woman i participates on welfare. Note that the associ-
ated conditional quantile function includes an additional variable Ri and omission of this
variable in a quantile model leads to inconsistent results since participation at t might
not be independent of Di0. Joint decisions for welfare participation and labor supply
are discussed extensively in the literature (see, for example, Moffitt, 1983, 2002, among
others).
This analysis leads to simple tests that can be performed using regression analysis as
follows. I first estimate the QTE in equation (2.1) and then compare with the QTE in
equation (2.2). The difference between parameters is:
C(τ) := ∆˜ (τ)−∆ (τ) ≥ 0, (2.3)
and it represents the relative cost of welfare participation at different quantiles of earn-
ings. At low conditional quantiles of earnings, one could expect C(τ) = 0 if α is zero or
the cost of participation does not vary by treatment status, and at high conditional quan-
tiles, one could expect C(τ) > 0 if Jobs First-assigned women incur participation costs
10Moffitt (1983) proposes an economic model where ‘flat’ stigma is defined as the cost related to any
welfare participation, and ‘variable’ stigma is a cost proportional to the size of the benefit. Although the
benefit size is constant for Jobs First participants, variable stigma may be considered the cost proportional
to the benefit-to-income ratio, which is decreasing over the earnings distribution. While Moffitt found no
evidence of variable stigma, he provided mean estimates that were pre-welfare reform under AFDC such
that any variable costs of participation at higher incomes post-welfare reform are unknown, such as the
case of Jobs First.
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to labor supply but AFDC-assigned women are not eligible for welfare, and consequently
have zero cost of participation. Additionally, I estimate the QTE in equation (2.1) and
then compare with the QTE of a model that incorporates an indicator variable for par-
ticipation. In the next section, I discuss estimation approaches for the QTE parameter
and then turn to investigating and testing the previous hypotheses in Sections 2.5.3 and
2.5.5.
2.3.2 Background
Although the QTE in equation (2.1) can be estimated using different approaches (see,
for example, Koenker, 2005), previous analyses of welfare reforms have been concerned
with potential selection into treatment. For consistent estimation of the parameter of
interest, ∆ (τ), the identification restriction used in the literature is known as selection
on observables (Firpo, 2007; Heckman et al., 1998; Rubin, 1977). Thus, given a set of
covariates, it is typically assumed that women are randomly assigned to Jobs First or
AFDC. This identification condition gives rise to different estimation strategies.
A nonparametric approach, denoted here as NP, to estimating the QTE for individuals
i = 1, . . . , N pooled over quarters t = 1, . . . , T is given by
∆ˆ(τ) = inf
{
y : FˆYit (y|Di0 = 1) ≥ τ
}
− inf
{
y : FˆYit (y|Di0 = 0) ≥ τ
}
,
for FˆYit (y|Di0 = d) =
[
1
NT
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
wˆi (xi) · 1 (Di0 = d) · 1 (yit ≤ y)
]
, (2.4)
where d = {0, 1} and the empirical inverse-propensity weight is wˆi(xi) = Di0/pˆi(xi) +
(1−Di0)/(1 − pˆi(xi)). This approach was used by Bitler et al. (2006). The variable
pˆi(xi) is the estimated propensity score obtained from a logit regression of an individual’s
propensity to be treated conditional on observed characteristics xi. Also considering
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selection on observables, Firpo (2007) proposes an estimation method that is a weighted
version of the classical quantile regression estimator for cross-sectional data (Koenker
and Bassett (1978)).11 The method is semiparametric in the sense that no parametric
assumption is made on the joint distribution of the observed variables. The quantile
regression estimator (QR) for the QTE in equation (2.1) can be obtained by solving:
min
(β0,∆)∈Θ
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
wˆi (xi) · ρτ (Yit − β0 −∆Di0) , (2.5)
where ρτ (u) = u (τ − I (u ≤ 0)) is the standard piecewise-linear quantile check function.
I consider two variations of the minimizer of equation (2.5): a weighted estimator de-
fined as above and an unweighted estimator with wˆi(xi) = 1 for AFDC and Jobs First
participants.
2.3.3 A Penalized Semiparametric Approach
Identification of the time-invariant treatment effect is based on the sparse nature of the
model. Let N0 denote the number of women assigned to the control group, and N1 the
number assigned to treatment, with N0 + N1 = N . Thus, the model can be augmented
by α = (α′0, α
′
1)
′, where α0 is an N0-dimensional sparse vector for the set of individuals
in AFDC, i ∈ D0 = {i : Di0 = 0}, and α1 is an N1-dimensional vector of individual
effects for the set of individuals in Jobs First, i ∈ D1 = {i : Di0 = 1}. This model can be
estimated by an extension of existing penalized quantile estimators with individual effects
since the conditions for consistent estimation are satisfied by the experimental design of
the program (Assumption 2, Lamarche (2010)). I augment the QR optimization problem
defined in equation (2.5) with individual effects and introduce an `1 penalty function of
11Alternative program evaluation methodologies have been recently proposed by Cattaneo (2010) and
S loczyn´ski and Wooldridge (2017). The treatment in this case, however, is not multivalued and I employ
inverse-propensity score weighting as in Bitler et al. (2006) for comparability of results.
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the following form:
Pen(α) =
N∑
i=1
|αi| =
N∑
i=1
(Di0|αi,1|+ (1−Di0)|αi,0|) =
∑
j∈D0
|αj|+
∑
k∈D1
|αk|. (2.6)
Recall that the framework discussed before leads to a model with N1 < N individual
effects possibly having non-zero costs of welfare participation. Following the economic
intuition in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, individual effects enter into the equation via a sparse
relationship to treatment, that is αi = vi for women in Jobs First and αi = 0 for those
in AFDC. In order to incorporate this restriction in a penalized setting, I allow the
Tikhonov regularization parameter, or tuning parameter, to be defined by treatment sta-
tus, {λ0, λ1}. The regularization parameter shrinks the influence of individual effects
toward zero as λd increases, so imposing the condition λ0  λ1 would imply that par-
ticipation costs are smaller in the control group than in the treatment group.12 (The
selection of the tuning parameters for the methods presented in this section is discussed
in Appendix D.1.) Therefore, the restricted panel quantile regression estimator (R-PQR)
at a given τ can be estimated by solving
min
(β0,∆,α′)∈Γ
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
wˆi(xi) · ρτ (Yit − β0 −∆Di0 − αi) + λ0
∑
j∈D0
|αj|+ λ1
∑
k∈D1
|αk| . (2.7)
The restricted estimator can be easily adapted to the simultaneous estimation of J
conditional quantiles as in Koenker (2004), and it differs from existing penalized esti-
mators for panel quantiles (for example, Harding and Lamarche, 2017) by controlling
for selection on observables. Moreover, the proposed semiparametric estimator in equa-
tion (2.7) relaxes the identification conditions in the literature by partially allowing for
selection on time-variant unobservables when λ0 = λ1 = c.
12Imai and Ratkovic (2013) use separate constraints in a least absolute shrinkage and selection operator
(LASSO) framework in order to select pre-randomization variables that are causally related to hetero-
geneous treatment responses, though their study does not address quantiles nor the panel dimension.
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More importantly, the restricted estimator offers a direct test of the economic model.
It is designed to allow for program-specific costs of participation that are more relevant
to Jobs First-assigned women than to AFDC-assigned women at conditionally higher
earnings.
In theory, AFDC-assigned women at the upper quantiles of monthly income do not
have costs of participating since they are out of welfare, while Jobs First-assigned women
may have costs of participating since they are still welfare-eligible. Although in practice
AFDC-assigned women were in general out of welfare several quarters after the reform,
some of them were still in the program. Moreover, stigma effects can persist over time.
Therefore, it is important to consider the case of λ = λ0 = λ1, which does not strictly
impose the framework presented in Section 2.2, however it does shrink the smallest indi-
vidual effects, presumably the αˆi0 ’s, to zero.
Let the unrestricted panel quantile regression (PQR) estimator of the QTE at a given
τ be defined as
min
(β0,∆,α′)∈Γ
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
wˆi(xi) · ρτ (Yit − β0 −∆Di0 − αi) + λ
N∑
i=1
|αi| , (2.8)
where λ ∈ R+ is a tuning parameter. Notice that for identification of the QTE, the tuning
parameter cannot be equal to zero. But for small values of λ, the QTE should be inter-
preted as an estimator from a model with individual effects. As the value of λ increases,
the individual effects go to zero such that PQR estimates converge to QR estimates. If
the restricted and unrestricted estimators give similar results, then the evidence supports
a differential role of individual effects by treatment status, which corresponds to the sug-
gested extensions to the economic framework in Section 2.2 and modeling assumptions
above.
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The economic model is nested such that comparisons for each of these estimators
correspond directly to testable assumptions proposed earlier in this section. That is, if
individual effects have no differential role in labor supply by treatment status, then the
methodology for estimating the QTE parameter would be inconsequential whether using
equations (2.5), (2.7), or (2.8).13 Evidence for the proposed method is given in Section
2.5, and more details on the role of penalized individual effects and tuning parameter
selection are given in Sections 2.6.2 and D.1.
2.4 Data
Experimental data for Connecticut’s Jobs First waiver program were obtained from
MDRC (formerly Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation). The observations
represent 4803 women, current welfare recipients or new applicants, who were randomly
assigned into either the AFDC control group (N0 = 2407) or the Jobs First treatment
group (N1 = 2396). Along with a range of time-invariant demographics, the data include
quarterly measures of earnings rounded to the nearest hundred dollars, and AFDC and
Food Stamps benefits rounded to the nearest fifty. Income measures are observed for
quarters -8 to -1 before random assignment, quarter 0 at the time of random assignment
into treatment (Di0), and quarters 1 to 16 where the Jobs First time limit binds by
quarter 7.14
13Estimates using RPQR are equivalent to those of PQR in either case (i) λ0 = λ1 = λ, or (ii) the
penalized individual effects for the treatment and control groups are no different when differentially
determined by the data given λ = λ∗ compared to when estimated given λ0  λ1. Further, RPQR
estimates are equivalent to those of QR if (i) λ0 = λ1 = λ  0 given that all individual effects are
penalized to zero as λ→∞, or (ii) if there are no differential individual effects by treatment status for
any value of λ.
14Earnings data are missing for 30 women in quarter 16; AFDC and Food Stamps data are missing
for 3175 women in pre-treatment quarter -8. See Bloom et al. (2002) for a background of the Jobs First
program including, for example, experimental design, program implementation, and initial outcomes.
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Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics by Treatment Status
Levels Differences
Variables Jobs First AFDC Unadjusted Adjusted
Newhaven County (urban) 0.753 0.757 −0.004 −0.000
(0.431) (0.429) (0.012) (0.012)
Never married 0.624 0.631 −0.007 −0.000
(0.484) (0.483) (0.014) (0.016)
HS dropout 0.331 0.313 0.018 −0.000
(0.471) (0.464) (0.013) (0.013)
More than two children 0.227 0.206 0.021∗ −0.000
(0.419) (0.405) (0.012) (0.012)
Mother younger than 25 0.289 0.297 −0.007 −0.000
(0.454) (0.457) (0.013) (0.014)
Mother older than 34 0.301 0.286 0.015 0.000
(0.459) (0.452) (0.013) (0.014)
Recipient (stock) sample 0.624 0.593 0.031∗ −0.001
(0.484) (0.491) (0.014) (0.014)
Currently working ≥ 30 hours 0.276 0.313 −0.037 −0.033
(0.447) (0.464) (0.029) (0.027)
Hourly wage 6.583 6.808 −0.225 −0.164
(2.234) (2.592) (0.155) (0.153)
Public or subsidized housing 0.356 0.346 0.010 0.003
(0.479) (0.476) (0.014) (0.014)
Ever on AFDC as a child 0.248 0.258 −0.010 −0.010
(0.432) (0.438) (0.013) (0.013)
Ever received AFDC at prior quarter 7 0.548 0.528 0.020 −0.000
(0.498) (0.499) (0.014) (0.014)
Length in months of 1st AFDC spell 17.622 14.221 3.402∗ 3.115∗
(9.910) (10.654) (0.344) (0.380)
Number of AFDC spells 1.173 1.217 −0.044∗ −0.046∗
(0.583) (0.685) (0.018) (0.018)
Long-term recipient (> 2 years) 0.569 0.554 0.015 −0.005
(0.495) (0.497) (0.014) (0.013)
Pre-Treatment Quarters
Average quarterly earnings 678.908 785.895 −106.988∗ −0.887
(1303.749) (1544.720) (41.240) (108.313)
Average quarterly cash welfare 890.818 835.112 55.706∗ −0.833
(806.032) (784.845) (22.958) (23.029)
Fraction of quarters with earnings 0.322 0.351 −0.029∗ 0.000
(0.363) (0.372) (0.011) (0.011)
Fraction of quarters with cash welfare 0.573 0.544 0.029∗ −0.001
(0.452) (0.450) (0.013) (0.013)
Experimental Quarters 1-7
Average quarterly earnings 1173.187 1139.047 34.141 81.931
(1501.393) (1739.033) (46.875) (123.695)
Average quarterly cash welfare 1083.255 889.050 194.205∗ 167.264∗
(620.003) (639.856) (18.180) (20.162)
Fraction of quarters with earnings 0.514 0.450 0.064∗ 0.077∗
(0.394) (0.398) (0.011) (0.012)
Fraction of quarters with cash welfare 0.746 0.662 0.084∗ 0.071∗
(0.345) (0.380) (0.010) (0.011)
Notes: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses, and ∗ denotes statistically significant differences at the 10-
percent level. 75
Although Jobs First was a randomized experiment, a simple inspection of basic statis-
tics reveals the presence of statistically significant differences by treatment status (Table
2.1). For instance, women in the Jobs First group have on average less quarterly earn-
ings and more cash welfare. This however has been well documented in the literature.
To address sample selection, Bitler et al. construct inverse-propensity weights by es-
timating the probability of treatment conditional on 60 variables including quarterly
pre-treatment earnings and transfers as well as indicators for individual characteristics
and family structure at the time of random assignment.15 After estimating each in-
dividual’s propensity to be treated, pˆi, the inverse-propensity weight is constructed as
wˆi = Di0/pˆi + (1−Di0)/(1− pˆi) where, as before, Di0 indicates treatment status. For
consistent comparison of results, I employ the same weights in the estimators defined in
equations (2.4), (2.5), (2.7) and (2.8).
The descriptive statistics in Table 2.1 highlight the role of sample correction as well
as some general outcomes of the treatment. First, note that randomization works well
overall based on the unadjusted differences shown in the third column. The differences
that remain statistically significant, though, may be important for estimating treatment
effects on earnings. In addition to Jobs First participants having less earnings and more
cash transfers on average during pre-treatment quarters, they also tend to have larger
families and are more likely to be continuing recipients instead of new applicants. Another
distinction between Jobs First and AFDC participants is that the Jobs First participants
have longer first spells on welfare yet slightly fewer spells, on average. The fourth column
15The covariates are quarterly levels of pre-treatment earnings, cash transfers, and Food Stamps;
quarterly indicators for any pre-treatment earnings, cash transfers, and Food Stamps; indicators for new
applicant status at randomization, any employment in the year before randomization, any cash transfers
in the year before randomization; indicators for black, Hispanic, white, never married, married/living
apart, age less than 25, age 25-34, no high school degree or GED, high school degree or GED, more than
two children; and, indicators for any missing data for education, children, and marital status.
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Figure 2.2. Empirical Distributions of Earnings at Quarters 0 and 7
0 2500 5000 7500 10000
0e+00
1e−04
2e−04
3e−04
4e−04
F
P
L
, 
F
a
m
il
y
 o
f 
3
F
P
L
, 
F
a
m
il
y
 o
f 
8 Quarter 0
Quarter 7
D
en
si
ty
Quarterly Earnings
Notes: FPL denotes the federal poverty line as of 1997, the midpoint between random assign-
ment and quarter 7.
in Table 2.1 shows sample differences adjusted by inverse-propensity weighting. For
the variables adequately controlled for in the first-stage propensity estimation, sample-
corrected characteristics are well balanced: only very small and statistically insignificant
differences remain in the adjusted variables for the pre-treatment period. However, for
the exceptions of number and duration of previous spells, there are still statistically
significant differences at the 10-percent level.
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Of the 4803 total participants, 2923 women are continuing welfare recipients compared
to 1880 who are new applicants. When the Jobs First experiment began in 1996, the entire
state of Connecticut transitioned to Jobs First except for the two experimental counties,
Newhaven and Manchester. Therefore, any new applicants would have different selection
into welfare than continuing recipients. The same descriptive statistics discussed above
are shown by participant type for recipients and applicants in Appendix Table C.1. As
expected, applicants are different from recipients by every dimension shown in the table.
In summary, applicants are less urban, more educated, less reliant on transfers, and they
work more hours at higher wages. In particular, only about 20 percent of applicants
had ever received AFDC around 2 years prior to random assignment compared to just
over 75 percent of recipients, and the probability of being a long-term welfare recipient
is about 43 percentage points lower for the applicant group on average. Applicants
also earn more and receive less transfers than recipients both before and after random
assignment. While applicants and recipients may experience some similar costs of welfare
participation in terms of hassle, the ongoing recipients group may face additional costs
related to persistent labor force detachment.
Lastly, Figure 2.2 shows the empirical distribution of earnings for working women at
random assignment (quarter 0) and at the Jobs First time limit (quarter 7). The figure
also shows the federal poverty line (FPL), which varies by family size. In the Jobs First
data, the modal family size is approximately 3 members with the maximum size around
8.16 The figure highlights how the probability that families earn more than the federal
poverty line changes over time, which is shown by the area shaded in gray. Referring
16Administrative data on family size is available for only 225 individuals in both quarter 0 and quarter
7. Otherwise, family structure is identified by the variable kidcount, which is top-coded at 3.
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to Figure 2.1, the likelihood of locating around points E or H (locations at or above the
federal poverty line) is small at the time of random assignment, but some participants
will relocate to those higher earnings locations by quarter 7. The increase in individuals
relocating near the poverty line, as shown in Figure 2.2, motivates the presumption that
treatment effects at upper quantiles are related to potential behavioral responses around
the eligibility notch.
2.5 Empirical Analysis
In this section, I employ the proposed estimation methods to investigate whether there
is evidence that suggests that individuals reduce hours in order to opt into welfare, the
behavioral-induced participation hypothesis. I compare findings with results obtained
by employing alternative estimation methods. Finally, I formulate a series of tests to
examine whether the new results offered in this study are significantly different than
existing results. Standard errors for all empirical results are constructed based on a
block bootstrap method for comparability across estimators; for details, see Appendix
Section D.2.
2.5.1 Pooled Data Results
As a baseline estimate of the QTE, I present results based on the non-parametric approach
given by equation (2.4) and the semiparametric approach introduced in equation (2.5). I
restrict attention to earnings in the first 7 quarters after the reform is introduced in order
to focus on behavioral responses in the upper tail of the earnings distribution before the
Jobs First time limit becomes binding. If behavioral-induced participation is expected,
it would be most evident before time limits apply to women assigned to Jobs First.
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Estimates are also provided for total income (earnings, cash welfare, and Food Stamps)
for quarters 8-16, which represent a long-run outcome.
Table 2.2 presents results for the QTE parameter given by the non-parametric estima-
tor where estimates obtained with inverse-propensity weighting are shown in column (1)
and estimates without weights in column (2). I reproduce all of the NP estimates exactly
with only slight variations in the confidence intervals based on different random samples
used for the 1000 bootstrap replications.17 Given the random design of Jobs First, which
remains a model program for welfare reform evaluation, one might expect the unweighted
and weighted QTE results to be similar. In fact, there is no qualitative difference and
only small quantitative differences in the point estimates presented in columns (1) and
(2). For the results shown, the only difference from weighting the NP estimates is at the
0.75 quantile for total income in quarters 8-16: 300 in column (1) and 250 in column (2),
though this difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels.18
Consistent with the predictions of the framework described in Figure 2.1 (panel A),
the table shows that the reform had no impact at the lower tail of the conditional earnings
distribution and it increased earnings at the 0.50 and 0.75 quantiles. At the upper tail,
NP estimates indicate that the reform reduces earnings by 200 dollars, suggesting that
some women reduced hours in order to opt for welfare.
Under the assumption that the treatment effect is linear and treatment status is ran-
domly assigned, the nonparametric estimator for the QTE and the quantile regression
17In order to reproduce the confidence intervals reported in Bitler et al. (2006), it is necessary to use
only bootstrap samples that are sufficiently balanced given that their software, which is available through
the AER website, weights the empirical cumulative distributions of each treatment group across the full
sample. This procedure causes the inference on the nonparametric approach to appear artificially more
precise than otherwise with respect to the semiparametric quantile regression methods.
18Comparing weighted and unweighted QTEs for several quantiles between 0.05 and 0.95 (in results
not shown here but available upon request), I find that there is no qualitative difference by weighting,
and little quantitative difference.
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Table 2.2. Quantile Treatment Effects on the Distributions
of Earnings and Total Income
NP QR R-PQR PQR
τ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Earnings, Quarters 1-7
0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
(31.92) (30.92) (32.88) (28.30) (52.64) (52.64) (52.66) (52.66)
0.75 300.00 300.00 300.00 100.00 500.00 600.00 400.00 500.00
(94.59) (129.66) (93.61) (100.58) (122.58) (108.90) (123.67) (115.44)
0.90 -200.00 -200.00 -200.00 -300.00 300.00 400.00 300.00 200.00
(117.68) (217.92) (119.89) (128.17) (110.08) (120.12) (110.49) (107.01)
Total Income, Quarters 8-16
0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -600.00 -650.00 -350.00 -400.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (91.55) (89.92) (101.78) (89.66)
0.25 -150.00 -150.00 -150.00 -150.00 -50.00 0.00 -50.00 -150.00
(109.66) (123.39) (108.96) (118.75) (60.79) (74.86) (60.57) (61.89)
0.50 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
(64.62) (74.46) (64.08) (67.64) (75.60) (75.60) (75.61) (75.62)
0.75 300.00 250.00 300.00 200.00 227.45 129.16 228.00 250.00
(90.67) (125.68) (90.68) (100.02) (81.92) (75.26) (80.88) (81.20)
0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 474.17 573.99 300.00 328.00
(118.30) (213.37) (118.33) (120.37) (99.22) (99.06) (87.10) (87.35)
IPW Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Notes: NP denotes the non-parametric quantile estimator, QR denotes the semiparametric quantile regression estima-
tor, R-PQR denotes the restricted panel quantile regression estimator, and PQR denotes the unrestricted panel quantile
regression estimator. Bootstrap standard errors are shown in parentheses based on 1000 replications. IPW denotes
inverse-propensity weighting.
estimator for a model that conditions on the treatment indicator variable are expected
to yield similar results (Koenker, 2005). The weighted and unweighted QR results are
shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.2. Although Table 2.2 shows some differences
between NP and the QR estimates in column (4), a closer examination of the estimated
effects across the 0.05 quantile through the 0.95 quantile reveals that the QTE estimates
obtained using QR are similar to the NP estimates.19 Therefore, the NP results appear to
19In estimates not shown here, the NP and QR are statistically significantly different (at the 10-percent
level) at 6 quantiles in the interval {0.05, 0.06, . . . , 0.95}, which includes the 0.75 quantile shown in Table
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be robust to the use of weights and an alternative parametric specification for estimating
the QTE. It is important to emphasize that this additional empirical evidence continues
to indicate that there is substantial heterogeneity predicted by labor supply theory and
low-income women can increase income by reducing hours and claiming welfare, which is
consistent so far with the behavioral-induced participation hypothesis.
2.5.2 Panel Data Results
In the last columns of Table 2.2, I present panel quantile regression estimates for both
the restricted and unrestricted cases. For the restricted estimator, I let λ1 = 0.01 for Jobs
First participants and λ0 = 1 for AFDC.
20 The weighted R-PQR estimates are shown
in column (5) and unweighted estimates in column (6). Despite controlling for women’s
heterogeneity by treatment status, the R-PQR estimator delivers results that are similar
to those of NP and QR at the center of the distribution. In contrast, I observe large
differences at the upper quantiles of the conditional distribution of earnings. For the un-
restricted case, weighted and unweighted PQR estimates are shown in columns (7) and
(8), respectively. In these cases, λˆ is estimated to be approximately 0.718 for earnings and
0.673 for total income.21 I note that the R-PQR and PQR estimates are qualitatively
similar. Restricting the degree of shrinkage for individual effects by treatment status
imposes no difference at the median, though the unrestricted estimates are somewhat
smaller at upper quantiles. Unrestricted penalized estimates, therefore, offer a more con-
servative contrast to pooled estimates. However, large differences between pooled and
2.2 but not the 0.90 quantile. For weighted estimates, the NP and QR are statistically significantly
different at 7 quantiles.
20The values of λ here are chosen to illustrate the economic model. See Appendix Section D.1 in
Appendix D for details on tuning parameter selection.
21See Appendix D for tuning parameter estimation details, and Section 2.6.26.2 for robustness evidence
for the tuning parameter selection.
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panel results in the upper earnings distribution are robust to modeling assumptions on
differential shrinkage for individual effects by treatment status. Thus, given the more con-
servative, yet similar results under weaker assumptions, the unrestricted PQR estimates
are preferred as the main results for comparison to the pooled results.
Figure 2.3 compares weighted estimates by NP and PQR for quantiles in the interval
from 0.05 to 0.95. The series of estimates appear to be equivalent through the 0.65
quantile after which they tend to diverge at upper quantiles. The reduction of earnings
in the upper tail of the distribution was predicted as a natural consequence of behavioral-
induced participation attributed to a reduction of exits from welfare. However, when
I control for latent individual heterogeneity, the negative treatment effect disappears.
Looking at the 0.90 quantile of earnings, for example, there is a weighted NP estimate
of -200 dollars compared to a PQR estimate of 300 dollars. As opposed to seeing a
negative effect in the upper tail of the earnings distribution, the estimated treatment
effect continues to be positive and statistically significantly different from zero. Although
it is naturally challenging to explain the mechanism behind these differences from the
reduced form coefficients, the evidence is consistent with the framework developed in the
previous sections, which points to the fact that welfare participation costs can have a
differential effect at the upper tail of the conditional distribution of earnings.
2.5.3 Welfare Participation Effect on Labor Supply
The individual effect at the 0.90 quantile, αi(0.90), is intended to capture individual-
specific sources of variability, or unobserved heterogeneity that was not adequately con-
trolled for by other covariates. If these latent factors do not affect earnings or are indepen-
dent of the treatment variable Di0, the proposed panel approach is expected to produce
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Figure 2.3. Quantile Treatment Effects on the Distribution of Earnings, Quarters 1-7
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Notes: PQR denotes panel quantile regression estimates and NP denotes non-parametric quan-
tile estimates. The dashed lines represent 90-percent confidence intervals obtained by 1000
bootstrap replications.
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similar findings to other methods. This is not what is evident in Figure 2.3. I interpret
the differences between nonparametric estimates and semiparametric panel estimates as
suggesting that participation costs of welfare affects Jobs First and AFDC participants
differentially at the upper tail. This is consistent with the economic implications dis-
cussed in Section 2.2 since it is expected that high earners who were assigned to AFDC
do not participate on welfare and high-earners who were selected to Jobs First do partic-
ipate. Moreover, it is natural to assume that these women make choices regarding work
and welfare based on their opportunity cost of time that depends on family structure,
preferences, and program features given treatment status. If there is a nonlinear cost of
participation across the distribution of earnings, then controlling for program participa-
tion in the pooled model may offer a simple check for the interpretation of labor supply
differences that are explained by latent characteristics related to program features.
The experimental data for Connecticut’s Jobs First waiver program allow us to run
a simple, yet important, robustness check. The data have information on whether the
individual was receiving cash welfare or Food Stamps at each quarter.22 Then, if there are
latent costs in terms of participation, one can introduce an indicator variable for welfare
participation in order to capture the potential omitted variable in the cross-sectional
quantile model. I expect, however, small differences in the panel results (PQR) since the
method is designed to account for these sources of variability and participation is roughly
constant over time.
Let Rit = 1 if individual i receives either cash welfare or Food Stamps in quarter t,
and Rit = 0 otherwise. In results shown in Figure 2.4, I estimate the QTE by quantile
22For Jobs First, 67.6 percent of women’s participation status do not change over quarters 1-7, and
for AFDC women, 63.1 percent do not change. The standard deviation for an indicator of participation
over this time period is 0.176 in Jobs First and 0.193 in AFDC.
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regression by solving
min
(β′,∆)∈Θ
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
wˆi (xi) · ρτ (Yit − β0 − β1Rit −∆Di0) ,
where β = (β0, β1)
′ and by panel quantile regression by solving
min
(β′,∆,α′)∈Γ
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
wˆi(xi) · ρτ (Yit − β0 − β1Rit −∆Di0 − αi) + λˆ
N∑
i=1
|αi| ,
where wi(xi) and λ are estimated as before. Recall that the cross-sectional methods QR
and NP offer, as expected, similar point estimates (Table 2.2). Moreover, I found that
while the NP (and thus QR) point estimate is equal to -200 dollars at the 0.90 quantile of
earnings, PQR suggests a positive treatment effect of 300 dollars (Figure 2.3). It is very
interesting to see now that the cross-sectional estimates and panel estimates are roughly
equivalent when controlling for participation as in Figure 2.7, suggesting that QR, NP
and PQR do not offer significantly different results.23 Also, as expected, the PQR results
are robust to the inclusion of a woman’s welfare participation status.
2.5.4 Quantile Treatment Effects by Participant Type
The evidence so far suggests that individuals may have differential participation costs by
treatment status and that these unobserved costs are increasing in work hours. However,
approximately three-fifths of the experimental sample are continuing welfare recipients,
whereas the remaining two-fifths of the sample are new applicants. While both participant
types would face welfare participation costs such as paperwork and standing in lines,
longer-term costs may differ between applicants and recipients.24 For instance, long-
term recipients may have higher informational costs of managing work, child care, and
23The findings of this robustness check are not sensitive to the definition of Rit. Results are qualita-
tively similar for participation defined by cash transfers only, or by Food Stamps only.
24Blank and Ruggles (1996) differentiate between participation decisions for women who are persis-
tently eligible versus those who may just qualify for eligibility for a short time.
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Figure 2.4. Quantile Treatment Effects on the Distribution of Earnings
Conditional on Welfare Participation, Quarters 1-7
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The dashed lines represent 90-percent confidence intervals obtained by 1000 bootstrap replica-
tions.
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welfare participation because of limited labor market experience. Also, persistent stigma
related to long-term welfare participation may affect individuals’ beliefs about market
productivity.
As noted above, descriptive statistics shown in Appendix Table C.1 demonstrate sig-
nificant differences between samples by participant type. Ongoing recipients are charac-
terized by longer and more frequent welfare spells, as well as higher dependence on public
housing and less experience in the labor market. Recipients have less labor force attach-
ment and thus may be affected differentially by informational costs or stigma. Newer
applicants, however, are more likely to have higher education and be working more hours
at higher wages. The costs of participation for new applicants may be more transitory
in nature given that individuals with temporary shocks and better earnings potential
may select into welfare under Jobs First based on the generous disregards near the fed-
eral poverty line. If there is evidence supporting the behavioral-induced participation
hypothesis, it should be related to behavioral responses among applicants as opposed to
recipients.
Figure 2.5 shows the QTE by participant type. In panel A, there is still weak evidence
of a negative treatment effect in the upper quantiles for pooled estimates, but the panel
estimates are statistically no different from zero throughout nearly the entire distribu-
tion of earnings (except at the median). Just as before, there is no difference based on
individual effects through the middle of the distribution, and now there is only a small
and statistically insignificant difference at the 0.90 quantile. The implication is that par-
ticipation costs might not play as important of a role for the applicant group as they
do for the full sample. Panel B, however, exhibits large differences in treatment effects
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Figure 2.5. Quantile Treatment Effects on the Distribution
of Earnings by Participant Type, Quarters 1-7
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at the upper quantiles of the distribution of earnings for recipients, though there is no
longer a negative treatment effect for the pooled estimates at the 0.90 quantile. On the
other hand, PQR estimates at the upper tail continue to be positive and significant. This
evidence suggests that controlling for individual costs of participation matters less for
applicants with treatment affects attenuated toward zero and matters more for recipients
where the treatment effect is increasing and positive at the upper conditional quantiles.
2.5.5 Characterizing Participation Costs using Experimental Data
The experimental research design allows us to test whether relative participation costs
are heterogeneous across the conditional distribution of earnings. A test on the difference
between NP and QR is interpreted as a test on the adequacy of the linear parametrization
of the model. More importantly, a test on the difference between NP and PQR can be
interpreted within the framework discussed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. If participation costs
are zero or do not depend on treatment status, then the parameter C(τ) in equation (2.3)
is zero. The framework suggests that C(0.5) ≈ 0, while C(0.9) > 0.
Table 2.3 shows estimator differences at the 0.50 and 0.90 quantiles, with the associ-
ated p-values of Hausman-type test statistics as described in Section D.3 (Appendix B). I
also show the percentage difference in terms of quarterly earnings and an estimated cost
in terms of number of hours per week. As expected, there are no significant differences
between the weighted estimates for NP and QR, as shown in column (1). When regarding
weighted estimates by NP and PQR, shown in column (2), I find that there is no statis-
tically significant difference at the 0.50 quantile, and a significant absolute difference of
500 dollars of quarterly earnings at the 0.90 quantile. Columns (3) and (4) show absolute
differences between weighted NP and PQR estimates by participant type for applicants
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Table 2.3. Estimator Differences for Quantile Treatment Effects
on the Distribution of Earnings, Quarters 1-7
Full Sample Applicants Recipients
QR−NP PQR−NP PQR−NP PQR−NP
Quantile τ Statistic (1) (2) (3) (4)
0.50 Difference 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
p-value [1.00] [1.00] [0.15] [1.00]
Percentage Difference 0% 0% 33% 0%
Hours per week ($6 wage) 0.00 0.00 1.28 0.00
0.90 Difference 0.00 500.00 200.00 500.00
p-value [1.00] [0.00] [0.34] [0.01]
Percentage Difference 0% 10% 4% 11%
Hours per week ($10 wage) 0.00 3.83 1.53 3.83
Notes: NP denotes the non-parametric quantile estimator, QR denotes quantile regression, and PQR denotes panel
quantile regression. The p-values shown in brackets are based on 1000 bootstrap replications.
and recipients, respectively. For applicants, I fail to reject the null of exogeneity at stan-
dard levels, yet for recipients I reject it at the 0.90 quantile at the 5-percent level with
differences similar in magnitude to the full sample estimates. These findings suggest that
Jobs First imposes an estimated cost of 10% of quarterly earnings, and it is larger for
recipients than for applicants at high conditional quantiles.25 In terms of labor supply,
the cost of participating in welfare under Jobs First is equivalent to 3.8 less hours per
week at the 0.90 quantile of earnings, which is slightly smaller than the estimated AFDC
participation cost of about 4 hours per week found by Moffitt (1983, pg. 331).
2.6 Discussion
Although QTE estimates for Jobs First are robust to selection on observables, the panel
estimates indicate that the QTE is influenced by unobserved characteristics differentially
at the upper conditional quantiles of the earnings distribution. As a possible explanation,
I have suggested that women experience nonlinear costs of welfare participation that are
25Although the percentage difference for applicants at median earnings is 33%, the difference is sta-
tistically insignificant and the magnitude of the percentage is driven by a small denominator of median
quarterly earnings.
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increasing with hours worked, which may only be relevant to Jobs First participants who
are still eligible at higher earnings. Referring back to the stylized budget constraints
in Figure 2.1, a woman’s unobserved characteristics might be interpreted as capturing
different costs and benefits for welfare participation when labor supply is high. Ex ante,
labor supply predictions for high earners may be ambiguous conditional on costs of par-
ticipation given that welfare participants are increasing hours and earnings over time (as
documented in Figure 2.2) while also being exposed to treatment over time. Based on the
QTE estimate differences shown in the previous section, individual heterogeneity plays a
prominent role in behavioral responses to Jobs First.
In what follows, this section explores the plausibility of the panel interpretation along
with alternative explanations for finding different results only in the upper tail of the
earnings distribution.
2.6.1 The Pre-Treatment Period and Randomization
An alternative explanation for finding differences when controlling for individual effects
is that randomization may have successfully balanced experimental samples based on
observed characteristics though not for unobserved characteristics. To investigate this
possibility, it may be helpful to consider earnings trajectories by treatment status before
and after randomization, as shown in Figure 2.6.26 Pre-treatment earnings are mostly
censored at the median where as many as 70 percent of the full sample had no earnings
2 years before random assignment. For applicants shown in panel A, the 75th and 90th
percentiles of pre-treatment earnings exhibit a pronounced dip, which is perhaps not
26In the full sample, there are statistically significant differences in earnings by treatment group one
year before random assignment, which suggests that differences in pre-treatment shocks may be related
to subsequent earnings processes. Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) discuss the importance of unobserved
heterogeneity for the variance of earnings related to transitory and permanent income shocks.
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Figure 2.6. Earnings Trajectories by Participant Type
and Treatment Group, Quarters -7 to 7
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Notes: The 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles of earnings are shown for Jobs First and AFDC before and
after random assignment, which is indicated by the dotted line at quarter 0. The dashed lines represent
90-percent confidence intervals obtained by 1000 bootstrap replications.
surprising in light of the work of Ashenfelter (1978, 1983). However, for recipients shown
in panel B, pre-treatment earnings are relatively flat with no evidence that might suggest
induced participation.
If there are important pre-treatment differences in experimental groups, then esti-
mates of the effect of Jobs First on earnings before random assignment may be revealing.
Naturally, one would expect zero treatment effect before randomization since the signif-
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icant earnings disregard had not been implemented yet. Figure 2.7 shows the estimates
for the parameter of interest obtained using NP and PQR for pre-treatment earnings,
quarters -8 to -1.27 Through the middle of the pre-treatment earnings distribution, the
estimated effects are zero due to the large number of censored observations for earnings
before random assignment, thus no information is conveyed about randomization except
at the upper quantiles. At the 0.75 quantile of pre-treatment earnings, estimates by the
NP estimator and PQR estimator differ by 300 [0.02] while the estimates at the 0.90
quantile only differ by 100 [0.71], with p-values shown in brackets. These results suggest
that NP and PQR estimates are similar in the pre-treatment period and the direction of
effects do not diverge as shown before in Figure 2.3.
2.6.2 On the Plausibility of the Sparse Model
If participation costs, or any other source of latent heterogeneity, are negligible at the
upper tail of the earnings distribution, the nonparametric estimator and semiparametric
estimator are not expected to produce different results. On the other hand, if costs asso-
ciated with welfare participation are important in the economic model, one would expect
different results because the identifying assumption on observables does not hold against
the data, or alternatively, there are non-zero latent costs associated with participation for
women who did not exit welfare in the period after the reform. The proposed method-
ology offers the possibility of investigating these conditions by changing the parameter
λ. As the regularization parameter increases, the estimated individual effects αˆi(τ, λ)’s
tend to zero, and thus, the PQR estimator converges to QR and NP. At the same time,
unobserved heterogeneity should not affect the QTE estimates for small values of λ by
27The pre-treatment PQR results are based on an estimate of λ equal to 0.716 and pre-treatment
earnings are not weighted since predetermined earnings and transfer data are not available.
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Figure 2.7. Quantile Treatment Effects on the Distribution of Earnings,
Quarters -8 to -1 (Pre-Reform)
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Figure 2.8. Quantile Treatment Effects on the Distribution of Earnings
as a Function of λ at the 0.50 and 0.90 Quantiles, Quarters 1-7
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Notes: PQR denotes panel quantile regression estimates and NP denotes non-parametric quantile esti-
mates. The dashed lines represent 90-percent confidence intervals obtained by 1000 bootstrap replications.
the experimental research design of the program. Recall that costs of participation are
assumed to be nonlinear and should be more pronounced at the upper tail of the earn-
ings distribution. Then, one could expect (i) no differences between the PQR and NP
estimates at the 0.50 quantile for all values of λ, and (ii) significant differences between
PQR and NP at the upper tail for those values of λ that are not sufficiently large enough
to shrink the individual effect for all i to zero.
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Figure 2.8 shows QTE results for the 0.50 quantile and 0.90 quantile as a function of
λ over the interval (0, 13]. It also shows the estimated value of λ which is equal to 0.718
for earnings in quarters 1-7. While panel A shows results for the median, panel B shows
results for the 0.90 quantile. As expected, panel A demonstrates the case where PQR
and NP give similar results. There are no differences between nonparametric estimates
and semiparametric panel estimates for all λ, even for λ → 0 consistent with a “fixed”
effects version of the estimator. On the other hand, panel B shows that PQR estimates
at the 0.90 quantile can differ substantially from NP estimates. A value of λ less than 4 is
consistent with the previous findings since PQR is roughly constant around 300 dollars.
2.6.3 Censored Earnings
When estimating labor supply responses to welfare reform, the considerable amount of
censoring at zero earnings may be concerning. To characterize the extent of censoring
in the Jobs First data, 70 percent of women had zero earnings two years before random
assignment and the average number of censored observations is just above 50 percent for
quarters 1-7. Censoring therefore might be expected to affect the shape of the QTE esti-
mates over quantiles τ . I briefly investigated the robustness of the findings to addressing
censored observations for earnings and found that censoring is not likely to be driving
the empirical results. Censored quantile regression following the methods proposed by
Powell (1986) and Fitzenberger (1997), as well as Chernozhukov and Hong (2002), pro-
duce similar estimates as QR at the 0.50 quantile and exactly the same estimates at
the 0.75 and 0.90 quantiles of the conditional distribution of earnings in quarters 1-7.
I argue that the similarity of these results is partially explained by the random assign-
ment of the treatment variable leading to a similar proportion of censored observations
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by treatment status (49 percent among Jobs First-assigned women and 55 percent among
AFDC-assigned women).
2.6.4 Policy Relevance of Participation Costs
Despite the importance of potential work disincentives of welfare generosity, there has
been little empirical evidence illustrating behavioral-induced participation where individ-
uals reduce labor supply to gain welfare eligibility. Jobs First has become a primary case
study based on the prominent work of Bitler et al. (2006) and Kline and Tartari (2016).
The panel estimates of quantile treatment effects shown here should be seen as comple-
mentary, though with the important exception of highlighting the role of participation
costs. Bitler et al. demonstrated the significance of quantile treatment effects for policy
impact analysis, particularly for welfare reform. This analysis extends their work directly
by allowing the costs and benefits of a given program to vary by individual throughout
the earnings distribution. Further, I demonstrate that different participant types may
incur different costs relative to program exposure as in the case of ongoing recipients
compared to new applicants.
Using a structural bounds approach, Kline and Tartari (2016) estimate that the in-
tensive margin effect is bounded by {0.28, 1.00} with a 95-percent confidence interval
of [0.20, 1.00], which implies that at least 20 percent of women who would have earned
above the poverty line are behaviorally induced to reduce hours in order to opt into Jobs
First. While Kline and Tartari’s model accounts for population heterogeneity by intro-
ducing primitives drawn independently from a parametric distribution, the design-based
approach in this study can be seen as allowing for earnings to be unconditionally serially
dependent. Although our findings are similar in spirit, the evidence presented here sug-
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gests that behavioral-induced participation does not generalize to all low-income mothers
on welfare near the eligibility threshold, especially regarding continuing recipients, and
that a possible explanation of the difference among long- and short-term recipients is
participation costs.
2.7 Conclusion
Behavioral responses to welfare policy, particularly concerning induced participation, are
still relevant to public debates for potential reforms regarding TANF and other means-
tested transfer programs. It is typically expected however that randomization provides
the basis for anticipating that observables and unobservables are equally balanced by
treatment status which applies to a range of policy interventions. Motivated by the
work of Moffitt (1983) and Blank et al. (2000), this essay points out the importance of
addressing unobserved heterogeneity in the estimation of QTEs using experimental data.
I proposed a semi-parametric panel quantile estimator for a model that allows women to
vary arbitrarily in preferences and costs of participating in welfare programs. Using data
from a welfare reform experiment, I find no evidence of reduced earnings from behavioral-
induced participation once I control for unobservables possibly capturing participation
costs. The evidence suggests that welfare programs impose different participation costs
by treatment status, and these costs can be heterogeneous throughout the conditional
earnings distribution.
The literature using observational data had recognized and addressed some of these
issues. Moffitt (1983) established the importance of stigma effects, or costs of welfare
participation, on labor supply using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
He finds that AFDC participation implies a fixed cost of about four hours of reduced
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labor supply per week. While Moffitt finds no significant variable stigma, the results are
mean estimates under AFDC program rules where eligibility phases out at lower earnings
than in the Jobs First context. Regarding other studies related to behavioral-induced
participation, the literature has shown little evidence that women reduce hours to opt
into welfare given constraints on labor supply adjustments and the lack of bunching near
budget constraint notches where welfare phases out (see, for example, Saez, 2010). The
literature on distributional effects of welfare reform has mainly abstracted away from the
panel nature of policy reform in terms of short-run and long-run effects, which suggests a
need to model how low-income single mothers’ preferences, incentives and participation
costs respond to program features and changes in labor supply over time.
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3 THE CHILD CARE SAFETY NET: EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF
ASSISTANCE, NONASSISTANCE, AND POLICY AFTER WELFARE
REFORM
3.1 Introduction
Childhood poverty and the transmission of dependence are primary concerns for means-
tested transfer programs in the United States. Given that welfare reform during the
1990s dramatically changed the mechanisms of government assistance, it is important
to reexamine the long-term effects of childhood welfare exposure. In particular, after
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of
1996, the entitlement cash assistance program Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) was replaced by the state block grant program Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF), a work-conditioned program with less emphasis on cash assistance and
more emphasis on in-kind supports, or “nonassistance” transfers. Although the litera-
ture has extensively noted the declines of welfare caseloads and cash assistance following
reform, the share of nonassistance transfers has increased such that total real expendi-
ture has remained relatively stable for TANF as a major transfer program. However,
the impact of nonassistance TANF participation is unknown. Notably, the largest TANF
expenditure category after cash assistance is directed toward child care, which represents
a potentially consequential child development input considering work requirements for
single mothers. This study provides an empirical analysis of the role of TANF child-
101
care expenditures and policies—which vary widely by states over time—on center-based
childcare utilization and children’s educational outcomes.
Children living in structural poverty face significantly worse outcomes for health, ed-
ucation, and earnings, so the extent to which means-tested transfer programs affect child
development matters for cycles of poverty and future program participation. The im-
portance of child development is highlighted in a recent study of extreme poverty in the
United States: Shaefer and Edin (2013) estimate that in 2011, about 4.18 million children
live on $2 or less per day based on cash income, 3.55 million accounting for cash welfare
transfers, and 1.17 million accounting for cash transfers, post-tax transfers, and in-kind
food and housing assistance.1 Recent studies have emphasized the critical role of early
childhood interventions on human capital accumulation (see surveys in Elango et al.,
2016; Heckman and Mosso, 2014), as well as the role of child care for low-income single
mothers (e.g., Bernal and Keane, 2011; Del Boca, Flinn, and Wiswall, 2014). To the ex-
tent that TANF childcare transfers confer a positive option value to single mothers, state
expenditure allocation decisions and child-related policies may increase access to higher
quality child care. For example, a mother may choose to substitute away from informal
care, such as a friend or grandmother, to center-based child care with a potentially more
enriching learning environment.
The major legislative precursor to PRWORA was the Family Support Act of 1988,
which introduced the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) program to encourage
work for AFDC participants along with guaranteed childcare assistance. As part of
the new legislation introduced by PRWORA, the Child Care and Development Block
1Shaefer and Edin (2013) use the Survey of Income and Program Participation. Post-tax and in-kind
transfers for this study include the Earned Income Tax Credit, Food Stamps, and housing subsidies.
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Grant Amendments of 1996 consolidated AFDC child care along with other assistance
programs into the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF). However, TANF would
continue to directly fund childcare subsidization as well as transferring funds to the
state CCDF program. Child care under TANF ceased to be guaranteed, though total
spending increased, and states gained a large degree of discretion in how to allocate
funds and set policies. As of fiscal year 2010, about 30 percent of all TANF expenditure
in the U.S. went to basic cash assistance, while about 15 percent went to childcare-
related expenses. Further, TANF childcare spending varies widely by state, for example,
Wisconsin allocated almost half of all spending on child care in 2010, while Colorado
allocated less than 2 percent of all spending.2 Depending on the state, TANF may be
the largest funding source for childcare transfers; for example, Illinois provides about
54 percent of all childcare expenditure with TANF-allocated funds over the years 1997-
2014. With more state discretion through the TANF federal block grant, the concept
of “welfare” has been implemented in vastly different ways (for examples, see Hahn,
Golden, and Stanczyk, 2012), which prompts the question of which state policies are
helping children become more self-sufficient in the next generation.
Using state-level expenditure data and policy parameters along with individual-level
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), this analysis estimates the effects
of welfare spending on center-based childcare utilization among low-income families. I
find that an additional thousand dollars of childcare assistance spending per child in
poverty increases a low-income single-mother family’s likelihood of choosing formal child
care by about 27 to 30 percentage points. To the extent that TANF assistance helps
2Other TANF expenditure categories include transportation, work-related expenses, individual de-
velopment accounts, refundable tax credits, prevention of out-of-wedlock pregnancies, and diversion
payments.
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participants to expand their choice set for childcare providers and potentially increase
quality of care, one might expect that child development may benefit along both cognitive
and non-cognitive dimensions in those states that prioritize block grant funds towards
child care.
3.2 Welfare Reform and Child Care Policy
The historical antecedent for public childcare assistance is the Lanham Act of 1940 (see
Herbst, 2017b), which was motivated by surges of women going to work during World
War II. While some women remained in the labor force after the war, it was not until
the 1960s that public assistance for child care became a means-tested program.3 As
part of President Johnson’s “War on Poverty”, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964
established Head Start, which was primarily targeted at children below poverty.4 Also
during the 1960s, in response to rising welfare rolls, the AFDC program introduced its
first reform intended to encourage work and assist in childcare expenses, though the size
of these programs were quite small relative to total AFDC expenditure. Further, women
with young children were still not as prominent in the labor force at this time, though
this begins to change by the late 1970s as seen in Figure 3.1.
3.2.1 Childcare Assistance through 1996
After experimenting with “workfare” programs in the early part of the decade, the Social
Security Act of 1967 introduced the Work Incentive Program (WIN) that promoted job
3According to Michel (1999), President Elect Kennedy is quoted at the onset of the 1960s as saying,
“I believe we must take further steps to encourage day care programs that will protect our children and
provide them with a basis for a full life in later years.”
4Head Start was originally required to serve at least 90 percent of child recipients at or below poverty
and 10 percent with some disability. Early Head Start, a program extension aimed at children 0 to 5
years old, began in 1995. For research on the impact of Head Start, see Bitler, Hoynes, and Domina
(2014); Chang et al. (2007); Deming (2009); Garces, Thomas, and Currie (2002); Gelber and Isen (2013);
Kline and Walters (2016); Ludwig and Miller (2007); Walters (2015).
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Figure 3.1. Women’s Labor Force Participation
by Presence and Age of Own Children, 1975-2015
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Notes: “Own” children include children through birth, marriage, or adoption, and exclude other related
and unrelated children. The major waiver period of welfare reform is indicated by the shaded region.
Source: “Women in the Labor Force: A Databook”, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Report 1065, Table
7. Employment status of women, by presence and age of children, March 1975-March 2015. U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, 19752015 Annual Social and Economic Supplement. Marital
and Family Labor Force Statistics, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Series FMUP1392239, 1392263, 1392275,
1392289. Children are “own” children and include sons, daughters, step-children, or adopted children. Not
included are nieces, nephews, grandchildren, and other related and unrelated children.
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training and search while providing supporting services such as childcare assistance.5
As of 1969, the WIN program spent about $77.5 million (in 2014 dollars) on childcare
assistance for around 55,000 children per month (compared to Head Start spending about
$1.6 billion and serving around 663,600 children on average). AFDC spending on childcare
would remain almost negligibly small until 1976, which saw the introduction of Title XX of
the Social Security Act, which later became the Social Services Block Grant (SSBG).6 By
1978, Title XX was allocating about $587 million towards childcare assistance for almost
600,000 children per month, and approximately half of the children served belonged to
AFDC-participating families. In the same year, for comparison, Head Start spent about
$1.8 billion to serve close to 400,000 children.
The welfare reform period of the 1990s was again motivated by public debate about
the nature of welfare dependence and the value of work (for historical, sociopolitical
context, see DeParle, 2004; Noble, 1997). As a harbinger to more widespread reforms,
the Reagan administration introduced the Family Support Act of 1988, which emphasized
work requirements in an effort to reduce long-term welfare participation for families with
children.7 This act created Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) program within
AFDC along with new childcare programs for AFDC recipients (AFDC Child Care),
which was guaranteed for JOBS participants, and for AFDC program leavers (Transitional
5Before WIN, select states implemented work-support programs for AFDC recipients: the Community
Work and Training Program from 1962-1967, and the Work Experience and Training Program created
by the Economic Opportunity Act.
6Title XX funds were directed to support work-related services to low-income families, including
AFDC recipients, and operated as a matching grant to states up to some federally mandated ceiling.
The block grant was established under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981.
7Prior state experiments with workfare and child care include: Massachusetts ’s Employment and
Training Choices program, California’s Greater Avenues to Independence (GAIN) program, Project
Chance in Illinois, Michigan’s Opportunities and Skills Training program, and the Realizing Economic
Achievement (REACH) program in New Jersey.
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Child Care). The JOBS program was to be implemented in every state by October 1990.8
In November of 1990, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act established the Child Care
and Development Block Grant—the predecessor for CCDF—as well as the “At-Risk”
Child Care program for families who are nearly eligible for AFDC. All AFDC recipients
not otherwise exempt by law are required to participate in JOBS. As states experimented
with AFDC program rules, namely making welfare conditional on recipients working, the
accessibility of suitable child care was a prerequisite before cases could be considered
noncompliant and subject to sanctions. Therefore, AFDC spending on child care instantly
shot upward.Figure 3.2 shows the U.S. expenditure trends for the major childcare and
early childhood education programs from 1965 to 2014, which features a stark rise in
spending as of 1991. (Note that the expenditures in Figure 3.2 are stacked cumulatively,
except for the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit, which is nonrefundable and less
relevant for low-income families, shown separately as a dashed line.) By 1996, AFDC
spending on child care reached about $2.9 billion serving over 140,000 children through
the JOBS program and 210,000 children whose families were non-JOBS cases.
3.2.2 Childcare Assistance after the Welfare Reform Act of 1996
As introduced above, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act (PRWORA)—sometimes referred to as the Welfare Reform Act—was a significant
turning point for the government role in childcare subsidization. The Child Care and De-
velopment Block Grant was consolidated along with a myriad of smaller federal childcare
programs into one primary assistance program, the Child Care Development Fund. At
the same time, the match-grant AFDC program was replaced by the block-grant TANF
8According to an official report by the Government Accountability Office, only about 11 percent of
AFDC recipients participated. See other GAO reports for related implementation issues.
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Figure 3.2. Childcare Expenditures of Major Assistance Programs, 1965-2014
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program, which gave states much more freedom to prioritize how welfare dollars were
spent, including by what means to fund childcare assistance (for more background on the
TANF program, see Moffitt, 2003; Ziliak, 2016).
Throughout this essay, the term “childcare assistance” is used generally to represent
government transfers to income-eligible families in order to make child care affordable. In
practice, the transfer could be in the form of direct provision of childcare services through
a state-run facility, or more likely, it could be in some monetary form, whether by cash in
advance, voucher, reimbursement, or payments to the service provider. In Figure 3.3, the
prevalence for each form of transfer are shown for the major AFDC programs as of 1996,
which also identifies the number of states (nearly all) that allow an income disregard for
childcare expenses.9 A major difference after PRWORA is not the method of transfer,
but the policy rules governing eligibility of recipients and regulation of service providers,
both of which may vary depending on the state and source of funding: TANF or CCDF.
Another change under TANF is the specific use of the term “assistance” versus “non-
assistance”. The key difference is that “assistance” refers to families who are not em-
ployed, and “nonassistance” to families who are employed. Based on this criterion, Figure
3.4 shows the trend for assistance and nonassistance childcare expenditures beginning
in 1991 (where JOBS and non-JOBS participants with earnings are considered “non-
assistance” during AFDC years). A glaring discontinuity occurs for reported expendi-
ture in years 1997-1999, the transition period immediately after PRWORA. While the
definition of assistance during this time period was less clear statutorily, states were
reporting childcare expenditure as assistance when payments were made for child care,
9For a study of what types of child care welfare participants use, see Fuller et al. (2002).
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Figure 3.3. Number of States by AFDC Childcare Provision Method, 1996
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and nonassistance for childcare-related services such as referrals or counseling.10 A large
distinction in the definition of nonassistance is that these transfers neither contribute
to the caseload nor time limits associated with TANF participation, and nonassistance
participation is also not included in state reporting requirements.11
When states allocate TANF block grant dollars to child care, there are three main
spending channels. One option is to simply transfer the funds to CCDF, which was
established to consolidate childcare assistance programs into one primary mechanism.
Up to 30 percent of a state’s federally allocated TANF block grant may be transferred to
CCDF in a given year (additionally, total funds transferred to CCDF and the SSBG are
not to exceed 30 percent). It should be noted that SSBG continues to provide childcare
services, as well, though this role has diminished greatly after welfare reform.12 A second
option for TANF childcare is expenditure on nonassistance transfers, which enables the
state to boost work participation rates in partial fulfillment of state obligations under
federal law. A third option, states can allocate funds toward assistance transfers, which
10See Appendix Table G.1 for spending across all assistance, nonassistance, and transfer categories
for select years; many nonassistance categories show zero expenditure in 1997. The definition of
“assistance” is given in the Code of Federal Regulations (U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2015)
Title 45.B.II.§260.31: “cash, payments, vouchers, and other forms of benefits designed to meet a fam-
ily’s ongoing basic needs (i.e., for food, clothing, shelter, utilities, household goods, personal care items,
and general incidental expenses).” According to this section of the federal code, TANF expenditures
for transportation and child care may be classified as assistance when provided to families who are not
employed, or as nonassistance when provided to families who are employed. The current definition of
assistance entered the federal code as of 2000, yet the original use of the term was less clear for the first
three years of TANF, 1997-1999. According to the Final Rule (Federal Register, Vol. 64, No. 69, 1999,
pg. 17775): “The general legislative history for this title indicated that Congress meant for this term
to encompass more than cash assistance, but did not provide much specific guidance (H.R. Rep. No.
725, 104th Cong., 2d sess.). Likewise, our pre-NPRM [Notice of Proposed Rule-Making] consultations
did not provide clear guidance or direction.” Therefore, the TANF transition years 1997-1999 may be a
difficult time period to make reliable inference based on nonassistance program data.
11Note that some families may receive both cash assistance and nonassistance child care, so the only
families not represented in official caseload statistics would be those receiving transitional child care or
considered at risk of needing government assistance.
12In 2014, the total amount of TANF transfers to CCDF was about $1.4 billion, whereas the TANF
transfers to SSBG were about $1.2 billion out of which $237 million was spent on child care along with
another $63 million of SSBG-allocated funds. The total SSBG funds spent on child care in 2014 comprise
about 2.7 percent of all childcare assistance.
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Figure 3.4. AFDC/TANF Childcare Expenditure
by “Assistance” Case Status, 1991-2014
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for details.)
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may apply to parents looking for work or participating in some job training, education,
or community service. TANF assistance funds for child care may also be used for family
counseling or for expanding existing early education programs such as Head Start as well
as after-school and summer programs.13 Transferring funds to CCDF might be preferable,
for example, if the state wants to support state-wide child care quality enhancement,
which may not directly satisfy TANF goals (Schumacher, Greenberg, and Duffy, 2001).
The discretion states have for allocating TANF block grant funds follows directly from
the overarching goal of PRWORA with respect to child care: to give states “maximum”
flexibility to serve families’ needs and to give families the ability to choose the best child
care according to their own needs.14
In addition to state spending through TANF and CCDF, there exist other TANF pol-
icy mechanisms that can make child care more accessible to the working poor. Foremost,
income disregards for childcare expenses can, depending on the state, either increase the
eligibility threshold, the benefit amount determination, or both. Other state-level TANF
policies related to child care and development include transitional childcare benefits (level
and duration) for families leaving welfare, school attendance and parental involvement
policies for dependent children, and the allocation of non-recurrent transfers (or, diversion
payments) for child care while a family member searches for employment. Further, state
CCDF programs define several relevant policy parameters for childcare assistance, for ex-
ample: initial and continuing eligibility income thresholds by family size; copay amounts
by income threshold and family size, as well as copay exemptions related to TANF status,
13Few studies look at the important gap in summer child care with the exception of Hardy and
Gershenson (2016).
14For further discussion of state incentives to allocate childcare-related funds to either TANF or CCDF,
see Greenberg (1998) and Lynch (2016).
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poverty status, or adjustments for multiple children or part-time care; and, regulations
and reimbursement rates by type of childcare provider.15
Lastly, to put the post-PRWORA era in perspective, total childcare assistance ex-
penditure has gone from almost nonexistent before the 1970s to almost equivalent to
the AFDC/TANF program on all other expenditures. Meanwhile, as seen in Figure 3.5,
welfare programs for some of the nation’s most vulnerable families has remained flat in
real terms as real education and total public welfare spending has climbed.16 In 2014,
childcare assistance amounts to about 2 percent of total public welfare spending.
3.3 Related Literatures in Early Childhood Intervention and Development
Evidence for the importance of early childhood development for later life outcomes has
become an important topic for researchers interested in persistent poverty across gener-
ations (see Currie and Almond, 2011; Elango et al., 2016; Heckman and Mosso, 2014).
In particular, studies have noted the importance of early investments in social ability,
so-called noncognitive skills, as well as more academic (or cognitive) skills, as determi-
nants of successful life outcomes in adulthood (Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Cunha et al.,
2006; Heckman and Kautz, 2012). Other studies have focused on the role of parental time
investments (Del Boca et al., 2014; Del Boca, Monfardini, and Nicoletti, 2017), the causal
effect of income transfers (Aizer et al., 2016; Dahl and Lochner, 2012), or environmental
inputs to child development, such as school quality, social networks, and neighborhood
15TANF policies on such dimensions as eligibility, copay, and regulations are not as readily available
as those of CCDF, yet these programs coordinate services in all states and CCDF programs consult with
TANF officials on policy development in at least a third of states. It is likely that states contrast policies
in these programs strategically to meet different goals with respect to target populations and federal
requirements.
16Total public welfare spending represents U.S. expenditures by all governments (federal, state, and
local) on assistance and subsidy programs including health and food assistance, notably Medicaid and
food stamps.
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Figure 3.5. Education and Public Welfare Expenditure Trends
Relative to Cash and Childcare Assistance, 1965-2014
B
il
li
o
n
s 
o
f 
2
0
1
4
 D
o
ll
a
rs
Year
1
9
6
5
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
5
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
5
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
5
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
5
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
5
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
700
750 Education, Elem./Second.
Public Welfare, Total
AFDC/TANF (non-childcare)
Child Care Assistance, Total
Notes: Education expenditure includes capital and current spending related to elementary
and secondary education. AFDC/TANF expenditures exclude direct childcare spending and
transfers to CCDF, which are both represented in total childcare assistance expenditure along
with Head Start and Title XX/Social Services Block Grant childcare expenditure. The major
waiver period of welfare reform is indicated by the shaded region. Source: U.S. Census Bureau,
Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances and Census of Governments; Statistical
Abstract of the United States; and, various other government publications. (See Data Appendix
for details.)
115
environment (Chetty et al., 2014; Durlauf, 1996, 2006; Fryer and Katz, 2013). For back-
ground on childcare subsidies and the demand for quality care, see Appendix E.
The economics literature on child care has been bolstered by evidence from two promi-
nent experiments, the Abecedarian Project (see Barnett and Masse, 2007) and the Perry
Preschool Program (Heckman et al., 2010; Heckman, Pinto, and Savelyev, 2013). Given
the demonstrated benefits of quality early childhood education for disadvantaged chil-
dren, there has been a growing public discourse on ways to improve childcare assistance
through reforms to the tax code (Ziliak, 2014) as well as a universal child allowance (Shae-
fer et al., 2016). There have been several studies to analyze experiments and case studies
for the provision of universal child care (Baker, Gruber, and Milligan, 2008; Havnes
and Mogstad, 2015; Herbst, 2017b; Kottelenberg and Lehrer, 2016; Shaefer et al., 2016).
Also, Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017) survey a range of family policies across high-income
countries, though this literature routinely examines female labor supply instead of child
outcomes.
A similar, and extensive, stream of research has examined the effect of education fi-
nancing on student outcomes, particularly as a result of equalization reforms (see Cascio
and Reber, 2013; Gordon, 2014; Hoxby, 2001).17 In a more general study on the effec-
tiveness of public expenditures (Harknett et al., 2005) find positive effects for state-level
spending on child outcomes such as health and test scores.
Several studies have directly addressed child poverty and development after welfare re-
form (Bennett, Lu, and Song, 2004; Danziger, 2003; Danziger and Danziger, 2008; Duncan
17For more extensive coverage of heterogeneous effects, distributional effects, and misspecification
issues, among others, see Baicker and Gordon (2006); Candelaria and Shores (2017); Dewey, Husted, and
Kenny (2000); Figlio and Fletcher (2012); Hanushek and Somers (2001); Jackson, Johnson, and Persico
(2016); Lafortune, Rothstein, and Schanzenbach (2016).
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and Brooks-Gunn, 2000; Kalil and Dunifon, 2007; Morris, Gennetian, and Duncan, 2005).
Morris and Hendra (2009) look at child wellbeing and academic achievement after time
limits have expired. Miller and Zhang (2009, 2012) present the first studies to directly
test welfare reform effects on children’s academic achievement and educational attain-
ment, respectively, given nationally representative data.18 For academic achievement,
the authors use restricted data on mathematics test scores from the National Assessment
of Educational Progress program and find relative test score gains for low-income stu-
dents based on changes-in-changes estimates.19 Further, they use a value-added analysis
to show the robustness of the effects to changes in EITC benefits. For educational at-
tainment, Miller and Zhang use the Common Core of Data, produced by the National
Center for Education Statistics, and continue to find positive effects of welfare reform
on child outcomes. The gains in test scores are increasing with the duration of welfare
participation. These findings contradict some experimental results showing adolescents
experience losses, which the authors attribute to their access to longer time horizons
suggesting again that duration matters (see Morris et al., 2009). Bruins (2016) provides
structural estimates suggesting that TANF child care is poorly targeted to the most needy
families, and Herbst (2017a) uses TANF’s age-of-youngest-child exemption to identify a
negative effect of work requirements on young children’s cognitive development.
3.4 Model
Given that most of this analysis is descriptive evidence to motivate a first-stage relation-
ship between childcare policy and family behavior, the framework here follows from a
18Levine and Zimmerman (2005) look at the effects before welfare reform using National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth 1979 data, and they find no significant effects of welfare exposure on children’s test
scores or behavioral indices when using instrumental variables, fixed effects, or sibling comparisons.
19“Changes-in-changes” refers to a nonlinear difference-in-differences approach (see Athey and Imbens,
2006).
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simple linear probability model for the choice of childcare arrangement. Let the child’s
outcome variable, Cist, be an indicator for whether the family of child i uses center-based
or family home day care while living in state s at time t. The child is considered to
receive formal child care if Cist = 1 and informal care otherwise. The baseline estimation
equation is
Cist = β
′xist + γEst + ψ′sst + ηs + θt + αi + uist, (3.1)
where xist is a vector of individual or family characteristics, Est is the state-level expendi-
ture on childcare assistance per child in poverty, and sst is a vector of other time-varying
state-level expenditure and policy controls. Controls for fixed state and year effects are
represented by ηs and θt, respectively, αi is an individual fixed effect, and uist is the
unobserved error term.
For states with generous childcare spending, families should have more ability to choose
quality child care. Holding constant time-varying state policies in sst and differencing out
fixed state and year effects, I expect γ > 0 for target families with low earnings and young
children if they perceive formal care to be higher quality than informal, and γ ≈ 0 for
ineligible families regardless of which type of care arrangement is preferred. An advantage
of state-level spending is that it should offer an exogenous form of variation whereas local
spending may be more closely correlated with families’ poverty status or accessibility of
child care. The test will be whether state spending has strong enough predictive power
for family behavior.
In the following sections, I first describe the data and then provide more detailed trends
in childcare assistance across states over time. Then I present preliminary estimates for
the first-stage model using variants of equation (3.1) where I begin with the assumption
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that neither confounding state policies nor any fixed individual heterogeneity are related
to a family’s chosen care arrangement. Then I progressively add controls for time-varying
state policies and then individual effects. Next, I test the sensitivity of this baseline
estimation by target population as well as timing effects relative to the major welfare
reform.
3.5 Data
In order to characterize the relationship between individual-level outcomes and state-level
policy, I use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics supplemented by various sources for
state-level policy and combined state/federal expenditure by year. Below is a summary
of the main variables, and further source details are available in Appendix F.
3.5.1 Individual-Level Data: Panel Study of Income Dynamics
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) provides a panel of family observations for
socioeconomic data that include family childcare spending and childcare arrangements
in certain years. For example, in the biennial survey years from 1999 to 2013, the main
family survey asks whether families used center-based or family home child care during
the previous year. Beginning in survey year 1997, the PSID added a Child Development
Supplement (CDS) questionnaire for a subset of families with children ages 0-12. Follow-
ing up on this initial wave, the CDS re-interviewed families in 2002 when the children
were 5-17, again in 2007/2008 for those children who were under age 18 in 2007, and then
another recent release in 2014. The CDS supplement adds rich information about the
child’s daycare arrangements in addition to detailed questions on topics of school, neigh-
borhood, and home, as well as the child’s relationship with different family members. As
these children aged beyond 18, the PSID added another extension called the Transition
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to Adulthood (TA) questionnaire, which complements the CDS. The TA has been admin-
istered every other year from 2005 to 2015 (data are currently available through the 2013
survey). TA data provide standardized college-entry exam scores and college enrollment
choices. Also, the CDS/TA surveys record educational attainment expectations held by
the child’s parents and teachers as well as the child’s own expectations and aspirations
as a young adult.20
The most consistent measure of child care utilization during the welfare reform era
is the family survey question of whether the family uses center-based care. As shown
in Table 3.1 for years 1998-2012, about 23 percent of all families with children under
age 13 use formal child care, and among single-mother families, the probability of using
formal care is increasing with income. Single mothers below poverty, based on the U.S.
Census poverty threshold by family size, use formal care in 21 percent of the sample
compared to 24 and 30 percent for single mothers below 200-percent poverty and above
300-percent, respectively. Also, Table 3.1 shows that as single-mother family income
decreases, younger children are more prevalent and the number of children is larger.
However, lower-income single mothers are also more likely to have some other adult
present in the household. The likelihood of single mothers having any family labor
income during this period is about 64 percent for those below 100-percent poverty and
about 76 percent for those below 200-percent poverty.
As a standard measure of educational attainment, the individual survey collects each
person’s years of education completed, which can be linked across generations, and fur-
ther, the TA supplement specifically asks about high school graduation, the GED, and
20In addition, PSID has also implemented the Childhood Retrospective Circumstances Supplement for
survey year 2014. These data cover broad topics about one’s environment while growing up, for example,
whether the child has had any negative interactions with the justice system.
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Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics for Children Under Age 13, 1998-2012
Sample Definition: Single Mother Families Full Sample
Poverty Status: < 100% < 200% ≥ 300%
Center-Based Child Care (%) 0.214 0.240 0.301 0.234
(0.410) (0.427) (0.459) (0.424)
Age of Child 7.083 7.160 8.072 6.729
(3.312) (3.286) (2.975) (3.395)
Age of Youngest Child in Family 5.624 5.925 8.175 5.716
(3.556) (3.549) (3.170) (3.599)
Number of Children in Family 2.786 2.581 1.673 2.440
(1.388) (1.290) (0.772) (1.092)
Number of Adults in Household 1.322 1.293 1.133 1.914
(0.642) (0.604) (0.357) (0.542)
Mother’s Education (years completed) 12.872 13.063 14.653 14.257
(1.895) (1.858) (1.894) (2.128)
Any Family Labor Income? (%) 0.642 0.756 1.000 0.941
(0.479) (0.430) (0.000) (0.235)
Expenditures below shown in thousands of dollars per child in poverty:
AFDC/TANF Child Care (Direct) 0.271 0.270 0.316 0.295
(0.318) (0.321) (0.350) (0.329)
AFDC/TANF Child Care (incl. Transfers) 0.664 0.669 0.782 0.749
(0.689) (0.699) (0.773) (0.721)
CCDF (Total incl. TANF Transfers) 0.662 0.674 0.766 0.760
(0.283) (0.290) (0.349) (0.341)
AFDC/TANF and CCDF Childcare Assistance 0.947 0.960 1.098 1.071
(0.509) (0.519) (0.578) (0.561)
Number of Individuals 2350 3031 309 7778
Total Observations 5134 7227 491 25009
Notes: Sample averages are weighted by the child’s PSID core longitudinal weights, and standard deviations are shown
below in parentheses. The full sample corresponds to all children whose age is greater than 0 and less than 13 during
years 1998-2012, though most estimations that follow restrict this sample to single mothers with family labor income,
and the PSID family survey measure for whether a child’s family uses center-based or family home day care is available
only for the even years in this time period. Poverty status is determined by family earnings as a percent of the U.S.
Census poverty threshold by family size and year.
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college attendance. In terms of measures of achievement, the supplemental surveys pro-
vide a more detailed perspective on both achievement test scores as well as attitudes
and expectations for educational attainment. During the first wave of the CDS in 1996,
children were administered the Woodcock-Johnson Test with percentile rank scores re-
ported separately for letter-word recognition, passage comprehension, applied problems,
and calculation.21 The CDS also records passage comprehension raw scores for the child’s
primary caregiver, which is the mother 95% of the cases and either the mother or father
in 98%. Another intergenerational achievement measure is available from the 1972 main
family survey in which the PSID administered the Lorge-Thorndike Sentence Comple-
tion Test (validated as a measure of intelligence/ability as part of the Detroit Survey).
Since each child observed in the CDS/TA surveys has a family identification number for
every survey year, a child’s educational outcome in 2013 can easily be matched for some
measure of family intelligence in 1972, likely a measure for a grandparent. These family
test scores may serve as controls for hereditary ability across generations.
3.5.2 State-Level Expenditure and Program Policy Data
In this analysis, the primary interest is the state-level amount of spending relative to
the target population. All expenditure measures throughout this essay are given as real
2014 dollars based on the personal consumption expenditures deflator (excluding food
and energy) obtained via the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. In estimation, the
expenditures are expressed as spending per capita by state, which is defined as children
21See Duffy and Sastry (2014) for details regarding achievement tests in the PSID-CDS. In addition to
these early educational achievement measures, CDS also collected information on a child’s self-concept in
math and reading, that is, measures of one’s perceptions of own ability in these subjects. An additional
measure of intelligence in the CDS is the WISC digit span raw score, which represents the total for
the longest forward-sequence and backward-sequence span of digits the child can recall after hearing
(Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children–Revised: The WISC Digit Span Test for Short-Term Memory,
c© Psychological Corporation). Other achievement measures for high school students include grade point
average, SAT and ACT scores.
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living below the U.S. Census poverty threshold for means-tested expenditure categories,
or all children under age 18 for broader spending categories such as education.
3.5.2.1 AFDC/TANF and CCDF Childcare Assistance Data
During the AFDC years 1991-1996, state-level expenditure data, including pre-PRWORA
childcare spending, are available via the Background Material and Data on Programs
within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means (Green Book). For the
TANF years, detailed expenditure data are available for every fiscal year via the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (USDHHS) website. The Green Books also
provide childcare caseload data in certain years, though caseloads during the TANF era
only correspond to cash assistance cases. The only indications of the number of TANF
childcare cases come from a measure of the percent of active TANF cases with subsidized
child care in the Characteristics and Financial Circumstances of TANF Recipients, 2000-
present, and state TANF reports on Separate State Programs and Maintenance of Effort
(MOE) activity, which are available for years 2005 and 2010.22 For earlier years of AFDC
childcare assistance, state-level expenditure or caseload data are much less available,
though the total level of childcare spending is also much lower before 1991. (See Appendix
F for more details and additional data sources.)
From 1999 to present, CCDF program data are available for both expenditure and
caseloads by state via the USDHHS website, and earlier data (including predecessor
programs) are available for years 1991-1998 via Green Book publications. Given that some
states allocate a generous proportion of TANF expenditure toward CCDF block grant
22While state reports for MOE activity are presumably collected in other years, only two have been
available recently via government websites or select Internet archive sites. In some states, the total MOE
spending for child care matches the total state expenditure in official budget reports, which means that
the childcare caseloads in those states should be representative.
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transfers, the TANF program can be a significant contributor to the variance of CCDF
programming. For example, in Wisconsin since 1997, the proportion of TANF transfers to
CCDF relative to total CCDF expenditure implies that TANF contributes toward about
8,700 children receiving child care on average per month out of a total of about 26,000.
Another data source for childcare assistance participation is a series of USDHHS briefs
providing estimates of childcare eligibility and receipt. In 2012, for instance, around 14
million children were eligible for subsidized care according to simulations under federal
rules, almost 9 million of those were eligible under more strict state rules, and the number
of children served was a little over 2 million (15 percent of those federally eligible).23
While there is little information about specific childcare policies within the TANF pro-
gram, the Urban Institute maintains the CCDF Policy Rules Database in coordination
with USDHHS. These policies include information on the amount of copays and eligibility
for copay exemption (for example, some states exempt TANF participants), the presence
of family-size adjustments for copays, whether relatives are authorized to provide subsi-
dized in-home care, or the length of eligibility redetermination periods. Another Urban
Institute project is the Welfare Rules Database, which does not offer childcare-specific
policy rules, yet does have state-level TANF policy information such as the size of child-
care earnings disregards, whether states impose rules on school attendance or parental
23Take up for childcare subsidies has been historically low. Evidence from certain pilot AFDC ex-
periments provided early evidence that childcare subsidies can incentivize low-income families to use
center-based child care, yet the costs born by families after subsidization was still a significant burden,
as was the prospect of transitioning out of public assistance (Committee on Ways and Means, U.S.
House of Representatives, 2000; Michalopoulos, 2010). Also, an increasing complication of using child-
care assistance when eligible is that low-wage workers frequently experience variable scheduling subject
to changes and difficult hours, such as contract or temp-to-hire work (Henly and Lambert, 2005; Katz
and Krueger, 2016). Even though TANF conditions assistance on mothers working, the percent of active
TANF cases receiving subsidized child care has stayed close to 10 percent over the last decade.
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involvement, and whether transitional child care after TANF participation is limited by
income or time.
3.5.2.2 Other State-Level Controls
In order to study the effect of childcare expenditure and policy on family behavior, it is
important to control for other variation within states over time that may also be correlated
with outcomes related to child care and education. In terms of additional program ex-
penditures, the most relevant for low-income families are the Social Services Block Grant
(SSBG), Head Start, elementary/secondary public education, and total public welfare.
SSBG funds are primarily directed toward child-wellbeing services such as foster care
or protection from abuse, yet the program allows states to fund a wide variety of social
services, which also includes providing for childcare assistance. Before the welfare reform
era, SSBG (or Title XX), was the leading funder of government subsidized child care,
especially for AFDC recipients. Today, SSBG childcare makes up almost 20 percent of
total SSBG spending, which amounts to less than 3 percent of the total spending from
TANF and CCDF combined. Head Start, meanwhile, is a large program that increased
dramatically during the 1990s (along with total childcare spending) and is comparable
in magnitude to total CCDF spending. In the analysis, I ignore SSBG spending given
the small size of the program and its shrinking role after welfare reform, and I assume
that Head Start spending varies consistently across states and thus control only for the
aggregate increases in Head Start allocations over time.
In addition to controlling for state-level expenditures as child development inputs,
controls for potentially correlated outcomes, such as high school graduation rates, can
further identify the relationship between childcare-specific spending and later education
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outcomes. In more recent years, the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES)
has begun measuring high school graduation using a 4-year adjusted cohort graduation
rate (ACGR), which is reported in the Common Core of Data. The income gap for high
school completion has narrowed considerably in the last two decades, as shown in Figure
3.6. However, for economically disadvantaged students as of 2012, the ACGR can range
from 58 percent in Nevada to 85 percent in Indiana.
3.6 Descriptive Evidence on State-Level Childcare Assistance Expenditure
Public assistance for child care increased greatly after the Family Support Act of 1988,
which resulted in more welfare participants working under the guarantee of subsidized
child care between 1991 and 1996. This period of time coincides with the AFDC waiver
era during which states began implementing state-wide reforms. After PRWORA was
signed in 1996, childcare assistance increased again. However, the post-PRWORA period
was also marked by increased state discretion on how to allocate TANF block grant funds
(as opposed to the match grant AFDC program). Figure 3.7 shows the distribution
of childcare assistance spending per child in poverty for the 50 U.S. states averaged
within four time periods. In the period well before welfare reforms introduced work
requirements, childcare spending was low and flat across states. The waiver era saw
increased state generosity and more variation across states, and the post-PRWORA then
saw more spending and even more variation. The most generous state in the five years
after PRWORA spent over three times as much as the most generous state in the five
years before PRWORA. Also evident in the years after 1997, especially in the most recent
era, is that some states allocate almost no funds to TANF direct childcare assistance while
other states use TANF as the predominant source of funds. The degree to which states
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Figure 3.6. High School Status Dropout Rates
by Family Income Quartile, 1975-2012
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Notes: High school status dropout rates shown above correspond to 16-24 year olds who have
not completed high school and are not currently enrolled. The major waiver period of welfare
reform is indicated by the shaded region. Source: Table 219.75. Percentage of high school
dropouts among persons 16 to 24 years old (status dropout rate), by income level, and percentage
distribution of status dropouts, by labor force status and years of school completed: 1970
through 2015, Digest of Education Statistics: 2015. U.S. Department of Education, National
Center for Education Statistics.
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Figure 3.7. State Distribution of Childcare Assistance
per Child in Poverty, by Program and Time Period
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Notes: For each time period above, the bars represent the distribution of average state expen-
ditures on childcare assistance per child in poverty for the 50 U.S. states excluding the District
of Columbia. The categories of expenditure are cumulative and ordered separately, that is,
TANF→CCDF represent total AFDC/TANF [SSBG] direct childcare expenditure plus TANF
transfers to CCDF. The major waiver period of welfare reform is indicated by “Waiver Era”,
and the “Post-PRWORA” period indicates the years after the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State
and Local Government Finances and Census of Governments; Statistical Abstract of the United
States; and, various other government publications. (See Data Appendix for details.)
fund childcare assistance through TANF or CCDF relates directly to the degree to which
those funds are restricted by federal policies.
Looking at the post-PRWORA period as a whole, Figure 3.8 illustrates the geographic
variation for different measures of states’ generosity for TANF childcare spending. The
maps in Figure 3.8 show real TANF expenditure (including transfers to CCDF) per
child in poverty in Panel A, the percent of TANF funds allocated toward child care in
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Panel B, and the percent of total childcare assistance that comes from TANF in panel
C. From a visual comparison, these measures seem to be highly correlated.24 Florida
stands out as being more generous than average for southern states, Oklahoma more
than its midwestern neighbors, and New England tends to have the largest concentration
of generous states in general. Some states like Idaho and Mississippi stand out as less
generous in terms of spending per child, yet they allocate a higher than average portion
of TANF spending toward child care. In panel C, note that the darkest shaded states are
ones that contribute around half of all childcare assistance through the TANF program.
In fact, five states fund over 50 percent of childcare assistance via TANF.25
The degree to which the childcare assistance landscape changed after welfare reform
is often understood as an increase in spending, yet the increase in variance of spending
is a striking feature of reform’s impact. Figure 3.9 shows that the median state spending
shifted upward after PRWORA, and in the most recent years it has shifted back closer
to 1996 levels. However, the upper tail of spending per child took off during the period
from 1999 to 2002, and while it has tapered off since then, it has remained almost twice
as high as the maximum spending in 1996. Regarding within state variation during the
post-PRWORA period after 1996, most states have varied widely in spending per child.
Figure 3.10 compares states along with a line depicting the U.S. median spending of
approximately $897 per child in poverty. Connecticut has a large range over this period,
which includes the maximum spending for all states and a minimum that is above the
U.S. median. Texas has the smallest range of per-child expenditure, and it is also one
24The highest correlation is between panels A and C at 0.854, and the lowest correlation is between
panels A and B at 0.648.
25TANF childcare expenditure and transfers are the majority funding sources for Michigan, Delaware,
Massachusetts, Illinois, and Wisconsin, ranging from 50 to 54 percent of total expenditure. The District
of Columbia funds 68 percent of childcare assistance through the TANF program.
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Figure 3.8. Geographic Variation in Average Measures
of TANF Childcare Generosity, 1997-2014
A. TANF Childcare Expenditure and CCDF Transfer
Per Child in Poverty
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Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; author’s tabulations.
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of the lowest funders of childcare assistance per child. Based on the variation evident
in Figures 3.9 and 3.10, there is more fluctuation in state-level childcare policy from
year-to-year than simply post-reform funds increasing and states separating in allocation
behavior. The state allocation decision seems to be dynamic over time, and possibly
related to changing priorities according to political administrations with the ability to
shift block grant funds to meet different agendas.
After PRWORA, TANF has become less of a cash assistance program in comparison
to AFDC, and it has taken up a significant role in childcare assistance alongside CCDF.
Before proceeding to the effects of state spending on family childcare choices, the following
figures explore the degree to which states allocate TANF funds in general. Figure 3.11
shows the percent of TANF allocations spent in broad categories by state over the period
1997 to 2014. States are ordered by the total percent allocated to childcare assistance
and CCDF transfers, shown in light shades increasing from the right side of the figure,
and cash assistance is shown from the left. Notice that for states like Delaware, Illinois,
Wisconsin, and Oklahoma, childcare-related spending dominates cash assistance. States
near the bottom of the figure, states like Texas and South Carolina are typically marked
by large nonassistance expenditure with very little going toward child care and still small
portions going toward cash assistance. Arkansas spends an especially large portion on
nonassistance to the neglect of both cash and child care. Few states still prioritize TANF
dollars on cash assistance, and only California and Maine spend over half in cash.
Just as childcare spending fluctuates over time, so do TANF allocations across all
categories. For total U.S. TANF expenditures, Figure 3.12 provides a stacked plot where
the height of each category contributes to the cumulative spending. This stratified visual
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Figure 3.9. Within-Year State Variation in AFDC/TANF and CCDF
Total Childcare Expenditure per Child in Poverty, 1991-2014
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Notes: The box plot above represents the interquartile range and median of the distribution
along with the minimum and maximum values. Different colors are used to highlight distribu-
tional differences pre- and post-PRWORA, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996. Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; Back-
ground Material and Data on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and
Means. (See Data Appendix for details.)
132
Figure 3.10. Longitudinal Variation in State AFDC/TANF and CCDF
Total Childcare Expenditure per Child in Poverty, 1997-2014
Wyoming
Wisconsin
West Virginia
Washington
Virginia
Vermont
Utah
Texas
Tennessee
South Dakota
South Carolina
Rhode Island
Pennsylvania
Oregon
Oklahoma
Ohio
North Dakota
North Carolina
New York
New Mexico
New Jersey
New Hampshire
Nevada
Nebraska
Montana
Missouri
Mississippi
Minnesota
Michigan
Massachusetts
Maryland
Maine
Louisiana
Kentucky
Kansas
Iowa
Indiana
Illinois
Idaho
Hawaii
Georgia
Florida
District of Columbia
Delaware
Connecticut
Colorado
California
Arkansas
Arizona
Alaska
Alabama
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
Thousands of 2014 Dollars per Child in Poverty
U.S. median ≈ 0.897
Notes: The box plot above represents the interquartile range and median of the distribution
along with the minimum and maximum values. Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services; Background Material and Data on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee
on Ways and Means. (See Data Appendix for details.)
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Figure 3.11. Distribution of Average TANF Expenditure
in Broad Categories by State, 1997-2014
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illustrates the rise in spending diversification during the early years of TANF, 1997 to
2000, and a general shrinking of cash assistance over time. After 2006, there seems to be
a shift upward of some nonassistance categories, and again, a slight shrinking of CCDF
transfers. The more telling visual of this change over time is to plot these allocations
trends by state. Appendix Figure G.1 provides a similar figure, though instead of stacking
the cumulative total spending, it depicts cumulative percent spending by category so that
all plots compare state TANF allocation distributions from 0 to 100 percent. This figure
alone, with plots for the 50 U.S. states from 1997 to 2014, is a strong motivation to
understand more about how TANF funds are spent and what outcomes follow for the
most vulnerable low-income families.
3.7 Childcare Assistance Expenditure Effects on Formal Care Arrangement
Along with an increasing trend in female labor force participation (Figure 3.1), the work
requirements of 1990s welfare reforms provide a clear motivation for increases in childcare
demand among single mothers. In particular, there is a pronounced increase in women
with young children entering the labor force between 1993 and 1996. The reform effect is
more evident among black families according to panel A of Figure 3.1, which is related to
the higher prevalence of poverty and single-parent families with young children for this
subsample. If the type of child care that working-poor single mothers choose matters
for child development and second-generation outcomes, then a first-stage test would be
to evaluate the extent to which childcare assistance affects the care utilization choices of
this target population. Further, the time trends of state allocations toward child care
may suggest differential outcomes for low-income families with young children.
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Figure 3.12. TANF Expenditure by Detailed Categories of
Assistance, Nonassistance, and Transfers, 1997-2014
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3.7.1 Main First-Stage Results
In the main results, shown in Table 3.2, I consider the decision to use center-based child
care for the sample of low-earning single mothers with children under 13 years old. The
estimation sample corresponds to the post-PRWORA years 1998-2012, which abstracts
away from some larger structural changes to welfare work requirements and childcare
demand. State generosity for childcare assistance appears to have a robustly positive
influence on a family’s likelihood of using formal child care instead of unpaid or relative
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care. All specifications control for a basic set of family demographics—child’s age, number
of children, parent’s education—along with fixed state and year effects.26 Using basic
family controls and state-year effects, column (1) indicates that an additional thousand
dollars of childcare assistance per child in poverty would make families 14.2 percentage
points more likely to use formal child care. After adding in further state-level controls
for spending on education, public welfare, Head Start, and specific TANF and CCDF
policies, column (2) shows a larger effect of childcare assistance spending with a 27.6
percentage point increase in formal care. The effects of family demographics on center-
based care use are decreasing for older children and the presence of other adults, and
increasing with mother’s education.
The remaining columns of Table 3.2 apply stronger controls for family heterogeneity
without weakening the influence of state childcare generosity. In column (3), detailed
family controls from the PSID CDS are included to control for effects of the child’s
home, neighborhood, and parental influence. The subsample with CDS data is about
one fourth of the baseline sample size such that columns (2) and (3) are not directly
comparable, though the estimates are qualitatively similar with a somewhat larger point
estimate: a 31.8 percentage point increase in formal care use. Columns (4)-(5) repeat the
same specifications as (1)-(3) with the addition of individual fixed effects. Overall, the
estimates are quantitatively similar regardless of the fixed-effect specification, especially in
columns (2) and (5) with the full sample and state policy controls, which both have point
estimates of 0.276 with standard errors of (0.083) and (0.141), respectively. The fixed-
26The full baseline set of individual/family controls used in the empirical specifications include: a
quadratic in the child’s age, an indicator for whether the child is female, an indicator for whether the
child’s race is reported as black, indicators for the number of children in the family unit and whether
there is more than one adult, an indicator for urban residence, mother’s educational attainment in years,
and parents’ marital status.
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Table 3.2. Childcare Assistance Expenditure Effects on Center-Based Care for Children
Under Age 13 with Low-Earnings Single Mothers, 1998-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Childcare Assistance 0.142 0.276 0.318 0.160 0.276 0.400
(thousands per child) (0.075) (0.083) (0.134) (0.126) (0.141) (0.197)
Age of Child −0.007 −0.009 −0.026 −0.047 −0.045 −0.049
(0.010) (0.010) (0.033) (0.021) (0.025) (0.048)
Age of Youngest Child −0.033 −0.034 −0.039 −0.018 −0.019 −0.010
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013)
Number of children = 2 0.024 0.021 0.032 0.025 0.030 0.210
(0.026) (0.025) (0.048) (0.071) (0.072) (0.141)
Number of children > 2 −0.063 −0.067 −0.077 0.015 0.018 0.198
(0.030) (0.030) (0.050) (0.079) (0.079) (0.164)
Other Adults in the Home −0.058 −0.057 −0.086 −0.014 −0.011 0.074
(0.031) (0.032) (0.057) (0.045) (0.045) (0.090)
Mother’s Education: 0.020 0.021 0.004
High School (0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
Mother’s Education: 0.077 0.079 0.047
More than High School (0.027) (0.027) (0.052
Basic Family Controls X X X X X X
State Expenditures and Policies X X X X
Detailed CDS Family Controls X X
Individual Fixed Effect No No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of Individuals 2629 2604 664 1678 1661 624
Observations 5558 5501 1461 3872 3833 1383
Linear Probability Estimates for Center-Based Child Care Use by Low-Income Families
At Percentiles of Average State Assistance Expenditure Per Child in Poverty
0.10 Nevada: $519/child 0.218 0.158 0.100 0.183 0.128 0.066
(0.034) (0.037) (0.063) (0.060) (0.066) (0.091)
0.25 Montana: $731/child 0.248 0.216 0.168 0.216 0.187 0.151
(0.018) (0.020) (0.034) (0.033) (0.036) (0.049)
0.50 Florida: $1,030/child 0.290 0.299 0.263 0.264 0.269 0.270
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010)
0.75 Nebraska: $1,436/child 0.348 0.411 0.392 0.329 0.381 0.432
(0.035) (0.039) (0.060) (0.056) (0.063) (0.090)
0.90 Wisconsin: $2,145/child 0.448 0.607 0.617 0.443 0.577 0.716
(0.088) (0.097) (0.155) (0.146) (0.163) (0.229)
Notes: Robust standard errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is an indicator
for whether the child’s family used center-based or family home child care, and the sample is restricted to low-income
families with positive earnings below 200 percent of the U.S. Census poverty threshold. The independent variable of
interest is the total TANF and CCDF childcare assistance expenditure per child in poverty. Basic family controls used in
all specifications include state and year fixed effects in addition to the child’s age, age squared, sex, race, urban residence
status, indicators for number of siblings and other adults living in the household, and indicators for parent’s educational
attainment. State expenditure and policy controls include measures of state spending per child with respect to Head
Start, elementary/secondary education, and total public welfare; state TANF policies regarding school attendance,
parental school involvement, childcare earnings disregards, and whether transitional childcare assistance is limited by
earnings or time; and, CCDF policies regarding copay amounts, the presence of TANF exemptions for copay, family-size
adjustments for copay, whether relatives are authorized to receive payments for in-home care, whether redetermination
period is no longer than 6 months. Additional detailed family controls from the Child Development Supplement (CDS)
include a home environment score, neighborhood score, measure of parental style (warmth), an indicator for low birth
weight, and intelligence measures for parent and grandparent.
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effect estimate loses some statistical precision, though both estimates are statistically
significant at the 10-percent level (column (2) at the 1-percent level).
The lower panel of Table 3.2 estimates the linear probability for in-sample families’
use of center-based child care given different levels of state assistance generosity based on
percentiles of average expenditure during the sample time period. For example, based on
column (5), if all states were as generous as Wisconsin, where $2,145 per child in poverty
is at the 90th percentile of state spending, then approximately 58 percent of working-poor
single mothers would use center-based care. At the median level of state generosity, about
27 percent would use formal care, and at the 10th percentile the number drops below
13 percent. As a comparison for these predicted probabilities, the sample average for
center-based care use is about 28 percent, and the 10th and 90th percentile probabilities
are 18 and 51 percent, respectively.27
3.7.2 Supplemental Results
Given that state-level childcare assistance has a strong effect on type of care arrangement,
the following results explore how the effects vary by family poverty status, timing effects
by source of funds, and a comparison just before and after PRWORA implementation.
As a direct comparison using the same specifications as in Table 3.2 columns (2) and
(5), the results in Table 3.3 allow the sample to vary based on the family’s earned income
as a percent of the U.S. Census poverty threshold. The effect of state childcare assistance
generosity on families below 100-percent poverty is larger than for families below 200-
percent poverty when considering the linear probability estimates in columns (1) and (3),
though not for the fixed-effect estimates in columns (2) and (4). These differences may
27Note that some states have rates of formal childcare utilization at over 70 percent. Sample means in
Table 3.1 offer another comparison, although these statistics are not conditional on the mother working.
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Table 3.3. Childcare Assistance Effects on Center-Based Care by Poverty Status for
Children Under Age 13 with Working Single Mothers, 1998-2012
Poverty Status: < 100% < 200% ≥ 300%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Childcare Assistance 0.310 0.181 0.276 0.276 0.128 0.054
(thousands per child) (0.095) (0.108) (0.083) (0.141) (0.113) (0.106)
Age of Child 0.002 −0.043 −0.009 −0.045 0.017 0.077
(0.013) (0.033) (0.010) (0.025) (0.041) (0.064)
Age of Youngest Child −0.038 −0.018 −0.034 −0.019 −0.042 −0.016
(0.005) (0.011) (0.004) (0.011) (0.016) (0.045)
Number of children = 2 0.002 0.155 0.021 0.030 −0.172 0.078
(0.036) (0.072) (0.025) (0.072) (0.061) (0.250)
Number of children > 2 −0.112 −0.002 −0.067 0.018 −0.378 0.463
(0.036) (0.109) (0.030) (0.079) (0.095) (0.379)
Other Adults in the Home −0.118 −0.083 −0.057 −0.011 0.164 0.473
(0.036) (0.053) (0.032) (0.045) (0.108) (0.133)
Mother’s Education: 0.080 0.021 0.148
High School (0.045) (0.029) (0.093)
Mother’s Education: 0.099 0.079 0.241
More than High School (0.032) (0.027) (0.105)
Individual Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of Individuals 1859 1171 2604 1661 306 209
Observations 3440 2332 5501 3833 485 338
Notes: Robust standard errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is an indicator
for whether the child’s family used center-based or family home child care. The independent variable of interest is the
total TANF and CCDF childcare assistance expenditure per child in poverty. All specifications control for state and
year fixed effects in addition to the child’s age, age squared, sex, race, urban residence status, indicators for number
of siblings and other adults living in the household, indicators for parent’s educational attainment, as well as controls
for state expenditures and policies. Specifically, state-specific measures include spending per child with respect to Head
Start, elementary/secondary education, and total public welfare; state TANF policies regarding school attendance,
parental school involvement, childcare earnings disregards, and whether transitional childcare assistance is limited by
earnings or time; and, CCDF policies regarding copay amounts, the presence of TANF exemptions for copay, family-size
adjustments for copay, whether relatives are authorized to receive payments for in-home care, whether redetermination
period is no longer than 6 months. Poverty status is determined by family earnings as a percent of the U.S. Census
poverty threshold by family size and year.
not be statistically significant, yet it would be reasonable to consider that family decisions
for child care exhibit more heterogeneity for poorer families. The less financial (or social
capital) resources a family has may cause more idiosyncratic responses to managing work,
transportation, and accessible child care.
It is plausible that levels of government childcare funding could affect markets for
providing quality care by changing the demand for services or by imposing regulations
on providers, which could potentially make childcare assistance relevant beyond just the
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lower distribution of earners. Given that columns (5) and (6) of Table 3.3 still represent
working single mothers, this might be the group most likely to be affected by such market
changes for child care. However, the results indicate that single mothers with earnings
above 300 percent of the poverty line do not seem to make childcare arrangements based
on the level of state assistance. Another notable difference for single mothers by poverty
status is that the mother’s education becomes a much bigger decision-making factor for
high earners who are about 24.1 percentage points more likely to use formal care if the
mother has more than a high school education. Also, higher-earning single mothers
seem to have an opposite response to additional adults in the home compared with
lower-earning mothers. A potential explanation of the additional-adult effect is that the
presence of unmarried partners in a home could increase family earnings that make child
care more affordable without making shared childcare responsibilities more likely.
Returning now to focus on single-mother families below 200 percent poverty of the
poverty line, Table 3.4 presents the effects of childcare assistance expenditure by source
of funds and interacted with indicators by year in order to highlight trend effects for the
period 2000-2012. This time period excludes 1998—the period just after reform—and
interactions by year follow an assumption that families’ time-varying unobserved reasons
for choosing care arrangements is stable across years. Overall, the results in Table 3.4
suggest a decreasing trend in the effectiveness of childcare assistance at encouraging for-
mal care among low-income single mothers. Columns (1) and (2) represent TANF direct
childcare expenditure excluding block grant transfers to CCDF, columns (3) and (4) rep-
resent CCDF expenditure inclusive of TANF transfers, and total combined expenditures
are shown in columns (5) and (6). The point estimates for TANF’s effect on formal child
141
care use are generally below CCDF estimates, which likely reflects the increased flexibility
states have to allocate funds through TANF without being regulated by CCDF policies.
TANF funds may be more targeted toward moving mothers into work than moving chil-
dren into center-based care. Note, also, that during this time period, states are decreasing
CCDF expenditure on average and keeping TANF childcare assistance relatively consis-
tent. These parallel trends highlight the fact that state funds to aid low-income families
may face reallocations over time to meet heterogeneous priorities for different states.
In another comparison of childcare assistance funds across years, Table 3.5 compares
the effect of state spending just before and after PRWORA.28 Columns (1)-(2) show child-
care spending for AFDC in 1996 or TANF in 1998 (excluding transfers to CCDF), columns
(3) and (4) show CCDF spending inclusive of TANF transfers in 1998 (where CCDBG is
the CCDF pre-cursor), again the total combined spending of these programs is shown in
the remaining columns (5)-(6). In order to compare the pre- and post-PRWORA peri-
ods, I use a difference-in-difference-type specification with childcare spending interacted
with an indicator for whether the year is 1998. Therefore, the coefficients on Childcare
Assistance correspond to pre-PRWORA effects, the interaction term compares the effect
sizes before and after, and the calculated 1998 effect is shown below along with standard
errors constructed by delta method. There is no statistically significant evidence that
childcare assistance affects the care arrangement chosen by low-income single mothers
before PRWORA, however, the magnitudes for CCDF and total childcare assistance in
the fixed-effect models are comparable to some later-year estimates in Table 3.4. The
coefficients on the post-PRWORA interaction term indicate that TANF childcare had a
28While previous estimates have used a center-based care variable from the PSID family survey, those
data are available only for 1998 onward. The variable for childcare arrangement in 1996 comes from the
CDS survey.
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Table 3.4. Childcare Assistance Effects by Year, 2000-2012, on Center-Based Care of
Children Under Age 13 with Low-Earnings Single Mothers
Expenditure Source: TANF CCDF Total Combined
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Childcare Assistance ×
(Y ear = 2000) 0.436 0.361 0.393 0.603 0.172 0.455
(0.139) (0.200) (0.110) (0.202) (0.361) (0.183)
(Y ear = 2002) 0.315 0.311 0.380 0.409 0.039 0.391
(0.178) (0.168) (0.118) (0.203) (0.282) (0.169)
(Y ear = 2004) 0.463 0.320 0.409 0.628 0.046 0.437
(0.198) (0.187) (0.131) (0.239) (0.268) (0.187)
(Y ear = 2006) 0.265 0.194 0.310 0.433 −0.045 0.353
(0.221) (0.176) (0.134) (0.261) (0.263) (0.186)
(Y ear = 2008) 0.179 0.228 0.301 0.285 −0.111 0.288
(0.175) (0.205) (0.127) (0.225) (0.245) (0.163)
(Y ear = 2010) 0.137 0.142 0.258 0.199 −0.290 0.220
(0.231) (0.261) (0.159) (0.185) (0.314) (0.175)
(Y ear = 2012) 0.129 0.104 0.246 0.133 −0.408 0.169
(0.143) (0.255) (0.131) (0.174) (0.386) (0.194)
Individual Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of Daughters 1401 2321 2321 2321 2321 2321
Observations 3146 4767 4767 4767 4767 4767
Notes: Robust standard errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is an indicator
for whether the child’s family used center-based or family home child care, and the sample is restricted to low-income
families with positive earnings below 200 percent of the U.S. Census poverty threshold. The independent variables
of interest are the interactions of indicators by year with the childcare assistance expenditure per child in poverty,
which is defined as TANF direct expenditures in columns (1)-(2), CCDF expenditures including TANF transfers in
columns (3)-(4), and total TANF and CCDF expenditures in columns (5)-(6). All specifications control for state fixed
effects in addition to the child’s age, age squared, sex, race, urban residence status, indicators for number of siblings
and other adults living in the household, indicators for parent’s educational attainment, as well as controls for state
expenditures and policies. Specifically, state-specific measures include spending per child with respect to Head Start,
elementary/secondary education, and total public welfare; state TANF policies regarding school attendance, parental
school involvement, childcare earnings disregards, and whether transitional childcare assistance is limited by earnings or
time; and, CCDF policies regarding copay amounts, the presence of TANF exemptions for copay, family-size adjustments
for copay, whether relatives are authorized to receive payments for in-home care, whether redetermination period is no
longer than 6 months.
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Table 3.5. Childcare Assistance Effects on Center-Based Care for Children Under Age
13 with Low-Earnings Single Mothers, Pre- and Post-PRWORA
Expenditure Source: AFDC/TANF CCDBG/CCDF Total Combined
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Childcare Assistance −0.267 0.088 −0.075 0.242 −0.046 0.139
(0.237) (0.288) (0.292) (0.270) (0.130) (0.137)
Post-PRWORA (1998) 0.171 0.155 0.152
(0.082) (0.085) (0.085)
Childcare Assistance × 0.900 0.699 0.339 0.121 0.259 0.139
Post-PRWORA (1998) (0.193) (0.263) (0.251) (0.264) (0.112) (0.130)
Individual Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes
Assistance Effect in 1998: 0.804 0.788 0.419 0.363 0.365 0.279
(0.181) (0.163) (0.134) (0.095) (0.104) (0.052)
Number of Daughters 1401 2321 2321 2321 2321 2321
Observations 3146 4767 4767 4767 4767 4767
Notes: Robust standard errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is an indicator
for whether the child’s family used center-based or family home child care, and the sample is restricted to low-income
families with positive earnings below 200 percent of the U.S. Census poverty threshold. The independent variables
of interest are the interactions of indicators by year with the childcare assistance expenditure per child in poverty,
which is defined as TANF direct expenditures in columns (1)-(2), CCDF expenditures including TANF transfers in
columns (3)-(4), and total TANF and CCDF expenditures in columns (5)-(6). All specifications control for state fixed
effects in addition to the child’s age, age squared, sex, race, urban residence status, indicators for number of siblings
and other adults living in the household, indicators for parent’s educational attainment, as well as controls for state
expenditures and policies. Specifically, state-specific measures include spending per child with respect to Head Start,
elementary/secondary education, and total public welfare; state TANF policies regarding school attendance, parental
school involvement, childcare earnings disregards, and whether transitional childcare assistance is limited by earnings or
time; and, CCDF policies regarding copay amounts, the presence of TANF exemptions for copay, family-size adjustments
for copay, whether relatives are authorized to receive payments for in-home care, whether redetermination period is no
longer than 6 months.
much increased impact over the AFDC program, and the CCDF program has a large and
statistically significant impact after PRWORA, as well. Note that the effects of child-
care assistance before and after PRWORA are negatively correlated, which is evident by
comparing the smaller standard errors for the estimated impact in 1998 (for example,
s.e. = 0.052 in column (6), which is smaller than both the childcare estimate and its
interaction with year).
One puzzle going forward is how to evaluate the impact of TANF childcare assistance
considering that (i) participation in TANF is difficult to measure given existing survey
questions and the prevalence of misclassification error; and, (ii) it is also inherently dif-
ficult to measure both the quality of, and intensity of exposure to, child care. As an
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example of some descriptive evidence, Table 3.6 shows the probability that an individual
over age 18 from a low-income, single-mother family graduates high school or attends
any college (by 2015) conditional on TANF participation and child care use during ages
5-12 using data from the year 2000. Without controlling for confounding factors by state
or family, the unconditional means in columns (1) and (2) imply that formal child care
correlates with higher educational attainment for this population. The informal child
care group graduates at a rate of 76 percent compared to about 90 percent for those
using formal care.29 The story on TANF participation is mixed. Participating in TANF
and using formal child care is still better than TANF and informal care, though it is
worse than having neither TANF nor formal care. The fact that TANF children face
unconditionally lower educational attainment is a common result of negative selection
into public assistance. However, the problem of disentangling the effects of selection and
misclassification can be exacerbated by data constraints. If obtaining quality child care is
a function of search time and transportation time, then the effects of childcare assistance
may be diminishing at the lowest end of the income distribution, or particularly, for
families selecting into TANF participation.
3.8 Discussion and Future Work
Conditional on state childcare policies and related expenditure, as well as rich family
controls plus fixed state and year effects, public assistance for child care significantly
influences its target population, low-earning single mothers, toward more formal childcare
arrangements such as center-based or family home care. A prominent effect of 1990s
welfare reform is that these single mothers are working more and substituting their own
29For comparison, among all families above the 200-percent poverty threshold, the high school gradu-
ation rate is about 93 percent, and the rate of any college attendance is about 85 percent.
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Table 3.6. Education Outcomes Conditional on Prior TANF Participation and Child
Care Among Children Ages 5-12 in Low-Income, Single Mother Families in 2000
Sample Means in 2015 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Graduating High School 0.760 0.898 0.625 0.704
(0.429) (0.305) (0.486) (0.459)
Attending Any College 0.620 0.768 0.326 0.592
(0.487) (0.426) (0.470) (0.494)
TANF Participation? No No Yes Yes
Center-Based Child Care? No Yes No Yes
Observations 119 53 149 85
Notes: Sample means are weighted by the individuals PSID core longitudinal weight, and standard deviations are
shown in parentheses. Children are considered low-income in 2000 if family earnings are below 200 percent of the U.S.
Census poverty threshold by family size.
time with children for either formal or informal care arrangements. Given that a large
portion of childcare assistance is funded via block grants to states, there is substantial
heterogeneity in how resources are allocated, which may have implications for the quality
of care options available to economically vulnerable families.
After establishing the potential for childcare assistance expenditure and state policies
as first-stage determinants of family childcare arrangements, a logical next step would
be to use this variation to instrument for endogenous family care choices as they af-
fect educational outcomes for the children. Studies have shown the long-term benefits
of quality child care and education for disadvantaged children, yet there has been no
nationally-representative evidence from non-experimental data demonstrating this effect.
Moreover, I plan to explore potential heterogeneous effects relative to TANF and CCDF
funding, which may be related to diverging program goals across states. Another issue
for children who receive early interventions is that they may subsequently continue along
in an educational system that delivers lower-quality preparation for economic success.
In terms of data availability, the PSID offers rich family characteristics in the CDS and
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TA surveys, though even more specific data on families’ county of residence, local school
quality, and educational outcomes can be obtained in the restricted-use PSID.
An important policy relevance goal of this work is to shed light on the longer-term
implications of some recent trends in childcare assistance. Early on during the welfare
reform era, large shares of expenditures were allocated toward supporting childcare costs
for the working poor. Since then, total spending has declined and the proportion of
spending allocated under TANF has increased. Moreover, the variation over states and
time in the levels of childcare assistance is a byproduct of the block grant funding mech-
anism. Since block grants and work-conditioned welfare loom large in current welfare
debates, more evidence is warranted on how well the most vulnerable families are able to
invest in their children’s development.
147
APPENDIX FOR ESSAY 1
A Notes on Misclassification Bias Corrections
Estimates based on equation (1.1) rely on self-reported data for a daughter’s welfare
participation at time t and her mother’s self-reported participation at any point prior to
time t,
W dist = α + β
′xdist + δW
m
is,∀jt + γR
m
st + θR
m
stW
m
is,∀jt + µ
d
s + ρ
d
t + ν
d
ist,
where Wmis,∀jt = max
{
Wmis,t−1,W
m
is,t−2,W
m
is,t−3, . . .
}
. Let the true participation status be
denoted W˜ dist for daughter at time t, W˜
m
ist for mother at time t, and W˜
m
is,∀jt for mother
at any time prior to time t. In principle, both W dist and W
m
ist can be affected by misclas-
sification error. However, as demonstrated below, Wmis,∀jt does not represent a challenge
for point estimation as long as individuals have some positive probability of truthfully
reporting welfare participation at time t.
To fix ideas, consider for simplicity t = 3 with j ∈ {1, 2} and let the probability of
truthfully reporting participation be defined as q = Pr
(
Wmist = 1
∣∣∣W˜mist = 1) 0. In this
case, the mother’s measure of any prior participation at t = 3 will be accurately reported
with probability
Pr
(
Wmis,∀j3 = 1
∣∣∣W˜mis,∀j3 = 1) = Pr(Wmis1 = 1∣∣∣W˜mis1 = 1)+ Pr(Wmis2 = 1∣∣∣W˜mis2 = 1)
− Pr
(
Wmis1 = 1
∣∣∣W˜mis1 = 1)Pr(Wmis2 = 1∣∣∣W˜mis2 = 1,Wmis1 = 1, W˜mis1 = 1) .
Denoting Pr
(
Wmis2 = 1
∣∣∣W˜mis2 = 1,Wmis1 = 1, W˜mis1 = 1) = r, it follows that
Pr
(
Wmis,∀3 = 1
∣∣∣W˜mis,∀j3 = 1) = q(2− r)q = Pr(Wmis3 = 1∣∣∣W˜mis3 = 1) .
The argument can now be generalized assuming, again for simplicity in exposition, that
q = r. The probability of ever truthfully reporting welfare participation under the above
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conditions can be expressed (based on the inclusion-exclusion principle for the union of
finite events (Billingsley, 1995, pg. 24)) as
Qt(q) ≡ Pr
(
Wmis,∀jt = 1
∣∣∣W˜mis,∀jt = 1) = t−1∑
j=1
(−1)j−1
(
t− 1
j
)
qj,
where
(
t− 1
j
)
=
(t− 1)!
j!(t− 1− j)! ,
which is increasing in the number of time periods observed. For my analysis, the mother’s
minimum number of time periods is five years, and for the average reporting rate for 1970-
2000 (Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan, 2015), the probability is Q5(q = 0.668) ≈ 0.996, or for
the minimum reporting rate over that time period, Q5(q = 0.318) ≈ 0.852. Given that
mothers are observed for about 14 years on average prior to the daughter’s participation
decision, the probability that a mother truthfully reports any prior participation tends
to 1, as shown in Figure A.1.
Therefore, the following bias-correction approach focuses on misclassification in the
binary dependent variable for daughter’s current welfare status. The probability that a
daughter reports participating in welfare can be written as
Pr
(
W dist = 1
)
= Pr
(
W dist = 1
∣∣∣W˜ dist = 1)Pr(W˜ dist = 1)
+ Pr
(
W dist = 1
∣∣∣W˜ dist = 0)Pr(W˜ dist = 0) ,
where false negatives are defined as τ1,ist := Pr
(
W dist = 0
∣∣∣W˜ dist = 1) and false positives
are defined as τ0,ist := Pr
(
W dist = 1
∣∣∣W˜ dist = 0) = 0 by assumption.1 This assumption is
standard in the literature as false positive reports are relatively small, and these mis-
reports typically correspond to individuals who mistake the source or timing of actual
welfare participation.
1Note that whereas q is assumed fixed for the purposes of exposition above, false negatives here can
be shown equivalently as τ1,ist = 1− qist.
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Figure A.1. Mother’s Welfare Participation Reporting Rate for Periods 1, . . . , t
as a Function of the Number of Periods t Observed
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Notes: Average and minimum PSID reporting rates for AFDC/TANF participation are sum-
mary statistics based on estimates from Meyer et al. (2015); see Table A.1. The estimation
sample selects only those mothers observed at least 5 years, t ≥ 5, while the daughter is ages
12-18 and living at home.
Therefore, using equation (1.1) and τ1,ist, the daughter’s probability of reported welfare
participation can be rewritten as
Pr
(
W dist = 1
)
= [1− τ1,ist]
[
α + β′xdist + δW
m
is,∀jt + γR
m
st + θR
m
stW
m
is,∀jt + µ
d
s + ρ
d
t
]
.
Estimation of the previous equation proceeds in two steps. The first step estimates
misclassification probabilities based on estimates of AFDC/TANF reporting rates in the
PSID by Meyer et al. (2015) considering that E [τ1,ist] = τ1t. Table A.1 shows the reporting
rates used in estimation. In the second stage, I estimate the parameter of interest, (δ, γ, θ),
by estimating the model of W dist on weighted independent variables including a weighted
intercept [1− τˆ1t]α, [1− τˆ1t]µds, and [1− τˆ1t] ρdt .
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Table A.1. PSID Reporting Rates Taken as Given
for Misclassification Bias Correction Estimates
AFDC/TANF Food Stamps/SNAP
Meyer et al. (2015) Meyer et al. (2015)
Year Transfers Cases Parameter Transfers Cases Parameter
1975 0.646 0.722 0.779 0.773
1976 0.662 0.740 0.734 0.728
1977 0.630 0.704 0.754 0.748
1978 0.661 0.739 0.772 0.766
1979 0.642 0.717 0.782 0.776
1980 0.700 0.782 0.761 0.782 0.755
1981 0.699 0.781 0.761 0.780 0.755
1982 0.679 0.759 0.832 0.841 0.826
1983 0.708 0.791 0.808 0.817 0.802
1984 0.631 0.705 0.830 0.784 0.824
1985 0.594 0.664 0.817 0.786 0.811
1986 0.587 0.656 0.818 0.841 0.812
1987 0.555 0.620 0.871 0.846 0.864
1988 0.620 0.693 0.862 0.847 0.855
1989 0.576 0.644 0.982 0.845 0.974
1990 0.586 0.655 0.857 0.770 0.850
1991 0.612 0.684 0.756 0.681 0.750
1992 0.600 0.671 0.731 0.720 0.725
1993 0.528 0.605 0.590 0.621 0.700 0.616
1994 0.474 0.569 0.530 0.662 0.686 0.657
1995 0.493 0.539 0.551 0.632 0.652 0.627
1996 0.541 0.572 0.605 0.572 0.604 0.568
1997 0.508 0.509 0.522 0.505
1998 0.369 0.403 0.412 0.563 0.561 0.559
1999 0.387 0.654 0.535 0.649
2000 0.323 0.445 0.361 0.617 0.583 0.612
2001 0.350 0.592 0.573 0.587
2002 0.303 0.343 0.339 0.744 0.595 0.738
2003 0.387 0.458 0.432 0.685 0.719 0.680
2004 0.487 0.510 0.544 0.718 0.807 0.712
2005 0.285 0.285 0.318 0.688 0.635 0.683
2006 0.395 0.365 0.441 0.693 0.758 0.688
2007 0.472 0.742 0.794 0.736
2008 0.450 0.497 0.503 0.777 0.791 0.771
2009 0.486 0.704 0.764 0.699
2010 0.419 0.504 0.468 0.648 0.713 0.643
2011 0.477 0.671
2012 0.473 0.657
Notes: PSID reporting rates for dollar amount in transfers and number of cases for AFDC/TANF and food
stamps/SNAP are estimated in Meyer et al. (2015). The estimation parameter used in misclassification bias correction
estimates, (1− τˆ1t), is the imputed reporting rate. The imputed rate is equal to the reporting rate for transfers in the
first column adjusted by the average ratio of the reporting rates for transfers and cases given the years with available
data, which is approximately 1.118 for AFDC/TANF and 0.992 for food stamps/SNAP. In years where both rates for
amounts and cases are missing, I linearly interpolate between observed years and use a two-year moving average for the
last years.
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B Additional Results and Robustness Checks
As referenced throughout the paper, the following section introduces additional results
that explore the sensitivity of the main findings. The qualitative results of welfare reform
are consistent: there is a causal influence from mother’s welfare participation, and reform
attenuates this transmission by more than 50 percent in levels and about 30 percent
above baseline probabilities given the mechanical change in participation after reform.
Figure B.1 demonstrates the relationship between mother’s welfare participation and
the main policy instrument of AFDC/TANF benefit generosity. Table B.1 shows the
first stage results for the mother’s AFDC/TANF participation decision for instrumental
variable estimates in Table 1.2. In Table B.2, I compare estimates for different sets of
instrumental variables, which are key to identifying the effect of mother’s participation
given her selection into welfare. Then, in Table B.3 I re-estimate the baseline IV model
including mother’s variables related to her lifetime earnings ability: an indicator for less
than high school education and an indicator for any prior family income below 200 per-
cent of the Census poverty threshold by family size. Next in Table B.4, I re-estimate the
baseline specifications from Table 1.2 without using the daughter’s PSID core longitudi-
nal survey weights, first for the full baseline sample including the Survey of Economic
Opportunity (SEO), which oversamples low-income, minority families, and then for only
the Survey Research Center (SRC) subsample, which is nationally representative. In
Table B.5 I re-estimate the baseline results in Table 1.2 for a sample of eldest daughters
only. Eldest daughters have the most opportunity to continue learning from their moth-
ers’ participation after leaving home since there may still be younger siblings living with
the mother, and this sample abstracts away from larger families being overrepresented in
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the data. Table B.6 estimates the intergenerational transmission of welfare participation
for the subsample of daughters whose mothers were more likely to participate based on
lifetime education and family income. In Table B.7, I present a falsification exercise in-
cluding a mother’s future welfare participation. Lastly, in Table B.8 I present estimates
of the baseline IV models imposing different levels of minimum years required for mother
and daughter to be observed living together before the daughter forms her own family.
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Figure B.1. Mother’s Welfare Participation
Relative to AFDC/TANF Benefit Levels
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Notes: Linear probability estimates are shown for the mother’s indicator for any prior
AFDC/TANF participation conditional on an average measure of AFDC/TANF benefit stan-
dard while the daughter is aged 12-18 along with the baseline controls of state and year effects
as well as the daughter’s quadratic in age and indicators for her number of children. The pre-
dicted probabilities are estimated for subsamples by the mother’s ratio of mean family income,
Y¯ , relative to the mean Federal Poverty Line (FPL) across all observation years. Dashed lines
represent 95 percent pointwise confidence intervals with state-level clustering.
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Table B.1. First Stage Instrumental Variable Estimates for
Mother’s AFDC/TANF Participation Decision
Second Stage Dependent Variable: Daughter’s Daughter’s
AFDC/TANF AFDC/TANF, SNAP, SSI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Avg. AFDC/TANF 0.548 0.532 0.741 0.733
(0.087) (0.096) (0.081) (0.082)
Reform × Avg. AFDC/TANF 0.199 0.231 0.263 0.281
(0.122) (0.114) (0.108) (0.104)
Max. AFDC/TANF −0.385 −0.385 −0.637 −0.633
(0.117) (0.114) (0.101) (0.099)
Reform × Max. AFDC/TANF −0.137 −0.170 −0.162 −0.179
(0.108) (0.104) (0.108) (0.106)
Avg. EITC 0.058 0.039 0.082 0.075
(0.040) (0.038) (0.051) (0.051)
Reform × Avg. EITC −0.030 −0.018 −0.035 −0.030
(0.046) (0.041) (0.053) (0.053)
Max. EITC −0.030 −0.023 −0.058 −0.055
(0.030) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029)
Reform × Max. EITC 0.023 0.015 0.018 0.014
(0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031)
Misclassification Correction No Yes No Yes
F Test of Excluded Instruments 10.200 9.337 10.200 9.539
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak IV Test Statistic 23.092 21.083 23.092 21.739
p-value 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.003
Hansen J Statistic 2.370 2.069 9.970 9.792
p-value 0.883 0.913 0.126 0.134
Number of Daughters 2961 2961 2961 2961
Observations 56068 56068 56068 56068
Notes: Robust standard errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. All specifications control for state
and year effects in addition to time-varying controls for daughter’s age, age squared, and indicators for number of
children equal to 1, 2, 3, or at least 4. Instrumental variables include average and maximum measures of the mother’s
AFDC/TANF benefit standard and federal/state EITC maximum credit by family size, which are defined over the
daughter’s critical exposure ages 12-18, and interactions of each with an indicator for welfare reform. The weak IV test
statistic is a Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank statistic. Daughters’ PSID core longitudinal weights are used in estimation.
Abbreviations: Food Stamps/Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and Supplemental Security Income
(SSI).
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Table B.2. Intergenerational Transmission of AFDC/TANF Participation
with Alternative Instrumental Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mother’s Participation 0.281 0.316 0.330 0.332 0.297 0.313
(0.056) (0.055) (0.057) (0.079) (0.065) (0.067)
After Welfare Reform 0.072 0.081 0.087 0.085 0.077 0.080
(0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.030) (0.025) (0.026)
Mother’s Participation × −0.197 −0.221 −0.241 −0.239 −0.214 −0.224
After Welfare Reform (0.050) (0.048) (0.046) (0.069) (0.055) (0.056)
Instrumental Variables:
AFDC/TANF X X X X X X
EITC X X X X X X
AFDC/TANF Application Denial Rate X X
Unemployment Rate X
AFDC/TANF Procedural Denial Rate X X
AFDC/TANF Favorable Claims Rate X
Weak IV Test Statistic 23.092 25.068 29.108 19.636 23.259 24.449
p-value 0.002 0.009 0.016 0.006 0.016 0.058
Hansen J Statistic 2.370 12.196 13.015 1.682 5.740 16.434
p-value 0.883 0.272 0.525 0.947 0.837 0.288
Percent Change in Levels -70% -70% -73% -72% -72% -72%
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Percent Change over Baseline -48% -47% -53% -43% -43% -42%
p-value 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.098 0.071 0.062
Number of Daughters 2961 2961 2961 1422 1422 1422
Observations 56068 56068 56068 32988 32988 32988
Notes: Robust standard errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. All specifications control for state and
year effects in addition to time-varying controls for daughter’s age, age squared, and indicators for number of children
equal to 1, 2, 3, or at least 4. Instrumental variables vary by column and include average and maximum [or minimum
for denial rates] measures of indicated variables, which are defined over the daughter’s critical exposure ages 12-18, and
interactions of each with an indicator for welfare reform. The weak IV test statistic is a Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank
statistic. Daughters’ PSID core longitudinal weights are used in estimation.
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Table B.3. IV Estimates of the Intergenerational Transmission of AFDC/TANF
Participation with Controls for Mother’s Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mother’s Participation 0.284 0.320 0.325 0.435 0.498 0.514
(0.059) (0.078) (0.081) (0.098) (0.148) (0.155)
After Welfare Reform 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.086 0.088 0.087
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Mother’s Participation × −0.195 −0.206 −0.205 −0.228 −0.248 −0.246
After Welfare Reform (0.050) (0.052) (0.052) (0.079) (0.085) (0.085)
Misclassification Correction No No No Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s Characteristics:
Less than High School Education X X X X
Ever Below 200% Poverty X X X X
Weak IV Test Statistic 21.826 17.134 16.483 19.923 14.095 13.295
p-value 0.003 0.017 0.021 0.006 0.050 0.065
Hansen J Statistic 2.256 3.066 2.960 1.901 2.553 2.409
p-value 0.895 0.800 0.814 0.929 0.862 0.878
Percent Change in Levels -69% -64% -63% -52% -50% -48%
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Percent Change over Baseline -45% -37% -35% -34% -30% -28%
p-value 0.006 0.067 0.081 0.042 0.089 0.111
Number of Daughters 2946 2946 2946 2946 2946 2946
Observations 55946 55946 55946 55946 55946 55946
Notes: Robust standard errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. All specifications control for state
and year effects in addition to time-varying controls for daughter’s age, age squared, and indicators for number of
children equal to 1, 2, 3, or at least 4. Instrumental variables include average and maximum measures of the mother’s
AFDC/TANF benefit standard and federal/state EITC maximum credit by family size, which are defined over the
daughter’s critical exposure ages 12-18, and interactions of each with an indicator for welfare reform. The weak IV test
statistic is a Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank statistic. The misclassification correction uses reporting rates in the PSID to
address potential misreporting for the daughter’s welfare participation (see Appendix A for details). Daughters’ PSID
core longitudinal weights are used in estimation.
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Table B.4. Intergenerational Transmission of AFDC/TANF Participation Estimated
without PSID Sample Weights
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Full Sample
Mother’s Participation 0.202 0.391 0.312 0.606
(0.017) (0.061) (0.023) (0.098)
After Welfare Reform 0.077 0.150 0.088 0.179
(0.010) (0.036) (0.018) (0.053)
Mother’s Participation × −0.158 −0.278 −0.202 −0.344
After Welfare Reform (0.017) (0.058) (0.031) (0.092)
Instrumental Variables No Yes No Yes
Misclassification Correction No No Yes Yes
Weak IV Test Statistic 21.100 21.184
p-value 0.004 0.004
Hansen J Statistic 8.222 6.932
p-value 0.222 0.327
Percent Change in Levels -78% -71% -65% -57%
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Percent Change over Baseline -55% -40% -45% -32%
p-value 0.000 0.008 0.001 0.024
Number of Daughters 2961 2961 2961 2961
Observations 56068 56068 56068 56068
B. Survey Research Center (SRC) Sample Only
Mother’s Participation 0.115 0.212 0.182 0.275
(0.021) (0.067) (0.034) (0.106)
After Welfare Reform 0.030 0.054 0.043 0.063
(0.010) (0.022) (0.018) (0.034)
Mother’s Participation × −0.089 −0.181 −0.121 −0.194
After Welfare Reform (0.022) (0.067) (0.039) (0.108)
Instrumental Variables No Yes No Yes
Misclassification Correction No No Yes Yes
Weak IV Test Statistic 19.330 16.900
p-value 0.007 0.018
Hansen J Statistic 6.711 6.519
p-value 0.348 0.368
Percent Change in Levels -78% -85% -67% -71%
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Percent Change over Baseline -55% -71% -49% -55%
p-value 0.001 0.016 0.008 0.104
Number of Daughters 1422 1422 1422 1422
Observations 28917 28917 28917 28917
Notes: Robust standard errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. All specifications control for state
and year effects in addition to time-varying controls for daughter’s age, age squared, and indicators for number of
children equal to 1, 2, 3, or at least 4. Instrumental variables include average and maximum measures of the mother’s
AFDC/TANF benefit standard and federal/state EITC maximum credit by family size, which are defined over the
daughter’s critical exposure ages 12-18, and interactions of each with an indicator for welfare reform. The weak IV test
statistic is a Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank statistic. The misclassification correction uses reporting rates in the PSID to
address potential misreporting for the daughter’s welfare participation (see Appendix A for details).
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Table B.5. Intergenerational Transmission of AFDC/TANF
Participation for the Subsample of Eldest Daughters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mother’s Participation 0.137 0.259 0.219 0.371
(0.014) (0.087) (0.022) (0.149)
After Welfare Reform 0.031 0.058 0.037 0.058
(0.007) (0.025) (0.013) (0.040)
Mother’s Participation × −0.100 −0.176 −0.135 −0.183
After Welfare Reform (0.017) (0.070) (0.030) (0.119)
Instrumental Variables No Yes No Yes
Misclassification Correction No No Yes Yes
Weak IV Test Statistic 20.956 18.285
p-value 0.004 0.011
Hansen J Statistic 3.237 3.010
p-value 0.779 0.808
Percent Change in Levels -73% -68% -62% -49%
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.021
Percent Change over Baseline -52% -43% -47% -29%
p-value 0.000 0.096 0.001 0.336
Number of Daughters 1914 1914 1914 1914
Observations 36288 36288 36288 36288
Notes: Robust standard errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. All specifications control for state
and year effects in addition to time-varying controls for daughter’s age, age squared, and indicators for number of
children equal to 1, 2, 3, or at least 4. Instrumental variables include average and maximum measures of the mother’s
AFDC/TANF benefit standard and federal/state EITC maximum credit by family size, which are defined over the
daughter’s critical exposure ages 12-18, and interactions of each with an indicator for welfare reform. The weak IV test
statistic is a Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank statistic. The misclassification correction uses reporting rates in the PSID to
address potential misreporting for the daughter’s welfare participation (see Appendix A for details). Daughters’ PSID
core longitudinal weights are used in estimation.
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Table B.6. IV Estimates of Intergenerational Transmission of
Mother’s AFDC/TANF Participation by Relevant Subsample
Daughter’s Outcome: AFDC/TANF AFDC/TANF, SNAP, SSI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mother’s Participation 0.219 0.258 0.351 0.344 0.207 0.246 0.362 0.303
(0.053) (0.047) (0.074) (0.061) (0.072) (0.070) (0.096) (0.070)
After Welfare Reform 0.069 0.071 0.153 0.117 −0.004 −0.020 0.051 −0.009
(0.019) (0.020) (0.038) (0.030) (0.041) (0.032) (0.051) (0.040)
Mother’s Participation× −0.185 −0.195 −0.261 −0.254 0.038 0.061 −0.075 0.010
After Welfare Reform (0.048) (0.049) (0.058) (0.053) (0.098) (0.085) (0.084) (0.080)
Subsample by Mother: Education Education Ever below Ever below Education Education Ever below Ever below
9 years ≤ 12 years 130% FPL 200% FPL 9 years ≤ 12 years 130% FPL 200% FPL
Weak IV Test Statistic 23.305 21.932 20.521 21.828 23.305 21.932 20.521 21.828
p-value 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.003
Hansen J Statistic 2.304 1.690 3.240 1.709 12.036 11.423 5.747 5.979
p-value 0.890 0.946 0.778 0.944 0.061 0.076 0.452 0.426
Percent Change in Levels -84% -75% -74% -74% 18% 25% -21% 3%
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.725 0.536 0.268 0.898
Percent Change over Baseline -67% -57% -55% -54% 30% 31% -16% 9%
p-value 0.006 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.600 0.460 0.424 0.745
Number of Daughters 1328 2507 2213 2634 1328 2507 2213 2634
Observations 30168 49918 40997 49266 30168 49918 40997 49266
Notes: Robust standard errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. All specifications control for state
and year effects in addition to time-varying controls for daughter’s age, age squared, and indicators for number of
children equal to 1, 2, 3, or at least 4. Instrumental variables include average and maximum measures of the mother’s
AFDC/TANF benefit standard and federal/state EITC maximum credit by family size, which are defined over the
daughter’s critical exposure ages 12-18, and interactions of each with an indicator for welfare reform. The weak IV test
statistic is a Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank statistic. The misclassification correction uses reporting rates in the PSID to
address potential misreporting for the daughter’s welfare participation (see Appendix A for details). Daughters’ PSID
core longitudinal weights are used in estimation.
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Table B.7. Intergenerational Transmission of Mother’s AFDC/TANF
Participation Controlling for Mother’s Future Welfare Participation
Daughter’s Outcome: AFDC/TANF AFDC/TANF, SNAP, SSI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mother’s Prior Participation 0.182 0.267 0.139 0.316 0.225 0.267 0.179 0.387
(0.024) (0.085) (0.023) (0.101) (0.028) (0.087) (0.027) (0.094)
After Welfare Reform 0.024 0.038 0.016 0.052 0.004 0.007 −0.004 0.032
(0.012) (0.019) (0.012) (0.027) (0.015) (0.023) (0.015) (0.033)
Mother’s Prior Participation × −0.111 −0.167 −0.090 −0.223 −0.066 −0.076 −0.040 −0.098
After Welfare Reform (0.031) (0.077) (0.027) (0.095) (0.032) (0.078) (0.033) (0.102)
Mother’s Future Participation 0.013 0.483 −0.007 0.896
(0.023) (0.579) (0.035) (0.732)
Mother’s Future Participation × −0.025 −1.030 −0.030 −1.424
After Welfare Reform (0.026) (0.740) (0.042) (0.934)
Mother’s Prior Participation × 0.250 −0.490 0.281 −0.996
Future Participation (0.063) (0.810) (0.072) (1.030)
Mother’s Prior × Future × −0.029 1.312 −0.060 1.540
After Welfare Reform (0.063) (0.992) (0.079) (1.260)
Instrumental Variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Weak IV Test Statistic 12.565 18.900 12.565 18.900
p-value 0.083 0.463 0.083 0.463
Hansen J Statistic 5.106 19.109 4.959 15.920
p-value 0.530 0.385 0.549 0.598
Percent Change in Levels -61% -62% -65% -71% -29% -29% -22% -25%
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.203 0.183 0.255
Percent Change over Baseline -31% -34% -38% -49% -3% -2% 6% 2%
p-value 0.178 0.168 0.122 0.091 0.862 0.940 0.783 0.948
Number of Daughters 1665 1665 1665 1665 1665 1665 1665 1665
Observations 15034 15034 15034 15034 15034 15034 15034 15034
Notes: Robust standard errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. All specifications control for state and
year effects in addition to time-varying controls for daughter’s age, age squared, and indicators for number of children
equal to 1, 2, 3, or at least 4. Instrumental variables include average and maximum measures of the mother’s prior
and future AFDC/TANF benefit standard and federal/state EITC maximum credit by family size, interactions of each
variable’s prior and future measure, and interactions of each with an indicator for welfare reform. Mother’s future
participation and instrumental variables are measured over years t+5 to t+11, which is arbitrarily distant from time t
with an equivalent window size to prior instrument measures over the critical exposure period for daughter’s ages 12-18.
The weak IV test statistic is a Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank statistic. Daughters’ PSID core longitudinal weights are
used in estimation.
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Table B.8. IV Estimates of the Intergenerational Transmission of AFDC/TANF
Participation by Minimum Number of Mother-Daughter Family Observations, NF
NF ≥ 5 NF ≥ 10 NF ≥ 15
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mother’s Participation 0.281 0.428 0.328 0.541 0.281 0.462
(0.056) (0.093) (0.071) (0.115) (0.064) (0.111)
After Welfare Reform 0.072 0.087 0.094 0.129 0.087 0.117
(0.022) (0.033) (0.027) (0.041) (0.027) (0.045)
Mother’s Participation × −0.197 −0.234 −0.253 −0.355 −0.195 −0.257
After Welfare Reform (0.050) (0.081) (0.066) (0.107) (0.059) (0.105)
Misclassification Correction No Yes No Yes No Yes
Weak IV Test Statistic 23.092 21.083 23.234 22.099 16.942 17.735
p-value 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.018 0.013
Hansen J Statistic 2.370 2.069 5.138 5.164 4.515 5.040
p-value 0.883 0.913 0.526 0.523 0.607 0.539
Percent Change in Levels -70% -55% -77% -66% -69% -56%
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Percent Change over Baseline -48% -37% -60% -52% -53% -43%
p-value 0.004 0.031 0.007 0.018 0.009 0.040
Number of Daughters 2961 2961 2466 2466 1806 1806
Observations 56068 56068 43733 43733 28903 28903
Notes: The minimum number of mother-daughter family observations, denoted NF, represents years when the mother
is observed living with the daughter before her daughter has formed her own family unit (the minimum restriction
throughout the rest of the paper is NF=5). Robust standard errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. All
specifications control for state and year effects in addition to time-varying controls for daughter’s age, age squared, and
indicators for number of children equal to 1, 2, 3, or at least 4. Instrumental variables include average and maximum
measures of the mother’s AFDC/TANF benefit standard and federal/state EITC maximum credit by family size, which
are defined over the daughter’s critical exposure ages 12-18, and interactions of each with an indicator for welfare reform.
The weak IV test statistic is a Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank statistic. The misclassification correction uses reporting
rates in the PSID to address potential misreporting for the daughter’s welfare participation (see Appendix A for details).
Daughters’ PSID core longitudinal weights are used in estimation.
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APPENDIX FOR ESSAY 2
C Experimental Sample
This section presents additional descriptive statistics of the experimental sample used
in our investigation. To complement the evidence presented in Section 2.4, Table C.1
presents evidence by participant type.
D Technical Appendix
D.1 Tuning Parameter
In the empirical analysis of Section 2.5.2, we estimate the restricted case by setting λ0 = 1
for the control group and λ1 = 0.01 for Jobs First participants. This restriction imposes
values of λ that would directly correspond to model assumptions of individual effects
relevant only to the treatment group who are welfare-eligible at higher earnings (and
presumably higher hours of labor supply). In this case, the choice of λ1 = 0.01 is small
enough to allow individual effects that can have a “fixed” effects interpretation for the
treatment group, and for the control group, λ0 = 1 is set to the standard condition
that the variance of αi is equal to the variance of uit (Koenker, 2005, pg. 281). For the
unrestricted case, λ is determined using a data-driven approach to be approximately 0.718
for the earnings dependent variable and 0.673 for total income. Under the assumption
that αi and Di0 are independent, which holds here by experimental design, the tuning
parameter λ is estimated to minimize the variance of the QTE estimator (Lamarche,
2010). Under further assumptions, λ is equal to the ratio σu/σα which can be easily
estimated by random effects or maximum likelihood methods. Apart from choosing the
tuning parameter according to standard values in the literature (as in the restricted
case) or by optimizing some objective function (as in the minimum variance estimator
163
Table C.1. Descriptive Statistics by Participant Type: Applicants and Recipients
Levels Differences
Variables Recipients Applicants Unadjusted Adjusted N
Newhaven County (urban) 0.794 0.695 0.099∗ 0.097∗ 4803
(0.404) (0.460) (0.013) (0.013)
Never married 0.655 0.584 0.072∗ 0.072∗ 4803
(0.475) (0.493) (0.014) (0.015)
HS dropout 0.350 0.278 0.072∗ 0.072∗ 4803
(0.477) (0.448) (0.014) (0.014)
More than two children 0.266 0.140 0.125∗ 0.124∗ 4803
(0.442) (0.348) (0.011) (0.013)
Mother younger than 25 0.237 0.380 −0.144∗ −0.147∗ 4803
(0.425) (0.486) (0.014) (0.013)
Mother older than 34 0.323 0.247 0.075∗ 0.075∗ 4803
(0.468) (0.432) (0.013) (0.013)
Currently working ≥ 30 hours 0.253 0.351 −0.098∗ −0.092∗ 989
(0.435) (0.478) (0.030) (0.029)
Hourly wage 6.392 7.120 −0.728∗ −0.700∗ 973
(2.224) (2.628) (0.160) (0.165)
Public or subsidized housing 0.451 0.191 0.260∗ 0.260∗ 4520
(0.498) (0.393) (0.013) (0.015)
Ever on AFDC as a child 0.264 0.235 0.030∗ 0.031∗ 4491
(0.441) (0.424) (0.013) (0.013)
Ever received AFDC at prior quarter 7 0.758 0.196 0.562∗ 0.562∗ 4803
(0.428) (0.397) (0.012) (0.015)
Length in months of 1st AFDC spell 17.705 13.435 4.269∗ 4.127∗ 3607
(10.332) (9.980) (0.345) (0.362)
Number of AFDC spells 1.243 1.122 0.121∗ 0.115∗ 4803
(0.595) (0.689) (0.019) (0.020)
Long-term recipient (2 years) 0.730 0.302 0.428∗ 0.429∗ 4706
(0.444) (0.459) (0.014) (0.014)
Pre-Treatment Quarters
Average quarterly earnings 413.937 1227.859 −813.922∗ −813.649∗ 4803
(1041.982) (1771.295) (45.170) (43.484)
Average quarterly cash welfare 1290.907 197.443 1093.464∗ 1095.108∗ 4803
(659.755) (462.488) (16.208) (25.845)
Fraction of quarters with earnings 0.259 0.456 −0.197∗ −0.199∗ 4803
(0.323) (0.399) (0.011) (0.011)
Fraction of quarters with cash welfare 0.827 0.142 0.684∗ 0.685∗ 4803
(0.309) (0.296) (0.009) (0.014)
Experimental Quarters 1-7
Average quarterly earnings 1014.784 1375.760 −360.976∗ −351.282∗ 4803
(1498.970) (1781.270) (49.562) (53.643)
Average quarterly cash welfare 1130.330 761.419 368.911∗ 360.858∗ 4803
(607.787) (617.241) (18.139) (20.269)
Fraction of quarters with earnings 0.466 0.505 −0.039∗ −0.044∗ 4803
(0.398) (0.396) (0.012) (0.011)
Fraction of quarters with cash welfare 0.788 0.573 0.215∗ 0.211∗ 4803
(0.319) (0.393) (0.011) (0.011)
Notes: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses, and ∗ denotes statistically significant differences at the 10-
percent level.
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in the unrestricted case), another selection criterion could be to follow a grid search over
plausible values of λ. This is essentially similar to our robustness results shown for the
tuning parameter selection as explored graphically in Figure 2.8.
D.2 Standard Errors
We propose to use the bootstrap for inference about ∆ˆ(τ, λ). In what follows, for nota-
tional simplicity, we suppress the dependence of the QTE estimator on τ and λ. Given
the different estimators used in this study, the bootstrap appears to have an advantage
over the estimation of the covariance matrices of the limiting process (NT )−1/2(∆ˆ−∆).
In order to directly compare QTEs with previous estimates, we follow the block bootstrap
method used in the panel quantile literature as well as in Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes
(2006). We proceed by drawing a sample with replacement of N subjects including their
T observations. Using these new pairs (Y∗i ,D
∗
i ,x
∗
i ), we recalculate inverse-propensity
weights based on x∗i in each bootstrap sample, and then obtain ∆
∗ as the argument that
minimizes the objective function. We reiterate this procedure B times to obtain a large
sample of realizations {∆∗b}Bb=1. For a given quantile, we can obtain an estimate of the
variance of ∆ˆ(τ) as the sample variance of {∆∗b}Bb=1. Moreover, a 100(1 − 2q)% confi-
dence interval can be obtained by constructing the qth quantile and (1 − q)th quantile
of {∆∗b}Bb=1. This pair bootstrap procedure is applied to compute the estimator standard
errors based on B = 1000 replications.
D.3 Hypothesis Testing
To evaluate significance of differences across quantiles, it is possible to employ the Hausman-
type statistic proposed in Harding and Lamarche (2014) or a Wald-type statistic (Koenker,
2005). We consider testing a basic general linear hypothesis on a vector ξ of the form
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H0 : Rξ = r, where R is a matrix that depends on the type of restrictions imposed. For
instance, one might evaluate the null hypothesis of equality of effects across quantiles
considering a vector ξ = (∆(τ1), . . . ,∆(τJ))
′. More importantly, in Section 2.5.5 we test
for an exogeneity condition of the treatment variable and the independent variables using
the Hausman-type test for the null hypothesis that ∆ (τj) in equation (2.1) is equal to
∆ (τj) in equation (2.2) for j = 1, . . . , J .
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APPENDIX FOR ESSAY 3
E Economics of Childcare Subsidization
Morgan (1986) introduced the notion of a childcare trilemma, a set of interrelated prob-
lems that complicate parental work and family decisions: quality, accessibility, and af-
fordability.2 The main avenues for intervention related to these problems are regulation,
information, and price subsidies. Through government regulation or private accredita-
tion, childcare standards can be established for education, health, and safety, though
these may prove to be weak floors for quality child investments, and measurement of
quality is imperfect. Public or nonprofit agencies can support clearinghouses of childcare
information to improve families’ ability to match their children with higher quality pro-
grams. And lastly, the cost of child care can be subsidized, potentially in coordination
with regulatory constraints.
Blau (2003) points out that price subsidies may have ambiguous effects on childcare
quality demanded. As an example, Blau defines the price of child care as p = α + βq
where q is the quality of child care demanded. An unconditional childcare subsidy would
lower α and have a larger effect on increasing labor supply than a quality-conditioned
subsidy on β. In practice, subsidies may set quality thresholds through eligible provider
policies or reimbursement rates that differ by provider type, which would be similar to
subsidizing β and more effective at improving quality than an unconditional subsidy.
However, subsidizing either α or β would have unknown effects on quality demanded
2Morgan’s trilemma was explicitly stated as quality, staff compensation, and parent affordability,
though the term accessibility might summarize her broader themes of informational constraints, problems
of “invisible” supply, and what to do with sick children. There remains an implicit tradeoff that finding
an accessible supply that satisfies quality and affordability places an strain on staff compensation absent
cost subsidies.
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given the trade offs between a family’s choice of quantity demanded as well as the relative
quality of parental care (see also Blau and Currie, 2006; Blau and Hagy, 1998). For single
mothers—especially those with lower education—center-based child care has been shown
to improve children’s cognitive development relative to the more common use of informal
care among this demographic (Bernal and Keane, 2011).
F Data Appendix
Additional details and notes on data sources:
1. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Financial Data by Fiscal Year, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/programs/tanf/data-reports.
2. TANF expenditures are given in thousands of nominal dollars and include all federal and
state spending by category. Note that some years may be negative in cases where states
make adjustments for previous years.
3. Aid to Families with Dependent Children/Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(AFDC/TANF) Caseload Data by Fiscal Year, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Administration for Children and Families,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/programs/tanf/data-reports.
4. Number of TANF child recipients for the United States in years 1998 and 1999 are inter-
polated based on the ratio of children to cases in the years just before and after.
5. Number of children in active TANF cases receiving subsidized child care is an imputed
estimate based on the number of subsidized childcare cases in that year and the ratio of
children to cases in the same year.
6. Number of AFDC children receiving subsidized childcare assistance in years 1969-1975 are
taken from NCSS Report E-4 [HE17.609] “Child Care Arrangements of AFDC Recipients
Under the Work Incentive Program as of the Last Day of the Quarter ended September
31, [YEAR]”.
7. Table 7-4. Historical Trends in AFDC/TANF Enrollments, Fiscal Years 1970-99, Percent
of all children who are on AFDC/TANF (pg. 376), Background Material and Data on
Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means, 2000.
8. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Active Cases - Percent Distribution of
TANF Families Receiving Assistance [Subsidized Child Care; federal, state/local], Char-
acteristics and Financial Circumstances of TANF Recipients [Table I-11 2000; Table 10:13
2001-2003; Table 13 2004-2012; Table 11 2013-2014], U.S. Department of Health and Hu-
man Services, Administration for Children and Families,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/programs/tanf/data-reports.
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9. State Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Maintenance of Effort (MOE)
Annual Reports, 2005 and 2010, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Ad-
ministration for Children and Families,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/programs/tanf/data-reports.
10. TANF MOE program data are organized by State program, with potentially more than
one program of a given type per state. Expenditure is given in thousands of nominal
dollars and cases are in thousands.
11. Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) State Expenditure Data [1999-2014], U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children & Families,
Office of Child Care, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/occ/resource/ccdf-expenditure-
data-all-years.
12. Table 9-28. Total Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) and Predecessor Program
Expenditures, by State, Fiscal Years 1992-98 (in thousands of dollars), Background Mate-
rial and Data on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means,
2000 (pg. 625).
13. Table 17. State Allocations under the Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG
[CCDF]), 1991-93 (by fiscal years; in thousands of dollars), Background Material and Data
on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means, 1993 (pg.
1013).
14. Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) Program Annual Reports, 2010-2014, U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Office of
Community Services, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ocs/programs/ssbg.
15. Table 1. Title XX Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) Funding Levels (in thousands of
dollars), Fiscal Years 1977-2011, Background Material and Data on Programs within the
Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means: 1998 (Table 10-1, pg. 714); 2012
(Table 10-1, pg. 483-484).
16. Table 2. Title XX Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) Allocations by State and Terri-
tory, Fiscal Years 1996-2012 (in thousands of dollars), Background Material and Data on
Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means: 1982 (Table 1,
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G TANF Categorical Expenditure Allocations Over Time
In order to emphasize the differences in TANF expenditures by category over time, Table
G.1 gives an overview of U.S. spending in 1997, 2000, 2005, and 2010. Then, the following
set of plots contained in Figure G.1 offers a more detailed breakdown of the U.S. aggregate
allocations of TANF block grant funds by states from 1997-2014. For reference, the total
U.S. spending by TANF category is shown in Table 3.12. While it may be difficult to
easily identify every spending category, note that the main categories relevant to this
study are as follows. Cash assistance is at the top in blue and all childcare-related
expenditures and transfers are in some shade of gold (light for “assistance”, medium
for “nonassistance”, and dark gold for CCDF transfers). Another prominent category,
especially in some states, is “Other Nonassistance”, which is shown in a light gray.
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Table G.1. TANF Expenditure by Category in Millions of 2014 Dollars, Select Years
1997 2000 2005 2010
Assistance 19,555 16,052 14,206 13,062
Basic Assistance 18,488 14,246 12,508 11,406
Child Care 1,055 -24 609 606
Transportation And Supportive Services 12 683 398 368
Assistance Under Prior Law 0 1,147 690 682
Non-Assistance 5,726 15,523 15,588 22,391
Work Related Activities/ Expenses 952 3,187 2,524 3,520
Child Care 29 4,507 3,114 3,732
Transportation 0 161 211 222
Individual Development Accounts 0 3 4 3
Refundable Earned Income Tax Credits 0 780 1,030 2,351
Other Refundable Tax Credits 0 98 282 585
Non-Recurrent Short-Term Benefits 0 187 311 1,160
Prevention of Out-of-Wedlock Pregnancies 0 137 776 2,071
Two-Parent Family Formation and Maintenance 0 225 203 313
Administration 2,111 2,889 2,445 2,378
Systems 270 427 323 273
Non-Assistance Under Prior Law 0 414 1,101 1,130
Other Non-Assistance 2,365 2,508 3,263 4,652
Transfer 789 4,471 3,331 2,764
Child Care And Development Fund 313 3,075 2,256 1,463
Social Services Block Grant 476 1,397 1,074 1,301
Total Expenditure 26,070 36,047 33,124 38,218
Notes: Author’s tabulations from USDHHS financial reports. Total expenditures represent all federal and state
expenditure (including separate state programs) for the 50 states and District of Columbia.
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Figure G.1. TANF Category Expenditures by Percent of Total, 1997-2014
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Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; author’s tabulations.
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Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; author’s tabulations.
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Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; author’s tabulations.
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